One of the essential characteristics of the religion of Islam is its insistence that the sovereignty of Allah, the Most High, requires that the State and all its institutions submit to Allah’s laws. If Allah, the Most High, is Sovereign, then Parliament, for example, cannot be sovereign. The Sovereignty of Allah, the Most High, implies the supremacy of the religion of Islam and, in particular, the sacred law or Sharî‘ah. That supremacy of Islam over the State, and over public life, was symbolized by the institution of the Khalîfate. Even when the office of the Khalîfate had been transformed into dynastic monarchy, the Khalîfate still performed that symbolic role of supreme strategic importance.
European civilization, on the other hand, experienced a conflict between religion and the State which resulted in the secularization of politics. The final chapter of the conflict, which sealed the fate of religion in Europe, and brought an essentially godless civilization into being, was the French and Bolshevik Revolutions. The sphere of religion was reduced to individual and group worship, and the Pope and Euro-Christianity were excluded as actors in the conduct of State. Allah, the Most High, was no longer recognized to be Sovereign (al-Akbar). Instead it was the people who now recognized themselves as sovereign, and they vested that sovereignty in the new secular model of a State. The State was ‘al-Akbar’. Islam, the religion, recognized such an act to be shirk, the greatest of all sins, and the one sin which Allah, the Most High, will never forgive!
Godless European civilization embarked upon an unholy crusade to transform the entire world, and to remold it after the new European model of the secular State and godless society. The rest of the world was colonized or had its essential freedom taken away. It was then secularized, and is fast being reduced to a godless society. This included the world of Islam. In fact the world of Islam was the special target of godless European civilization. The process of reducing the world of Islam to a godless society commenced with the secularization of public life. The Ottoman Islamic Empire was targeted. It had to be destroyed. It could not be destroyed so long as the Khalîfate remained a powerful institution of the sacred model of society which recognized the sovereignty of Allah, the Most High. And so the Khalîfate had to be destroyed.
The destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which was effected in the first world war, resulted in the emergence of the secular State of Turkey. The government was constituted of secularized westernized Turkish nationalists who worked hand-in-glove with an under-ground Jewish movement. They first reduced the now powerless Khalîfate to an office which resembled that of the Pope, and then they abolished it. But the secularization process in the world of Islam was sealed when the Hijâz, under the rule of ‘Abdul ‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, also joined Mustafa. Kamal (Ataturk) in the rejection of the supremacy of Islam over the State. And so Arabia, the heartland of Islam, also embraced the secular model of a State. The birth of the State of Saudi Arabia coincided with the destruction of the Dâr al-Islâm which had been established by Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah, the Most High, be upon him) and from that point onward the Haramayn and Hijâz fell into the control of forces which would stop at nothing to obstruct the re-emergence of the Khalîfate and the restoration of authenticity to the collective life of the Ummah.
So long as the Hijâz remained Dâr al-Islâm, every Muslim was guaranteed by the Sharî‘ah the right of entry into that territory. He did not need a visa. There was no such thing as Saudi sovereignty. There was no such thing as Saudi citizenship. The right of entry into any part of Dâr al-Islâm was one of several rights which Muslims had. They also had the right to reside in Dâr al-Islâm; they did not need residence permits; the right to seek their livelihood in any part of Dâr al-Islam; they did not need work permits; and the right to participate in the political process (Sh ûrâ); they did not need Saudi citizenship etc. The birth of the Nation State of Saudi Arabia resulted in the denial, and, eventually, the elimination of all these rights of Muslims. The huge oil-wealth of Arabia belonged to the world of Islam. When the State of Saudi Arabia was born, the Saudis robbed the rest of the Muslims of what belonged to all Muslims and what was to serve the interests of the Ummah . Then the Saudis handed over the effective control of the oil to the Americans in exchange for an American security guarantee. That, also, was treason.
The destruction of the Khalîfate and the emergence of the State of Saudi Arabia were events which changed the very face of the world of Islam in such a way as to result in a return to the pre-Hijrah stage of Islamic civilization. Nowhere in the world today does Dâr al-Islâm exist. Islamic civilization now exists in the post-Kh alîfate era of its history. And, as it was in Makkah fourteen hundred years ago, so too today, the Muslim community around the world is subjected to an all-embracing Jâhiliyyah which dominates the world. The origin of that Jâhiliyyah is, of course, modern post-Christian western secular and materialist western civilization. It was, perhaps, with particular reference to this age, that the Prophet of Islam (divinely blessed is he and in eternal peace) is reported to have said :
‘ Whosoever dies without having witnessed (during his lifetime) the institution of bay‘ah (the oath of allegiance by the people through which an appointment to the position of leadership over the Jamâ‘ah is legitimized) has certainly died a death of Jâhiliyyah (This could also imply a death in an age which has witnessed the return to the pre-Hijrah Jâhiliyyah).’ (Muslim)
If this Ummah is ever to succeed in restoring the supremacy of Islam over the State in the world of Islam, it is imperative that Muslims be taught the history of the collapse of the Khalîfate and its replacement, in the heartland of Islam, by the secular Saudi-Wahhâbî nation-State on its ruins. This was an act of supreme betrayal of Islam.
Allah, the Most High and All-powerful, revealed the Dîn of Islam to the Holy Prophet Muhammad Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam that it establish its supremacy over all other religions. This required the prior submission by the Ummah to the supremacy of Islam in both the private and public life of Muslims.
The office of the Khalîfate functioned as the ultimate symbol of Islam as a dominant force in public life. Without the Khalîfate the world of Islam would never have political power. There was, moreover, a permanent link between the Khalîfate and control over the Haramayn, i.e. the sacred territories in Makkah and Madînah. Anyone who could succeed in severing that link, would cripple the institution of the Khalîfate and, eventually, render the world of Islam powerless!
Throughout the 1400 years of the history of the Ummah of Prophet Muhammad Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam, no one has ever been successfully appointed to the Khalîfate, and has had his appointment legitimized by the bay‘ah, or oath of allegiance of the Muslims, without such a person having either actual control, or the capacity to exercise control, over the Hijâz in general and the Haramayn in particular. The office of the Khalîfate, and authority over the Haramayn, have always been inseparably linked in the religio-political consciousness of the Ummah. The inseparable link also had a foundation in the Sharî‘ah in so far as the Hajj was an institution binding on the members of the Ummah, and Hajj involved physical travel to the Hijâz. No one, therefore could be recognized to be the supreme leader of the Muslims who did not have the authority, and the means of exercising responsibility for the organization and administration of the Hajj. And this, of course, included freedom and security for the pilgrims and, hence, required control over the Hijâz. As a consequence, even when the seat of the Khulafâ (ie. Khalîfate was shifted from the Hijâz to Kûfah (Iraq), Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and even Istanbul, the Kh alîfs) always took the greatest care to maintain their authority and control over the Hijâz. This basically continued uninterruptedly until the demise of the Ottoman Islamic Empire in the First World War. The enemies of Islam paid very careful attention to the study and understanding of the link between the Khalîfate, the preservation of faith (Îmân) among Muslims, the power of Islam as a world-wide force, and control over the Haramayn. They then planned their diabolical strategy to render Islam powerless, and to confine it to a personal private faith with no authority over public life. In other words they planned their strategy to secularize Islam, and, in so doing, to reduce Muslims to the godless European way of life. They achieved considerable success!
