Category Archives: Imam Abu Hanifa

Salafism and Barelwism- Two Deviants at two opposite ends of extremes

[By Maulana Ahmad Sadeq Desai d.b]

Two mutant accretions  which have  become  attached  to  Islam  in these  times  are  the  two  deviant groups of  Bid’ah, viz.,  the Barelwi grave-worshippers  and  the  Salafi worshippers  of the  nafs.  Both these  groups are  extremists, having  veered sharply  off  from  Siraatul  Mustaqeem  (the  Straight  Path of the  Qur’aan  and  Sunnah). Both  groups are  guilty  of  ghulu’  fid-deen  (excess committed  in the Deen).  All  types  of ghulu’  fid-deen  are  haraam  and  destructive. The  Qur’aan  Majeed prohibits excesses. Allah Ta’ala says: 

“O  People  of the  Kitaab! Do  not  commit  ghulu‘  (excess)  in   your  Deen  and  do  not  speak about  Allah,  but  the  Haqq  (truth).”   (Qur’an – 4:171)

  Bid’ah  and  Ghulu’  were  common  acts  of deviation  perpetrated by  the  Yahood  (Jews)  and  Nasaara (Christians). Whenever  a  Muslim  veers off  from  the  straight  path of  the  Sunnah, he  emulates the example  of the  Ahl-e-Kitaab  in their practise  of ghulu’  fid-deen. Just  as the  Jews  and  Christians committed ghulu’ in abundance, so do the two deviant Barelwi and Salafi sects.

 While  the  Ahl-e-Kitaab  committed  excesses  in  their religions in different  ways,  they  differed in  their attitudes.  The  ghulu’  of  the  Yahood  was the  product  of their extreme  disrespect  for the  Ambiyaa while  the  ghulu’  of the  Nasaara  was  the  consequence  of their  extreme  veneration  for their Nabi (Nabi Isaa  –  alayhis salaam). The  Ghulu’  of  the  Yahood  led  them  to  murder  the Ambiyaa  (alayhimus salaam). In  contrast,  the ghulu’  of the  Nasaara  led  them  to  elevate  Nabi Isaa (alayhis salaam)  and even his mother, Hadhrat Maryam (alayhas salaam) to the level of gods and beings of worship. 

Yahood And Nasara 

In  our time,  the  Salafis resemble  the Yahood  and  the  Barelwis are  the  specimen of the  Nasaara.  The Salafis are  totally  barren  –  spiritually  dry  to  the  point  of  vulgarity.  They  are  rude,  crude  and  even cruel in their  attitude. They  lack  respect  for  the  illustrious personalities  of Islam,  especially  for  the great  Salf-e-Saaliheen,  viz.,  the Fuqaha-e-Mujtahideen  who  were  the  Students  of  the  noble Sahaabah. Not  only  are they  crude  and  disrespectful,  but  they  are  also  devious, for when they discuss with  the Ulama  of  the  Ahlus Sunnah  or they  speak in public,  they  guard  their tongues. They deviously  praise  the  Fuqaha of  the  Math-habs  while  subtly  negating  the  Waajib  Shar’i concept  of Taqleed. However,  in their  private  discussions  or  when  conversing  with ignorant  members  of  the Ahlus Sunnah, they  mercilessly  and  rudely  condemn  the  great  Imaams.  Thus, they  are  like  the  Jews who murdered the  Ambiyaa (alayhimus salaam)  despite  their  overt  acknowledgement  of  the Nubuwwat  of Allah’s Messengers. The  only  difference  between  the  Salafi deviates and  the  Jewish murderers  of  the  Ambiyaa  (alayhimus  salaam)  is  that  the  crimes  of  the two groups are  committed in different  planes.  The  Yahood  physically  murdered  the  Ambiyaa  (alayhimus  salaam). The  Salafis spiritually  murder  the  Rasool (sallallahu  alayhi wasallam)  by  negating  most  deviously  the  Sunnah  of Nabi-e-Kareem  (sallallahu  alayhi  wasallam).  Those  who  are  not  prepared to  submit  to  the  Fuqaha  – the illustrious Students of the Sahaabah – are denying and killing the Sunnah by shaitaani deception.

The Sahaabah (radhiyallahu anhum) 

It should  be  well  understood  that  the  Sunnah  is  inextricably  interwoven with  the life and  teaching  of the Sahaabah.  The  Sahaabah  handed the  Sunnah  most  meticulously  by  way  of practical  example and teaching  to  the  Taabi-een  who  constituted  the first  group  of  Aimmah-e-Mujtahideen  in the  Ummah after  the  Sahaabah. Thus,  obedience  to  these  great  Scholars and  Ulama among  the  Taabi-een is pure obedience  to  the  Sahaabah, which  in turn  is  the  Waajib  obedience  of the  Rasool  (sallallahu  alayhi wasallam). 

When the  Qur’aan  and  Hadith  are  subjected  to  personal opinion  or  the  opinions and  interpretations of a  single  Aalim  appearing  on  the  Islamic scene  a thousand  years  after  the  Sahaabah, are  accepted as ‘Wahi’  and  the  final  word  of rectitude  in preference  to  the  interpretations and  rulings of those who had  acquired  their  Ilm  (Knowledge)  from  the Sahaabah, it  is pure  deviation  (dhalaal) and rejection  of the  Sunnah  of  the  Sahaabah. Such people  have  no  right  to  call  themselves  the  Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah. Their claim is palpably baseless.


The  other  extremity  of  the  disease  of ghulu’  is  the  Barelwi  sect.  While these  people  purport  to  follow the Sahaabah  and  overtly  proclaim  themselves  as  followers  of  the  Math-habs, they  are  bereft  of  the Aqeedah  (Belief)  propagated by  the  Math-habs  of the  Ahlus Sunnah. Their adherence  to  the  Mathhabs relates  to  only  the external dimension, i.e. to  Fiqh, and  that  too, partially. They  commit wholesale Bid’ah  (innovation). They  destroy  their concept  of Tauheed with a number  of beliefs  of shirk. They  perpetrate  acts  of grave-worship. They  elevate  the  Nabi  (sallallahu  alayhi wasallam)  and the Auliyaa  (rahmatullah  alayhim)  to  the  pedestal  of Godhood. In  their  excessive  veneration  they resemble the  Nasaara  who  deify  Hadhrat Isaa (alayhis  salaam)  and  his noble  Mother,  Hadhrat Maryam (alayhas salaam).

  Muslims  should  beware  of  both these  mutant  groups.  They  are  astray.  They  have  left  the  Path  of the Ahlus Sunnah  Wal Jama’ah.  Inspite  of their  deviation,  they  dub  themselves,  Ahlus  Sunnah  and  Sunni. But, their claims are false. 

The salient features or symptoms of their spiritual diseases are: 

The  Salafis reject  the  four  Math-habs;  they  lack  taqwa;  they  are  disrespectful,  their Salaat is absolutely  devoid  of  khushu’;  they  fiddle profusely  in their Salaat;  they  are  unable  to  stand motionless  in  their Salaat;  they  sway  to  and  from  in their Salaat;  they  are  obsessed  with  obedience to the views of Ibn Taimiyyah and the modernist Al-Albaani.

  The  Barelwis  prostrate  to  the  graves  of the  Auliyaa;  they  make  tawaaf  of  the graves;  they  decorate the graves  with expensive  quilts  and  sheets, they  practise  meelad, urs,  etc.;  they  believe  in  the omnipresence  of  the  Rasool (sallallahu  alayhi  wasallam);  their  headquarters  are  the graveyards where they erect mausolea (tombs) for generation of financial income.


  The  opposite  poles  of these  two  deviant  groups  is  their diverging  beliefs regarding  the  attributes  of omnipresence.  The  Salafis  have  stripped Allah  Ta’ala  of His Attribute  of  Omnipresence  and  have assigned Him  into  a specified section  of created space. In  stark  contrast  to  this evil  concept  of the Salafis, the  evil  belief  of  the Barelwis  have  bestowed  the  attribute  of  omnipresence  to  Rasulullah (sallallahu  alayhi  wasallam). While not  negating  the  Omnipresence  of Allah  Ta’ala, the  Barelwis commit  shirk  in this  Divine  Attribute, by  their  shirki bestowal  of the  Attribute  to  our Nabi (sallallahu alayhi wasallam). 