The British, realizing the paramount importance of the Hijâz and the Haramayn for the legitimacy and even survival of the Ottoman Khalîfate, concentrated their diplomacy in the First World War on wresting the Hijâz from the control of the Ottoman Khalîf. This was achieved when Sharîf Husayn, the Ottoman-appointed Sharîf of Makkah, and great grandfather of the now deceased King Husayn of Jordan, was successfully induced by the British to rebel against the Ottoman Khalîf and to establish his own authority over the Hijâz under benign British alliance and protection. The British also successfully concluded a Treaty of Collaboration in 1916 with ‘Abd ul-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd. That Treaty further destablized Ottoman rule over the Hijâz.
By 1916, and in the very midst of the first world war, the Ottoman Khalîf had lost control over Makkah and Jeddah, ie. the lower Hijâz. His control over Madînah was maintained throughout the war and only came to an end in 1919 when certain Ottoman troops within the city of Madînah were induced to betray and rebel against their commander, Fakh rî Pasha after his heroic defense of the city.
After the Ottoman Khalîf had lost control over the Hijâz, the Khalîfate was so crippled that it lingered on in Istanbul for just a few more years before it collapsed completely. And this was a truly outstanding success for British diplomacy. The weakening of the Khalîfate destabilized the entire structure of the Ottoman Islamic Empire. It eventually collapsed. In 1919 British troops, under the leadership of General Allenby, captured Jerusalem. It is significant that the British General, upon entering the Holy City, proclaimed that ‘… the crusades were finally over…’ If there was any doubt whatsoever of the extreme danger to Islam posed by British diplomacy in the Arabian peninsula, this statement of Allenby should have put those doubts to rest.
What Allenby meant was that Islam was now a tiger without teeth. Its fate was to remain permanently powerless and, therefore, incapable of responding to the loss of Jerusalem in the manner in which Sultân Salâhuddîn Ayyûbî Rahimahullah (Saladin) had responded when Jerusalem was lost to the Crusaders.
The Arabs had been deceived to fight with Allenby, in his army, against the Turks, to wrest Jerusalem from the rule of the Ottoman Khalîf. Those Arabs were now waiting to ravage the carcass left by the British victory over Istanbul. They coveted local rule over the Hijâz, but it was still necessary to wait and see whether the Ottoman Khalîf would ever be able to regain the strength necessary to seek to re-impose his rule over the Hijâz. When, on March 3, 1924, the Ottoman Khalîfate was abolished, it became clear that no such threat existed. And it was precisely on that day that the clients of Britain began their fight over the carcass left by their betrayal of the Ottoman Islamic rule.
On March 7, 1924, Sharîf al-Husayn pre-emptively claimed the Khalîfate for himself. His most important credential was that he exercised de facto local control over the Hijâz. He also boasted of being Hâshimite, i.e. belonging to the same clan – Banû Hâshim – of the tribe of the Quraysh , to which the Holy Prophet (Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam) himself belonged. In fact this weighed so heavily amongst the people that the Chief Qâdî of Trans-Jordan promptly accepted the claim and recognized Husayn as Khalîf.
His other credential, which was of dubious value amongst the Muslim masses, but which weighed heavily in the power-politics of the peninsula, was that the Sharîf was an ally of Britain, the super-power of the day, and had received considerable financial, diplomatic and military support from Britain in his successful rebellion against Ottoman authority in the Hijâz. In claiming the Khalîfate for himself, however, Sharîf Husayn committed the monstrous blunder of not first seeking the permission of the British to act as he did. It is the essence of the client-State status that freedom is effectively curtailed. Sharîf Husayn had violated the basic rule of conduct for clientStates. How would the British react ??
British diplomacy in Jazîrat ul-‘Arab (i.e. the Arabian peninsula) was multidimensional and yet integrated. There was, first of all, the objective of wresting control of the Haramayn from the Khalîf. This was meant to weaken his legitimacy, and thus his influence and control over the rest of the world of Islam, and so facilitate the defeat of the Ottomans in the world war.Secondly, Britain wanted a friendly regime in control of the Hijâz so that it could better be able to manipulate the politics of the peninsula in pursuit of the long term goal of destroying Islam. Thirdly, British politics in the peninsula, and the defeat of the Ottomans, were strategically linked to Zionism’s efforts to create a Jewish National Home in Palestine. And this integrated diplomacy was finally made clear with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
The ‘ super-power ’ (of the day), and the so-called ‘ chosen people ’ of Allah, the Most High, would hence be locked in a highly deceptive embrace of truly calamitous consequences for Muslims, Jews, Christians, and for the rest of mankind. The objective of the integrated diplomacy was to dismantle the entire Islamic Public Order so as to render Islam powerless to prevent Zionism from achieving its goal. So long as the institution of the Khalîfate remained it was always possible for the Islamic Public Order to linger on and, eventually, be revived. The attack on the institution of the Khalîfate was, therefore, vitally necessary.
It was quite clear to the British and the Zionists that a Jewish National Home – the Jewish State of Israel – could not be established in Muslim Palestine, and could never hope to survive so long as the world of Islam had a Khalîf capable of mobilizing its formidable resources and religious fervor and directing it to military ends. And so the control over the Hijâz, which was of paramount importance in the politics of the peninsula, was a matter to which British diplomacy directed supreme attention.
The claim to the Khalîfate by the Hâshimite British client, Sharîf al-Husayn, was incompatible with British diplomatic objectives. It was always possible that the claim could have succeeded. Sharîf al-Husayn could then have mobilized the world of Islam to such an extent as to re-establish the Islamic Public Order and Pax Islamica in the symbolically powerful heartland of Islam, and so pose a threat to Britain’s influence and control over large parts of Dâr al-Islâm. A revitalized world of Islam would also have made Jewish control over Palestine and Jerusalem quite impossible.
Britain responded to the claim to the Khalîfate by Sharîf al-Husayn by giving her blessings to the other British client in the peninsula, ‘Abd al‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, to move against Husayn, and to wrest control of the Hijâz from him. This was the perfection of the art of double-crossing and of hypocrisy. One British client was used to eliminate another (British) client.
In so far as the Muslim World was concerned the first world war was much more than a mere European war. It was, rather, a war which brought about upheavals and changes in the Muslim World which were unprecedented in its thirteen hundred years of existence.