Waseelah literally means medium. Waseelah has different meanings according to the different sects. According to the Ahlus Sunnah, the meaning of waseelah when supplicating, i.e. making Dua to Allah Ta’ala, is to petition Allah Ta’ala for one’s needs and to tender the medium of a Nabi or a Wali or even the medium of one’s own pious deeds. Example:
“O Allah! Accept my dua through the waseelah of Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) – or through the medium of a certain amal-e-saalih which I had rendered solely for Your pleasure.”

In this type of waseelah, the dua is made directly to Allah Ta’ala, not to the Nabi, etc. It is not permissible to supplicate to any being besides Allah Ta’ala. To make dua to any being besides Allah Ta’ala is shirk in terms of the Shariah.

According to the Salafi extremists, supplicating in this way is not permissible. Even this form of waseelah in which the supplication is made directly to Allah Ta’ala, is considered shirk by the Salafis. According to the Barelwi Bid’atis, it is compulsory to make dua directly to Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) or to the Wali in the grave. Since Dargah-Puja (or worship of the graves of the saints) forms an integral part of the Aqeedah of the Qabar Pujaari sect, they consider it imperative to make dua to Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) or to the Auliya in their graves.


From these two issues, viz. the Haazir-Naazir and the Waseelah questions, it will be seen that both these groups have strayed far from the Moderate Path of the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah. While the one group negates Omnipresence for Allah Ta’ala, the other sect ascribes it to even created brings. While the one group of Bid’atis (the Salafis) refute waseelah in even its lawful form, the other group of Bid’atis (the Barelwis) go to the opposite extreme of developing it into a concept of shirk whereby divinity is conferred to Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) and the Auliya. In this deviation, they have fallen into the same trap as the Christian and other peopleof shirk.

Besides the clarity of Shar’i proofs for the views of the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah, commonsense will acknowledge the simple and convincing reasoning of those who ascribe to the Middle Path of the Deen.

Beliefs cannot be based on weird concoctions of the minds of people. Beliefs require absolute Qur’aanic and Hadith facts and proofs. No shaitaani analogical reasoning is valid for any deduction of masaa-il, leave alone beliefs.

May  Allah  Ta’ala  save  Muslims from  the  evil  and  ruin  of dhalaal (deviation).

The Divine Attributes: Ahlus Sunnah vs. Mujassimah (Psuedo-Salafiyyah)

The  Belief  of  Ahlus  Sunnah  wa  l-Jamā‘ah

In  the  view  of  Ahlus  Sunnah  wa  l-Jamā‘ah,  Allāh  (subhānuhū  wa  ta‘ālā)  is  totally  unlike  His creation.  There  is  nothing  in  His  essence  (dhāt),  attributes  (sifāt)  or  actions  (af‘āl)  that  resembles in any  way  anything  found  in  creation.  This  is  the  clear  position  of  Ahlus  Sunnah,  and  is  the decisive  and  definitive  verdict  given  by  the  Qur’ān,  Sunnah,  sayings  of  the  Salaf  and  the  Ahlus Sunnah  who  followed. Allāh  (subhānuhū  wa  ta‘ālā)  says in  the  Qur’ān:  “No  thing  is  as  His  likeness.”  (42:11) ءيش هلثمك سي This  verse,  which  is  the  foundation  for  Sunnī  doctrine  concerning  the  oneness  and  uniqueness of  Allāh  (subhānuhū  wa  ta‘ālā),  expressly  negates any  and  all  similarity  between  Creator  and creation.  There  are  a  few  points  to  note  about the  verse:

1.  The  form  of  the  sentence  is  “nafy  (negation)  in  the  context of  nakirah  (an  indefinite noun).”  Shay’  (thing)  is  an  indefinite  noun  and  it has  been  negated  using  the  word  laysa. It  is  an  established  principle  of  Nahw  (Arabic  grammar)  that  a  nafy  in  the  context  of nakirah  connotes  total  negation.  In  other  words,  the  form  of  the  sentence  grammatically entails  that  there  is  absolutely  nothing  whatsoever  that  resembles  Allāh  (subhānuhū  wa ta‘ālā).

2.  The  terms  used  for  resemblance  in  this  verse  are  two:  one  particle  (harf),  ka  (like),  and one  noun  (ism),  mithl  (likeness).  This  compounding  of  terms  used  for  resemblance negates the  minutest  possible  similarity.  For  instance,  if one  were  to  say,  “Zayd  is  not  a lion”  (laysa  Zaydun  asadan),  this  would  negate  only  a  gross  resemblance.  If  one  were  to say,  “Zayd  is  not  like  a  lion”  (laysa  Zaydun  ka  asadin),  this  would  negate  similarity  with  a lion  to  a  greater  degree.  And  if one  were  to  say,  “Zayd  is  not  as  the  likeness  of  a  lion,” (laysa  Zaydun  ka  mithli  asadin)  it  would  be  to  negate  any  similarity  between  Zayd  and  a lion.  

Imām  al-Bayhaqī  (384  –  458  H) said: “When  Allāh  intended  to  negate  tashbīh  (making  a  resemblance  between  Allāh  and  His creation)  in  the  most emphatic  way  that  a  negation  can  [possibly]  be  made,  He  put together  in  our  recitation  the  particles  of  similitude  (i.e.  ka)  with  the  noun  of resemblance  (i.e.  mithl),  so  that  the  negation  is  emphasised  to  the  utmost.”  (Al-Asmā’  wa l-Sifāt,  2:34)

The  word  mithl  (likeness)  is  the  broadest  term  of  equation.  It  incorporates  similarity  in every  possible  dimension,  whether  in  appearance,  qualities  or  actions.  Other  words  of equation,  like  shaklnidd  and  musāwī  are  narrower  than  mithl.  Hence,  this  entails  a negation  of  similarity  in  all  respects,  as  it  means,  “no  thing  is  as  His  likeness  in  any respect.”

Imām al-Rāghib al-Asbahānī said in Mufradāt al-Qur’ān: “Mithl  is  an  expression  about resemblance  with  something  in  any  property  from  its properties,  whatever  property  it may  be.  It  is  broader  than  other  words  designated  for resemblance.  That  is,  nidd  is  said  about  something  that  shares in  essence  only,  shibh  is said  about  something  that  shares in  quality  only,  musāwī  is  said  about  something  that shares in  quantity  only,  shakl  is  said  about  something  that  shares in  measure  and  distance only.  Mithl  is  broader  than  all  of  that.  This  is  why  when  Allāh  (Exalted  is  He)  wished  to negate  tashbīh  from  every  dimension,  He  mentioned  this  specifically,  so  He  said:  laysa  ka mithlihī shay’.”  (al-Mufradāt,  p.  597)

Hence,  the  verse  is  absolutely  categorical  in  its  indication  that  Allāh  (subhānuhū  wa  ta‘ālā)  is totally  unlike  His  creation.   As  for  rational proof,  if  we  were  to  assert  that  there  was  any  similarity  between  Allāh  and  His creation,  it would  entail  that  the  beginningless  entity,  Allāh,  has  within  Him  some  attributes  of temporal or  originated  entities.  This  would  entail  that  the  beginningless  is  originated,  at  least  in some  aspects,  and  that  is  absurd,  as  “beginningless”  is  the  opposite  of  “originated”  and  they cannot  come  together.  Imām  al-Bayhaqī  expressed  this  in  the  following  words: “Further,  it is  known  that  the  Creator  of  creation  does  not  resemble  anything  of  the  creation, because  if He  resembled  any  originated  thing  in  any  way,  He  would  resemble  it in  origination from  that  aspect,  and  it is  impossible  for  the  beginningless  to  be  temporal,  or  beginningless from  one  angle  and  temporal from  another.”  (al-I‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād,  p.  37)

Furthermore,  if any  aspect  or  quality  of  temporality  were  to  exist  in  the  necessary  and beginingless  existence  of  Allāh  (subhānuhū  wa  ta‘ālā),  the  same  laws  that  apply  to  temporal entities would  apply  to  Him.  For  temporal entities,  their  being  and  attributes  are  only  possible, whereas  for  Allah  they  are  necessary. 

And  it is  not  possible  for  something  to  be  possible  and necessary  simultaneously. As  for  the  recorded  view  of  the  Salaf,  Imām  Abū  Ja‘far  al-Tahāwī  (239  –  321  H) transmitted from  the  founders  of  the  Hanafī school,  Imām  Abū  Hanīfah  (80  –  150  H),  Imām  Abū  Yūsuf (113  –  182  H)  and  Imām  Muhammad  al-Shaybānī  (132  –  189  H)(rahimahumullah): “Whoever  describes Allāh  with  a  meaning  (or  property)  from  the  meanings  (or  properties)  of man,  he  has  disbelieved.”