Firstly, the greatest Muslim power and seat of the contemporary Khalîfate, the Ottoman Islamic Empire, entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. While this decision is still clouded in some controversy since, up to the very last moment, the Ottoman leadership had not decided whether to enter the war or not, and if so, which side to support, there were grounds for speculating a British-Zionist role in the affair.
The Jewish-Zionist leaders had made a number of unsuccessful efforts at striking a deal with the Khalîf for Jewish control over Jerusalem. They even offered to buy the holy city. Britain had supported these Jewish-Zionist efforts zealously.
Among Britain’s major political and military goals in the war were the subjugation of Islam as a power in the world, the conquest of Jerusalem, and the creation in Palestine of a Jewish home-land which would constantly disrupt and police the Muslim Middle East on behalf of the West.
The Ottoman leadership predictably attempted to mobilize support for its war effort from the entire Muslim world. In this connection, on November 23, 1914 the Shaykh al-Islâm of the Ottoman Islamic Empire issued a fatwâ (Islamic legal ruling) and a proclamation declaring jihâd (ie. war conducted in accordance with Allah’s law) and commanding all Muslims to fight against the Allied Powers. British diplomacy, however, succeeded in promoting and exploiting Arab nationalism in the Arabian peninsula as an effective means of attacking and undermining the formidable strength of the universal Islamic fraternity. As a consequence the Arabs rebelled against Ottoman rule on the basis of a British offer of assistance to achieve national independence.
In less than two years after the commencement of the war Sharîf al-Husayn, self-styled ‘ King of the Arabs ’, firm ally of the British, and great-grandfather of Jordan’s now deceased King Husayn, had successfully rebelled against the Ottoman authority and was installed as King of the Hijâz, the heart-land of Islam. And as a consequence of the loss of the cities of Makkah and, eventually, Madînah, the pan-Islamic appeal of the Ottoman Khalîf suffered irreparable damage.
The British followed up their success in the Hijâz by installing the sons of Husayn as Kings in Iraq and Trans-Jordan as well. And by 1919 the British General, Allenby, with Arab troops fighting loyally with him, marched triumphantly into Jerusalem and declared that the crusades had finally come to an end. Palestine remained a British Mandate territory (mandated by the League of Nations) until the British withdrew in 1948 and the Zionist Jews declared the establishment of the State of Israel. Muslim Nationalists had in effect fought against the central Khalîfate to unwittingly effectuate the establishment of the Zionist State.
The Ottoman Islamic Empire was badly defeated in the war. The Allied Powers combined their military prowess with a psychological weapon which had far-reaching effects for Islam. The British and French succeeded in winning Muslim military support (by means more foul than fair) from India, the Maghrib and other areas and so both Arab and non-Arab Muslims fought against their brother Muslim Turks. The result was that the Ottoman Islamic Empire was not only defeated but its universal Islamic foundations were destroyed.
In the wake of the loss of the cities of Makkah and Madînah and the Arabian peninsula , and after brother-Muslims had fought against them in the war, the Turkish nationalist forces, who had been in constant conflict with the Khalîf, now felt themselves free from any impelling attachment to the world of Islam. Out of the ashes of Ottoman defeat in the first world war the secular Turkish nationalist forces, led by Mustafa Kamal (Ataturk) moved swiftly to transform their political order from the old model of Dâr al-Islâm, or the Islamic Public Order, to the western model of a modem secular nation-State, the Republic of Turkey.
It was no surprise, therefore, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted, on March 3, 1924, law abolishing the Kh Law stated :
‘ The Khalîfate. The office of the Khalîfate is abolished, since the Khalîfate is essentially comprised in the meaning and signification of the words Government (Hukûmah) and Republic (Jumhuriyyah).’
The passage of this law marked a decisive moment in the history of the Ummah. After a period of thirteen hundred years during which the institution of the Khalîfate was almost universally recognized by Muslims as essential to their religion, even when the seat of the Khalîfate was filled in ways which were contrary to the principles of Islam, the world of Islam found itself in the fourteenth century of its existence without a Khalîf. Indeed so definite and permanent was the change that one could, perhaps, be forgiven for concluding that the world Islam had now passed into the post-Khalîfate period of its existence. This, of course, is an incorrect conclusion, since the Holy Prophet Muhammad Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam has himself prophesied the emergence of a true Khalîf from amongst his descendents, Imâm al-Mahdî , who will lead a Muslim army which will destroy the stranglehold of Shirk and Kufr over the world (contemporary manifestations being both the Saudi State, and the State of Israel).
Britain had cultivated Ibn Sa‘ûd’s friendship and alliance during the war against the Khalîfate and, as usual, had employed financial diplomacy (i.e. bribery). Ibn Sa‘ûd received a monthly sum of 5000 pounds sterling from the British Treasury in return for his benevolent neutrality in Husayn’s rebellion against the Khalîf, the imposition of Hâshimite rule over the Hijâz, and Britain’s diplomatic and military efforts in the peninsula directed against the Ottomans. He diabolically rationalized this manifest violation of the command of Allah, the Most High, and His Prophet not to take Jews and Christians as protecting friends by explaining it away as Jizyah ( tax imposed on free non-Muslims under Muslim rule).
But British diplomacy in respect of Ibn Sa‘ûd was directed to ends of far greater strategic importance than mere benevolent neutrality in the war and the disposal of the injudicious Sharîf Husayn. Ibn Sa‘ûd had a far greater potential which Britain now moved to exploit, consequent on Sharif Husayn’s claim to the Khalîfate. The Saudi power in the Najd, which had reemerged with the capture of Riyadh in 1902, was the product of an old alliance between a tribal chief and the religious leader of the Wahhâbî religious sect. That alliance ensured that while the descendants of the tribal chief would wield political power over territory ruled by the alliance, religious affairs would be subject to the authority of the descendants of the religious chief. As a consequence it was inevitable that the Najdî Saudis would be under pressure from the Wahhâbîs to seek to force the submission of the heart-land of Islam (the Hijâz) to the Wahhâbî perception of the true faith.
Britain was only too pleased to give the green light to Ibn Sa‘ûd to move his forces against Husayn four days after the Hâshimite had claimed the Khalîfate for himself. Ibn Sa‘ûd was impatient to move against Husayn since, as strange as it may appear, both Jewish control over Jerusalem, and Wahhâbî control over Hijâz, faced a similar threat. Neither could be achieved, and neither could hope to survive, if the world of Islam had a Khalîf. (Indeed, the destruction of the Saudi State may very well take place when the Khalîfate is restored at the time of Imâm al-Mahdî).