Here,  Imām  al-Tahāwī (rahmatullah alaih) is  clear  that  it is  not  the  wording  or  outward  expressions  that  matter,  but the  meaning  and  substance.  If  any  actual  or  ontological reality  of  a  created  being  is  believed  to exist  in  Allāh,  that  is  comparing  Him  to  creation  and  is  disbelief.   As  for  the  later  Ahlus  Sunnah,  the  books  of  ‘aqīdah  have  clearly  incorporated  this  fundamental doctrine  into  the  very  foundation  of  Islāmic  belief,  Tawhīd.  In  defining  Tawhīd,  Shaykh  Burhān al-Dīn  Ibrāhīm  al-Laqānī  al-Mālikī rahimahullah (d.  1041  H)  and  many  others  said: “It  is  to  single  out  the  Deity  for  worship,  along  with  believing  in  His  oneness,  in  essence, attributes  and  actions.” (Hidāyat  al-Murīd  li Jawharat  al-Tawhīd,  1:83) 

The  commentators  of  Jawharat  al-Tawhīd  and  other  ‘aqīdah  texts  explain  that  oneness  in  essence means:  Allāh  has  only  one  being  and  there  is  nothing  else  akin  to  His  being;  oneness  in attributes  means:  He  has  only  one  of  each  attribute,  like  power,  knowledge,  hearing,  seeing  and will,  and  no  other  being  has  an  attribute  akin  to  it in  any  way;  and  oneness  in  actions  means:  He alone  is  the  true  active  agent  in  the  created  realm,  bringing  things  into  being  from  nonbeing  and taking  things  out  of  existence  after  existence,  and  no  other  being  has  any  real  action. Hāfiz  Ibn  Hajar  al-‘Asqalānī rahimahullah (d.  852  H)  states in  Fath  al-Bārī  on  the  meaning  of  Tawhīd according  to  Ahlus  Sunnah: “As for  the  Ahlus  Sunnah,  they  explain  Tawhīd  as  negating  similarity  [with  Allāh]  and [negating]  nullification  [of  His  attributes].  Thus,  al-Junayd  [al-Baghdādī]  said  in  that  which  Abu l-Qāsim  al-Qushayrī related:  ‘Tawhīd  is  to  single  out  the  Beginningless  from  the  temporal.’” (Fath  al-Bārī,  13:421)

The  Attributes  of  Allāh

Once  the  above  has  been  settled,  the  question  arises:  what  of  the  established  attributes  and names  of  Allāh  which  have  counterparts  within  creation,  like  knowledge,  hearing,  seeing,  life, speech,  power,  will and  so  on?? Do  they  not  suggest that  there  is  indeed  some  degree  of similarity  between  Creator  and  creation??

In  answer  to  this,  it must  firstly  be  understood  that  true  similarity  or  resemblance  between  two entities  occurs  only  in  their  actual external realities,  meaning,  in  things that  have  actual  existence or  an  ontological  reality  in  the  beings of  those  entities.  Based  on  this,  the  following  aspects will not  be  considered  true  resemblance  as  they  do  not  entail  any  similarity  in  the  external  realities of  the  entities:

1.  The  consequences  or  relations of  attributes.  For  example,  the  consequence  of  “hearing” is  to  perceive  sounds.  However,  this  is  not  the  reality  of  hearing  as  it subsists  in  the being  of  the  entity  that  hears.  The  reality  of  hearing  as  we  know  it  is  “to  perceive  sounds with  the  two  ears.”  This  reality  is  restricted  to  creation.  As  for  the  reality  of  the  hearing of  Allāh,  there  is  absolutely  no  similarity  of  it  with  creation,  and  we  are  not  aware  of  it. We  do  know  the  consequence  of  it,  however,  which  is  “to  perceive  sounds.” 

This  degree of  similarity  in  the  consequences  of  the  attributes  entails  no  similarity  in  the  actual realities  of  the  entities themselves.  In  other  words,  by  stating  that  sounds  are  not  hidden to  Allāh,  or  that  they  are  disclosed  to  Him  by  virtue of  a  particular  attribute  He possesses called  sam‘,  says nothing  about  a  description  of  the  external  reality  of  this attribute  in  the  being  of  Allāh.  Similarly,  Allāh’s  attributes  of  knowledge,  power,  seeing, will and  life  are  understood  according  to  the  dictates or  relations of  these  attributes  and not  on  how  they  subsist  in  the  being  of  Allāh.  These  attributes  according  to  the  Ahlus Sunnah  (as  opposed  to  the  Mu‘tazilah  and  Jahmiyyah)  do  enjoy  a  real,  unchanging  and non-temporal  ontological  existence  within  the  essence  of  Allāh.  That  reality  however  is beyond  the  human  mind  and  is  absolutely  incomprehensible,  as  Imām  al-Tahāwī rahimahullah mentioned in his ‘Aqīdah:

“Imaginations do  not  reach  Him,  comprehensions do  not  grasp  Him.”

This  is  applicable  to  many  other  attributes,  like  mercy,  love,  anger,  pleasure  and  so  on. The  famous  early  Ash‘arī scholar,  Abū  Bakr  ibn  Fūrak rahimahullah (d.  406  H) ,  said  about the  mercy of Allāh as it comes in one particular hadīth: “The  mercy  itself  [as  it subsists  in  the  essence  of  Allāh]  may  not  retreat  or  proceed  with a  limit  or  end,  because  it is,  according  to  us,  an  attribute  from  the  attributes  of  His essence  that  He  has  borne  in  eternity.  What  is  intended  here  is  an  indication  to  the mercy  which  you  attain  from  Allāh,  because  that  which  comes  about  from  something and  is  connected  to  it is  often  given  its  name,  just  as  something  that  appears  from  the power  of  Allāh  (Glorified  is  He)  from  His  actions  is  called  ‘the  power  of  Allāh.’  The meaning  of  this  is  that  it came  about from  His  power.  Similarly,  that  which  appears from  one  with  pre-eternal mercy  may  be  called  mercy  by  way  of  flexibility  in  speech.” (Mushkil  al-Hadīth,  p.  112)

In  other  words,  when  we  describe  attributes  like  hearing,  seeing,  power,  knowledge,  will, life,  mercy,  love,  anger,  pleasure  and  so  on,  we  are  not  describing  them  as  they  subsist  in the  essence  of  Allāh,  as  that  can  never  be  comprehended.  Rather,  we  describe  their connections,  relations,  outcomes  and  so  on.

  However,  this  does  not  mean  we  negate that  they  have  a  beginningless,  unchanging  and  intangible  reality  in  the  essence  of  Allāh as the Mu‘tazilah do. This  also  applies to  divine  actions.  If  we  say  a  worldly  ruler  “honours”  or  “debases”  one of  his  subjects,  the  reality  of  this  action  would  be  to,  for  example,  write  a  decree  and send  it to  a  governor  to  exalt  or  lessen  his  rank.  The  consequence  of  this  action  is  for the  subject  to  have  a  higher  or  lower  position.  When  we  say  Allāh  “honours”  or  He “debases,”  the  reality  of  this  action  bears  absolutely  no  resemblance  to  the  reality  of  the action  of  man.  However,  its  relation,  in  terms of  the  effect  the  action  produces,  may bear  some  resemblance. 

This  is  not  similarity  in  the  external  realities  of  these  attributes but in a relational or consequential property.  Another  example  is  “existence”  itself.  Existence  is  a  relational  attribute  that  merely conveys  the  reality  that  there  is  an  entity  that  enjoys  an  ontological  presence  outside  of the human mind. It does not say anything descriptive about the reality itself.

2.  The  absence  of  attributes.  For  example,  if we  say,  “angels  do  not  sleep,”  and  we  say, “Allāh  does  not  sleep,”  this  is  a  resemblance  in  the  absence  of  attributes,  and  not  a resemblance  in  any  true  reality  that  subsists  in  either  of  them.  Hence,  this  is  not  an actual resemblance.  When  we  say  Allāh  is  self-subsisting,  dissimilar  to  creation,  one, transcendent,  beginningless,  without  end  and  so  on,  we  are  not  affirming  any  positive external realities  subsisting  in  Allāh’s  being.  Rather,  we  are  saying  what  He  is  not.  Hence, there  is  no  question  of  anthropomorphism  or  regarding  Allāh  similar  to  His  creation  in this.