By supporting Ibn Sa‘ûd the British were now ensuring that so long as the Saudi-Wahhâbîs ruled over the Hijâz, the Khalîfate could never be revived. The British further calculated that without the Khalîfate the Islamic Public Order could not survive and the world of Islam would then be so weakened that it could never be mobilized to prevent the creation of the Jewish State of Israel. Britain also knew that the Wahhâbîs, themselves, could never claim the Khalîfate, firstly because they knew that if they did so they would meet the same fate as Sharîf al-Husayn, and secondly because they had the good sense to know that a Wahhâbî Khalîf would always be totally unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of Muslims the world over. And so, by withdrawing support from Husayn and supporting Ibn Sa‘ûd, Britain was in fact pursuing her relentless attack on the institution of the Khalifate theo-centric Islamic Public Order.
Khalîfate and the Within a few months Ibn Sa‘ûd was able to conquer Makkah and Husayn fled to Jeddah. The British eventually intervened to remove him physically from the peninsula by offering him a comfortable exile in Cyprus. And soon Madînah and Jiddah were also under Saudi-Wahhâbî rule.
More than a century earlier, however, the Saudi-Wahhâbî alliance had succeeded in overcoming the defenses of Taif and Makkah and there ensued a blood-bath of truly astonishing proportions. The Wahhâbîs, in their fanatical zeal, considered the Muslims resident in the Hijâz to be engaged in shirk and, as a consequence, held that it was permissible to kill them. The Khalîf in Istanbul got the Mamluke Khedive of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to send an army to the Hijâz under the leadership of his son Ismail. The SaudiWahhâbî warriors were unceremoniously driven out of Hijâz and into the desert. A century later, however, there was no Khalîf and all the powerful Muslim communities were under western colonial rule. In addition, Ibn Sa‘ûd enjoyed the protecting friendship of Great Britain which was the super-power of the day. There was, therefore, no immediate possibility whatsoever of dislodging the Saudi-Wahhâbî forces from the Haramayn and Hijâz.
Although Ibn Sa‘ûd was safely in control of Hijâz at the commencement of his rule in 1924 he was still confronted with a truly formidable problem. Namely, he had to devise some strategy which could avert the long-term possibility of a repetition of the disaster which visited the previous SaudiWahhâbî rule over the Hijâz . It would appear that he first thought of a policy of conciliation with non-Wahhâbî Muslims and of using his control over the Hijâz to further the cause of the unity of the Ummah. Thus shortly after gaining control over Makkah and receiving from its inhabitants their recognition of him as Sultan of the Hijâz, he issued a proclamation to the entire world of Islam to the effect that the Hijâz, with its Haramayn, belonged to the entire world of Islam and that he, Ibn Sa‘ûd, held control over the Hijâz as a trust only, and on behalf of the entire world of Islam. He then went on to invite the entire world of Islam to send its representatives to Makkah so that, on the basis of Shûrâ and Ijmâ’, a just, efficient and representative administration could be established over the Hijâz.
This important announcement was entirely consistent with the provisions of the Islamic Public Order. The Hijâz was still the Dâr al-Islâm which had been established by the Holy Prophet . As yet there was no hint of any Saudi State which would claim territorial sovereignty over the Hijâz. The rights of the Muslims in the territory of Dâr al-Islâm were being publicly recognized and respected. But, unfortunately, this concern for the unity of the world of Islam and this fervent declaration concerning the status of the Hijâz did not represent the actual Saudi-Wahhâbî designs over the Hijâz. It was simply a case of politics of expediency and was designed to protect the Saudi-Wahhâbîs in the wake of a significant initiative undertaken by the formiddable Indian Khilâfah Movement & Al-Azhar University in Cairo shortly after the abolition of the Ottoman Kh alîfate. Indeed the Azhar initiative had perilous implications for Ibn Sa‘ûd and the Saudi-Wahhâbî rule over the Hijâz. It also constituted a troublesome ‘fly in the ointment’ for the victorious Zionists and British. Al-Azhar University proposed to convene an International Islamic Khalîfate Congress (Mu‘tamar al-Kh ilâfah) in Cairo which would, among other things, attempt to appoint a new Khalif over the world of Islam.
Had the Wahhâbîs been genuinely devoted to Islam they would have welcomed these efforts to achieve conformity with an essential requirement of the Sharî‘ah, i.e. the establishment of a genuine Khalîfate. The Wahhâbîs had long argued that the post-Râshidûn Khalîfate was invalid because, among other things, the Khalîfate was not constituted in a manner which conformed with the requirements of the Shari’ah. Now that the ‘invalid Khalîfate’ had been abolished and the leading center of Islamic learning of the day was convening an international Islamic congress to discuss the question of the Khalîfate, and to effect the appointment of a new Khalîf, the Wahhâbîs should have welcomed this initiative. In addition, they should also have extended every possible cooperation, and should have participated in a serious way in the Congress in order to ensure that the genuine Khalîfate was restored.
But the Wahhâbîs had no such sincere devotion to Islam. Their attitude was essentially one of selective religiosity, expediency, opportunism and parochialism.
The Wahhâbîs knew that the world of Islam would never have accepted a Wahhâbî Khalîf and, as a consequence, they found it expedient to repudiate an essential requirement of the Islamic Public Order. They marshaled all their energies to sabotage the Cairo Khalîfate Congress. Their strategy was to organize a rival congress in Makkah at the time of the Hajj of 1926. That meant that the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ would take place within a month of ‘ Cairo Congress ’, making it difficult for delegates to attend both conferences. Since the ‘ Makkah Conference ’ was timed to coincide with the Hajj, and since it had the active support of the British, it had a clear advantage over the Cairo Conference.
Secondly they specifically excluded from the agenda of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ the question of the Khalîfate. This transparent attempt to sabotage the ‘ Cairo Conference ’ and to bury the Khalîfate was more than ample evidence to expose the hollow credentials of the Wahhâbîs as socalled champions of the Sh arî‘ah and of Islam.
The response of the world of Islam to this rivalry, ie. the ‘ Cairo Khalîfate Congress ’ of May/June 1926, and the rival Makkah ‘ World Muslim Congress ’ of July 1926, is a subject which deserves serious research, as well as how much British machination was involved in ensuring, for example, that the important Muslim community of India which had supported the Ottoman Khalîfate to such an extent that they had established the formidable Khilâfah Movement, would stay away from the Khalîfate Congress of Cairo and, instead, attend the rival ‘ Makkah Congress ’ from the agenda of which the question of the Khalîfate was specifically excluded.
It was clear, however, that in this rivalry the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ achieved a tactical victory over Cairo – a victory which had enormous implications for the very survival of the institution of the Khalîfate and the orthodox Islamic Public Order (i.e. Dâr al-Islâm). Those who organized the ‘ Cairo Congress’ wished to ensure conformity with the orthodox Islamic system of political organization. But they were intellectually incapable of articulating a conception of the Islamic Public Order (Dâr al-Islâm) and the Islamic Conception of an International Order which could convince a skeptical world of Islam. And they could not respond to the new and unique situation in which Muslims had found themselves by articulating the alternative of the establishment of the authentic Jamâ‘ah and Amîr wherever in the world it could be established.
Those who organized the ‘ Makkah Congress ’, on the other hand, were unwilling, because of vested interests, to remain faithful to the orthodox Islamic Public Order with its Khalîfate, Dâr al-Islâm, etc. Instead they chose to accept the rival system of political organization which had emerged in modem western civilization and which had just penetrated the very seat of the Ottoman Khalîfate, namely the secular nation-State system. And they did so because it was only in the nation-State system that the Saudi-Wahhâbîs could realistically pursue an effort to win recognition and legitimacy for their rule over the Hijâz and thus ensure the survival of the Saudi State. They camouflaged their true designs and made an elaborate attempt to dupe the world of Islam. And their success in this game of deception was amply demonstrated in the representative character of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’.
The tactical victory of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’
in its rivalry with the ‘ Cairo Congress ’ played a significant role in paving the way for the rest of the world of Islam, including the very heart-land of Islam, to eventually follow the example of Mustafa Kamal and his model of the secular State of Turkey. The history of the world of Islam since 1924 records, on the one hand, the evils which were continuously injected into the body of the Ummah through this alien system of political organization and, on the other, the naive, confused and superficial attempts of modern Islamic scholarship to reconstruct a new Islamic Public Order on the secular foundations of the nation-State system.
What emerged from those efforts was the goal of ‘ Islamization ’ and of establishing the ‘Islamic State within the system of nation-States’. But both of these were futile goals for it was, and still is, impossible for them to be achieved without first dismantling some of the essential apparatus of the Khalîfate system.
Eminent Islamic scholars such as Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Abul Ala Maududi, Dr. Ismail Faruqi etc. ventured into Ijtihâd (i.e. independent reasoning) to reconstruct an Islamic Public Order in post-Khalîfate Islam. Their efforts resulted in the concepts of the ‘ Islamic State ’ and ‘ Islamization ’. Despite being great thinkers of the time they appeared not to have adequately understood the true nature and consequences of the change which was taking place. Dr Iqbal, for example, has stated that ‘… according to Sh ar‘î law the appointment of an Imâm or Khalîf is absolutely indispensable. Turkeys ijtihâd is that according to the spirit of Islam the Kh alîfate or Imâmate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected assembly (e.g. the Turkish Grand National Assembly or Parliament). Personally I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound…’ Unfortunately, however, the efforts for Islamization and for establishing the Islamic State resulted in the orthodox Islamic system of the political organization of the Ummah or the Islamic Public Order (i.e. Pax Islamica and Dâr al-Islâm) being relegated to total obscurity. As a consequence political thought in the world of Islam was gravely misdirected, and the immense confusion so created persists to the present day.
The World Muslim Congress which convened in June 1926 as a result of the efforts of King ‘Abdul ‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd was hailed as the first such meeting in the History of Islam. And indeed it was, for all the wrong reasons. The Congress received two messages from the King. In the first, the opening address of the Congress, the King made reference to the sorry history of the Hijâz ending with the despotism of Husayn who, among his other sins, placed the Hijâz under foreign non-Muslim influence. This being prohibited by the Prophet , a justification was therefore presented for the Najdî conquest of the Hijâz. As a result of that conquest, the King was pleased to point out there was now security in the Hijâz. The Congress was invited to hold its sessions in that atmosphere of security and of total liberty. The only constraints on the conference were the restraints of the Islamic Law and of not meddling in international politics nor in the differences which separate certain Muslim peoples from their governments. And yet Ibn Sa‘ûd was less than honest in his opening statement since he was just as guilty as was Husayn in aiding and abetting the penetration of British influence in the peninsula.
Two things stand out in the King’s address. Firstly the Wahhâbî leadership was showing its best possible face in order to court the support of the Congress, – thus the security and total liberty promised. But secondly, and more important, the ban on international politics in the discussions of the Congress clearly implied that the security of the Saudi-Wahhâbî State and the maintenance of its relations with its allies (Britain in particular) took precedence over the considered opinions of the Ummah even when expressed through Sh ûrâ in an Islamic Conference ‘ unprecedented ’ in the history of Islam.
The King gave to the Congress the safe task of examining the necessary ways and means for making the holy places the best centers of Islamic culture and education, the most perfect region in terms of prosperity and hygiene, and the Muslim country which is most conspicuous for its recognition of Islam . It was very clear from this address that the King was attempting to foist on the Congress an artificial division between religion and politics, and a new theory to the effect that the proper subject matter for the consideration of Islamic Congresses was the subject matter of religion and religious affairs. And this was a bid‘ah (ie. blameworthy innovation) of a truly reprehensible nature since it was in such manifest conflict with the Qur’ânic guidance, the Sunnah of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam and the very foundations of the Islamic legacy. The King was, in fact, making an attempt to transform alIslam, which was al-Dîn, into religion in the narrow and distorted sense in which the term was used in secular western civilization.
On July 2nd , 1926, on the occasion of the 15th plenary session, the King addressed a second message to the Congress, through which he sought to achieve one of the main objectives of the Wahhâbî initiative, to wit, the international Islamic recognition and acceptance of Saudi-Wahhâbî control over the Hijâz.
The King expounded his politique for the Hijâz as follows :
1) We do not admit any foreign intervention in this sacred country, whatever may be its nature.
2) We do not admit any privileges open to some and denied to others; whatever takes place in this country must conform with the Sh arî‘ah.
3) The Hijâz must have a special neutral regime. It must neither make war nor be attacked, and this neutrality must be guaranteed by all the independent Muslim States.
What the King was attempting to do in this address was nothing less than propounding a new Islamic political theory. It was as though the SaudiWahhâbîs were convinced that they were the only Muslims, and hence Hijâz and Najd, which were under their control, was the real Dâr al-Islam. Thus all territories outside of Hijâz and Najd (or modem Saudi Arabia) were foreign. And when the King spoke about the need to prevent any foreign intervention in the Hijâz, he was referring specifically to the kind of intervention which had ousted the Wahhâbîs from the Hijâz more than a century earlier.
The second point made was, of course, quite admirable i.e. a nondiscriminatory application of the injunctions of the Sh arî‘ah. But the second point was incompatible with the first. The world of Islam was being accorded the status of foreigners who, naturally, would not be eligible to all the privileges open to the Saudi-Wahhâbîs. Foreigners, for example, would need a visa in order to enter the Hijâz even for performing the Hajj. The Saudi-Wahhâbîs would not require a visa since they were citizens of the new-born State of Saudi Arabia and so the Hijâz belonged to them. NonSaudi Muslims could now be imprisoned if they extended their stay in Hijâz after the expiry of their visas for they were now foreigners and the Hijâz, which was no longer Dâr al-Islâm, did not belong to them.
The King had, in fact, dismantled the Dâr al-Islâm which had been established by the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam himself, and by his companions , in the Hijâz, had dispossessed the world of Islam of its very heartland, had insulted the Muslims, and was destined to get away with that audacious behavior for more than seven decades.
The third point made in the King’s address was quite remarkable. There could be no doubt at all that it was a manifest statement of bid‘ah. Neither in the Qur’ân, nor in the Sunnah of the Prophet , nor in the entire Islamic legacy is there any concept of the neutrality of the Hijâz. Indeed the statement that the Hijâz must not make war amounted to taking the very heartland of Islam out of jihâd, and was thus in manifest conflict with explicit commands of the Qur’ân. Here again the King was walking the path of kufr. In respect of the request of the King that all independent Islamic States should recognize the neutrality of his regime, it was clear that this was a scarcely disguised attempt to win recognition from the world of Islam of Saudi-Wahhâbî rule over the Hijâz.
As such the Khalîfate question was never discussed. This was a major triumph for the new secular approach to Muslim ‘ unity ’. The conference did, however, enter into politics in approving a resolution demanding the return of Ma‘ân and ‘Aqabah to Hijâzî control since the British annexation of these territories to Trans-jordan (over which Britain was the mandate power) violated the command of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam that the Arabian peninsular must remain free of all non-Islamic influence.
This however was not entirely the case. One of the effects of the war of 1914-18 was to eliminate the Turks from Arabia and to extend the British sphere of influence over the whole peninsula. But it is very important to note that in this unique and momentous achievement of the British in which the command of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam was compromised for the first time in thirteen hundred years, the British were aided and abetted by both Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ûd. Indeed both commanded a price for their services to Britain. The Arab forces of Husayn actually fought alongside the British against the Turks. Ibn Sa‘ûd’s benevolent neutrality in this struggle enhanced the chances of Britain’s success. Up to 1920 when his monthly payments from the British were stopped, Husayn had received about six million pounds sterling. Ibn Sa‘ûd, who received from the same British Government a more modest 350,000 pounds at the rate of 5000 pounds a month, diabolically explained it away as jizyah (a tax paid by a subject non-Muslim people resident in the territory of Dâr al-Islâm).
It was Britain (the mandate power in Trans-jordan) which had annexed Ma‘ân and ‘Aqabah to Trans-jordan in 1925. Although ex-King Husayn protested the annexation from his exile in Cyprus and Ibn Sa‘ûd moved the World Muslim Congress to adopt a resolution protesting the annexation, the British action was clearly a fait accomplishment.
It is interesting to note that if the command of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam had not been compromised by Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ûd in their misguided assistance to the British, and in their attempt to rid the peninsular of Ottoman influence, it would not have been possible for the Balfour Declaration to be fulfilled and for the Zionist State to be established in Muslim Palestine. It is also interesting to note that if ‘Aqabah had remained under Hijâzî control, Saudi Arabia would have been a front-line State in the present Middle East conflict. History may one day reveal that one of the reasons for the British annexation of Ma‘ân and ‘Aqabah was to create a buffer zone between the volatile heartland of Islam and the Jewish national home in Palestine which the Balfour Declaration envisaged. It should be clear that a direct confrontation between the Hijâz (now part of Saudi Arabia) and the Jewish National Home in Palestine (now the State of Israel) would arouse uncontrollable Islamic passions, a factor which still constitutes the only serious threat to the survival of the Zionist State.
And so became manifest the contemporaneous destruction of the institution of Khalîfate and the symbiotic character of the emergence and future existence of the Saudi-Wahhâbî State and the State of Israel.
Why was the Khalîfate not restored somewhere else after it collapsed in Istanbul ? Why have we had no Khalîfate for more than seventy years now? The reason for this is the nature of the age in which we now live. This is the age when the greatest force of evil ever created by Allah has been released (eventually to appear as a human being). This is the age of al-Masîh adDajjâl (ie. anti-Christ) and of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj (ie. Gog and Magog).
When viewed from an essentially Qur’ânic perspective, the abolition of the Ottoman Khilâfah appears to have occurred at the same time that other events of supreme Qur’ânic importance were unfolding. For example, the Ottoman empire would not have been defeated and destroyed had fundamental change not come to Europe, transforming European civilization into a major actor on the stage of the world. The French and Bolshevik revolutions marked the turning points in the transformation of Western and Eastern European civilizations from civilizations based on faith (in Christianity) to essentially godless civilizations. The scientific and industrial revolutions and the emergence of the capitalist economy resulted in those godless civilizations becoming predatory and having the power with which to prey upon all mankind. Those godless European civilizations then embarked upon an effort to transform all the rest of the world to godlessness! The Ottoman Empire stood in the way of Europe since it was established on foundations which were essentially sacred. The institution of the Kh alîfate established and legitimized Islam’s sacred model of a public order and a world order. That public order, or Jamâ‘ah, was absolutely essential for the preservation of the integrity and faith of the World of Islam. And so, the Khalîfate had to be targeted and destroyed in order for the penetration and destruction of faith in the world of Islam to be ever realized.
With the destruction of the Khalîfate in 1924, the last major hurdle in the way of those who were determined to reduce all of mankind to godlessness was now removed. The stage was thus set for the fulfillment of the words of the Hadîth al-Qudsî in Sahîh Bukh ârî narrated by Abû Sa‘îd Khudrî Radiyallahu Anhu, in which Allah, the Supreme, informed Âdam Alaihissalaam that 999 out of every 1000 persons (of this age) would enter into Hell. In other words, the destruction of the Khalîfate by the modern godless European world provided evidence that the age of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj had commenced. (See Qur’ân, al-Kahf, 18:98-99)
Indeed, for one of the greatest Islamic scholars of the age, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, the age of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj had commenced even earlier. He declared in 1917, perhaps after the Bolshevik revolution, that ‘… all the armed forces of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj have now been released …’
‘ Khul gayah Yajûj awr Majûj kay lash kar tamâm Chasmay Muslim daykhlay tafsîr harf e yansilûn’
Iqbal advised that the attention of Muslims should now be directed to the verse of the Qur’ân (Al-Anbiyâ’: 21: 96) which ended with the word ‘ yansilûn ’, and which spoke of the re-emergence of the Jewish State of Israel. And that is the subject to which we now turn.
At the same time that the objective of the destruction of the Khalîfate was being pursued by modern, godless, European civilization, another more sinister revolution was taking place in the Jewish world. A godless, Zionist Movement emerged amongst Eastern European Jews. It declared that the Holy Land of Palestine belonged to the Jews because God gave it to them. The Zionist movement misled the Jews into believing that it was their inalienable right and divinely ordained destiny to restore the Jewish State of Israel 2000 years after it was destroyed by Allah, the Most High. It totally ignored the fact that Jews had both corrupted and betrayed the religion of ‘Abraham ’ and, as a consequence, no longer had any right to the Holy Land ! Jews swallowed the bait of the Zionist Movement. The supreme goal of Jews now became the goal of establishing the State of Israel regardless of the means which were to be employed to achieve this goal. Zionism was created by a truly evil force. A force about which Allah had warned – the release of al-Masîh ad-Dajjâl and of the Gog and Magog (Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj).
And so we witnessed the amazing phenomenon – amazing for those who ponder over the Qur’ân – of the destruction of the Khalîfate and the restoration of the State of Israel as contemporaneous events. The same evil forces were at work in both cases. This was confirmed in Sûrah al-Anbiyâ’ of the Qur’ân in verses 95 and 96 where Allah spoke of a qaryah (town) (i.e. the city of Jerusalem, symbolizing the State of Israel) which He destroyed and then pronounced the restoration of that qaryah (ie. the restoration of the State of Israel) to be harâm (prohibited) until the (commencement of the) release of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj.
‘ And it is prohibited for a town (ie. Jerusalem is referred to here ) whose people We have punished (with expulsion from that territory, ie. the Holy Land), that they may not return (ie. to restore the State of Israel), until Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj are released and they descend from every direction. (ie. they take control of the world). ’ (Qur’ân, al-Anbiyâ’, 21:96)
Since the Jews were now deceived and put on a path which led, progressively, to the greatest oppression and wickedness in their conduct with mankind, in general, and with Muslims, in particular, a third event now took place at just this same time. It was a sign from Allah which was spoken of in the Qur’ân, a sign which was meant to warn both modern western civilization and the Jews: ‘…If you live like Pharaoh (ie. rejecting the Truth, demonizing Islam, and oppressing the Muslims), you will die the way he died…’ (See Qur’ân, Yûnus :10:92). That event was the discovery of the body of Pharaoh by Loret in 1898 at Thebes in the King’s Valley of Lower Egypt. The discovery of Pharoah’s body confirmed what Allah had declared at the moment of his death ( ie. the death of Pharoah) :
‘ This day We (have decided to) preserve your body (from destruction) so that you (ie. your body) may be come a sign to (a people) who will come after you, for most people are heedless of Our signs.’ _(Qur’ân, Yûnus, 10:92-93)
And the specific warning to the Jews, at the moment of their last and greatest act of wickedness and oppression, was that not a single one of them would escape the fate of Pharoah. Just as Pharoah had declared his faith in Allah at the moment of his death, and that did not save him from the hell-fire, so too would the Jews have to declare their faith in ‘Îsâ (Jesus) as the Messiah at the moment of their death, but that would not save them from the hell-fire. (Qur’ân, an-Nisâ’: 4:159)
Complicit in this final onslaught against Islam are the Saudi-Wahhâbîs. It should be known that the Holy Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallamsaid :
‘ The violent and torturous people are in the East, and Shaytân will arouse dissension from there.’ pointing towards the Najd. (Mish kât)
Another title used in reference to the Wahhâbîs is ‘ Najdî ’. They hail from Dar’iyyah in the Najd. The disunion predicted in the above hadîth emerged twelve centuries later. The Wahhâbîs spewed forth from the Najd into the Hijâz, plundering the possessions of Muslims, killing the men and enslaving the women and children. They committed the basest evils, evils reminiscent of the Mongol sack of the Islamic empire centuries before.
Three other related events took place and, indeed, are still taking place, all of which are directly related to the release of those evil forces created by Allah. They all flowed from the emergence of materialism and secularism as the philosophical foundation of the modern western civilization. These were the events :
i) The emergence of ribâ (interest) at the very foundation of the European economy, and the subsequent deadly embrace of the entire world economy by ribâ. The Ottoman Empire was the special target, however, and the decline of this great Islamic State began when it was penetrated by Jewish bankers with ribâ during the rule of Mahmûd II (1808-39). By 1896 the stranglehold of ribâ on the Ottoman economy had put the Sultân in such dire straits that the Zionist leader, Herzl, could finally visit Sultan ‘Abdul Hamîd II and play the card of financial diplomacy which ribâ made possible, i.e. black mail. In return for Palestine he offered ‘…to regulate the entire finances of the Ottoman State…’. ‘Abdul Hamîd refused. He was overthrown by the complicit Nationalist forces, the Khalîfate was abolished – and the Jewish bankers rubbed their hands and declared ‘ mission accomplished ’!
ii) The emergence of shirk at the very foundation of the new European political philosophy. Allah is no longer sovereign. The modern secular State is now sovereign. That modern European model of a State then embraced all of mankind in its deadly embrace, but the seat of the Khalîfate was the special target. After the Khalîfate was abolished the new, modern, secular State of Turkey emerged with that sh irk at its very foundation. From Turkey it went to ‘Abd ul-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd who then transformed the heartland of Islam into the modern State of Saudi Arabia based on the same shirk. Pakistan followed in tame imitation and the great effort of Iqbal became an exercise in futility.
iii) The emergence of a new philosophy of feminism at the very heart of the new, European, secular society. It brought in its wake a sexual revolution which dismantled the edifice of sexual morality. Sexual freedom resulted in an unprecedented explosion of sexual promiscuity and sexual perversions. This was the kath r al-khabath (excessive immorality and sexual perversion) which the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam had declared to be the sign of the great Fitnah of the Dajjâl and the Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj. This destructive sexuality now targeted all of mankind, but the special target was again the World of Islam.
As these events were taking place, the world of Islam witnessed the emergence many lesser Dajjâls (false Prophets); Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the false Prophet of Qadian and founder of the Ahmadiyyah Movement, Elijah Muhammad, the founder of the Nation of Islâm in the U.S.A. et al. The primary role of these and their like was one of corrupting Muslim thought and belief, especially as it related to the accurate perception of the transcendental reality which was now unfolding in the Age of fitan. These were and are tools of the forces which were at work planning the destruction of the Khalîfate and the universal Ummah, and their primary role was one of diverting Islamic thought from that supreme attack which was being launched on the Ummah, and reducing the Islamic intelligentsia to a state of intellectual confusion. They have been eminently successful.
We embarked on this cursory analysis in respect of the transcendental dimension of the historical reality which witnessed the abolition of the Khalîfate, in order to demonstrate that the restoration of the Khalîfate was not possible during these last eight decades. After all, some of those who are hesitant about giving the bay‘ah (oath of allegiance) to an Amîr of a Jamâ‘ah have asked the question : ‘ Why was the Khalîfate not restored somewhere else after it collapsed in Istanbul ? Why have we had no Khalîfate for more than seventy years now ? ’ The reason for this is the nature of the age in which we now live. This is the age when the greatest force of evil ever created by Allah has been released (eventually to appear as a human being – Dajjâl). This is the age of al-Masîh ad-Dajjâl and of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj. That authentic Jamâ‘ah which is struggling for the restoration of the Khalîfate cannot possibly succeed in its efforts unless it first has an accurate perception of today’s objective reality and recognizes this age as the Age of the Dajjâl. That authentic Jamâ‘ah did not exist in 1924. How, then, was it possible to wage a successful struggle for the restoration of the Khalîfate?
We turn now to explain the ‘political reality’ of the age which witnessed the collapse of the Khalîfate, and of the period of time which has elapsed since 1924. Sharîf al-Husayn, great-grandfather of the now deceased King Husayn of Jordan, claimed the Khalîfate on March 7, 1924, four days after the announcement from the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolishing the Khalîfate. He had been appointed by the Ottoman Khalîf as the Sharîf of Makkah, but had rebelled against Istanbul and, as a client of the British, had fully co-operated in the British effort to defeat the Ottoman Empire. His reward was a princely seven million Sterling pounds pay-off from the British Treasury. In claiming the Khalîfate, however, he was in conflict with the basic British and Zionist objective in the war against the Ottoman Empire. The war was not just a war against Turks. It was a war against Islam. The objective was the destruction of the Khalîfate and the emasculation of the Muslim world so that the Jewish State of Israel could be restored, and the faith of Muslims destroyed.
Sharîf al-Husayn’s claim to the Khalîfate threatened the entire scheme of the British and the Zionists. And so they had to get rid of him. They did it with diabolical cunning. They gave the green light to another British client, ‘Abd al-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, head of the Saudi-Wahhâbî alliance which had briefly captured Makkah about a hundred years previously, to attack Husayn. ‘Abd
al-‘Azîz cooperated with the British in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire through concluding a treaty of ‘ Benevolent Neutrality ’ with the British in 1916. His pay-off from the British Treasury for his treachery against Islam was a less princely sum of five thousand Sterling pounds a month. He explained to his gullible so-called Salafî Ikh wân (an armed forced of Wahhâbî zealots used by the Saudi King) that this was jizyah (a punitive tax imposed by Dâr al-Islâm on Christian and Jewish residents). They accepted his explanation, and so, perhaps, do well-paid Saudi clients around the world !
The British-Zionist political strategy succeeded in replacing Husayn with a Saudî-Wahhâbî monarchy which effectively prevented the restoration of the Khalîfate. The plan was simple, yet brilliant. No one could possibly be recognized as Khalîf, and win legitimacy for his Khalîfate, unless he controlled the Haramayn (i.e. Makkah and Madînah) and the Hajj. No one could succeed in controlling the Haramayn and the Hajj so long as the Saudi regime, supported militarily by the West, remained in control of Arabia. And the Saudi-Wahhâbîs would never be so stupid as to claim the Khalifate for themselves. After all, what happened to khalîfate of Sharif al-Husayn was supposed to function as a warning. It did! And the so-called Salafî Wahhâbîs and the Saudi kingdom abandoned the Khalîfate! In doing so they committed an unprecedented act of treachery against Islam. The reality is that the Khalîfate could not, and still cannot, be restored until Arabia is liberated and Dâr al-Islâm is restored.
And while the struggle to restore the Khalîfate must never cease, we also recognize the possibility that the liberation of Arabia may, in all likelihood, not take place until the advent of Imâm al-Mahdî. When the Imâm al-Mahdî does emerge, however, he will need the Jamâ‘ah of Muslims to support him and to struggle with him. This, then, is the imperative for the creation of the authentic Islamic revolutionary movement or Jamâ‘ah.
The destruction of the Khalîfate of Islam was the result of a diabolical conspiracy hatched by the British and the Zionist Jews.
The Saudis and the so-called Salafî-Wahhâbîs acted as willing accomplices in that crime against Islam. The Khalîfate symbolized a system of political organization (ie. Dâr alIslâm) which recognized the supremacy of Islam in public life, and in the international relations of the Muslim world. The emergence of the secular nation-states of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, at the seat of the Khalîfate and in the very heart-land of Islam, paved the way for the secularization of the system of political organization of the Muslim world. And since it was governments of secular nation-States within the Muslim world which would now represent the World of Islam, the implication was that Islam would no longer rule supreme over public life or over the international relations of the Muslim world. Rather the secular State now claimed sovereignty. Recognition of that sovereignty amounted to an act of shirk. And so, the whole world of Islam now found itself, in so far as its collective existence was concerned, within the embrace of shirk,
A more blunt way of saying the same thing would be to say that in so far as public life in the Muslim world was concerned, Allah, the Most High, would no longer be Akbar ! No Muslim can read these lines without feeling great anger against those who betrayed Allah, the Most High, and the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam! The quality of faith (Îmân) of a Muslim can, in fact, be gauged through the manner in which he responds to this pathetic situation. The World of Islam is today without power. The conclusion is that the institution of the Khalîfate, which forms part of Dâr al-Islâm, is indispensable for the restoration of power. Without power there will be many more Bosnias, Kashmirs, Algerias, Chechnyas, Palestines etc. The only way this deplorable state of affairs can be changed is through the restoration of the supremacy of Islam in the public life of Muslims and in the international relations of the Muslim world. That requires the restoration of Dâr al-Islâm and the Khalîfate. We need, therefore, to articulate anew the provisions of the Islamic Public Order (Dâr al-Islâm) and Islam’s Conception of an International Order, and to demonstrate their clear superiority over the secular rival which has emerged from western civilization. We also need to recognize, as this series has made clear, that it is impossible, and will remain impossible, to restore the Khalîfate so long as the Hijâz remains under the control of the Saudi-Wahhâbî alliance. Power cannot be restored without the liberation of the Haramayn and the Hajj from the control of those who participated in the destruction of the Khalîfate. The goal of destroying the Hajj is now within the grasp of the enemies of Islam.
All that is required for that goal to be fully realised is that Masjid alAqsâ be destroyed. The Jewish State of Israel can do that at any time. It is just a matter of choosing the opportune moment. The present Saudi regime has, from its inception, adopted a non-reversible position of acceptance of, and accommodation with, the Jewish State of Israel. The destruction of Masjid al-Aqsâ will, as a result, create greater opposition against Saudi rule over Arabia. The Saudi regime will not be able to control the rage which Muslims will openly express at the time of the Hajj. And yet if the Saudi regime is seen to be unable to control the Hajj, then the internal opposition within Saudi Arabia will put the Hajj to effective use in destabilizing the regime. This is the scenario which will most likely lead the Saudis to suspend the Hajj in order to preserve their rule. Any suspension of the Hajj by the Saudis, as a consequence of security considerations, will be exploited by the West to ensure that the Hajj cannot be resumed. They have the resources to ensure this.
The liberation of the Haramayn and the Hajj will be possible when the Saudi-Wahhâbî alliance breaks down. There are indications that the alliance is already under great pressure and can fall apart. There are many Saudi ‘Ulamâ’ who are now imprisoned or under house arrest. The issues which are most likely to tear the alliance apart would be Saudi ‘ recognition ’ of the Jewish State of Israel (something which has already taken place de facto, and cannot be indefinitely concealed), and the immanent likelihood of the destruction of Masjid al-Aqsâ by the Jews.
As events unfold they will confirm the basic points argued in this treatise.