Thus,  the  divine  attributes  in  the  Qur’ān  and  Sunnah  which  outwardly  and  nominally  bear resemblance  with  creation  do  not  give  the  indication  of  any  real similarity.  The  similarity  is  only in  consequences  and  connections  or  in  the  absence  of  something,  which  does  not  represent  any external reality  of  the  beings  themselves.  This  is  how  many  names  and  attributes  of  Allāh  can easily  be  understood. Hence,  these  attributes  are  readily  affirmed  and  one  will notice  that  these are  the  more  frequently  mentioned  attributes  of  Allāh  in  the  Qur’ān  and  Sunnah  e.g.  the oneness  of  Allāh,  His  absolute  power,  hearing,  seeing,  knowledge,  life,  mercy,  love,  generosity, transcendence,  self-subsistence  and  so  on.

The  Sifāt  Khabariyyah

However,  there  are  certain  attributes  and  actions  known  as  sifāt  khabariyyah (characteristics which  outwardly  suggest physical/bodily  parts),  like  hand,  foot,  eye,  laughter,  and  ascension (istiwā’),  for  which  even  a  relational meaning  or  negative  meaning  is  often  difficult to  decipher. For  these,  two  views  have  emerged  from  the  early  scholars:  

1.  One is  the  way  of  the  Salaf,  which  is  to  consign  their  realities  to  Allāh,  while  having surety that the literal meaning is not intended, e.g. eye is not a physical organ of sight.

2.  The  second  is  to  interpret  them  according  to  the  context  in  where  they  appear,  which  is the  methodology  of  many  of  the  later  scholars.

On  the  first  view,  these  ascriptions  are  affirmed  as  actual intangible  attributes  in  the  being  of Allāh  just  like  power  and  will,  or  as  attributes of  action  like  honouring  and  debasing,  but  like other  attributes  that  are  affirmed,  their  reality  is  consigned  to  the  knowledge  of  Allāh.  However, their  connections and  relations may  be  described,  expanded  upon  and  comprehended.  On  the second  view,  these  “attributes”  or  ascriptions  do  not  have  any  reality  in  the  essence  of  Allāh  but are  reducible  to  other  attributes  or  to  particular  aspects  of  other  attributes,  like  will,  power  and knowledge.

Imām  al-Bayhaqī rahimahullah (384  –  458  H)  explicitly  mentions  these  two  methodologies  of  the  early scholars  in  his  work  on  Islāmic  beliefs called  al-I‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād.  He  says: “[Some]  amongst  them  accepted  it,  believed  in  it and  did  not  interpret  it  but  consigned  its knowledge  to  Allāh,  while  negating  kayfiyyah  (modality)  and  similarity  [with  creation]  from  Him. [Some]  amongst  them  accepted  it,  believed  in  it and  interpreted  it in  a  manner  whose  usage  is valid  linguistically,  and  does  not  contradict  the  oneness  [of  Allāh].  We  have  mentioned  these two  approaches  in  the  book  Kitāb  al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt.”  (al-I‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād, p.  120)

The  first  view,  known  as  tafwīd  (consignment),  is  the  preferred  methodology,  related  from  the earlier  Salaf,  as  will be  shown  below.  

The  second  methodology  was  that  of  many  of  the  later  scholars.  For  example,  the  great commentator  of  hadīth  from  the  fourth  Hijrī century,  Abū  Sulaymān  al-Khattābī rahimahullah (319  –  388 H),  says under  the  commentary  of  a  hadīth  from  Sahīh  al-Bukhārī  which  ascribes a  “foot”  to Allāh:

Abū  ‘Ubayd  [al-Qāsim  ibn  Sallām  (d.  224  H)]  –  who  was  one  of  the  imāms from  the  people  of knowledge  –  would  say:  We  narrate  these  hadīths  and  we  do  not  search  for  meanings  for them.” Then  he  says: “We  are  more  worthy  of  not  advancing  into  that  which  those  with  more  knowledge  and  more senior  in  era  and  age  retreated  from.” 

He  then  says:

However,  the  time  that  which  we  are  in,  its  people  have  evolved  into  two  camps:  the  denier  of what  has  been  narrated  of  these  hadīths  entirely  and  a  belier  of  them  completely  and  in  this  is [entailed]  accusing  the  scholars  who  narrated  these  hadīths  of  lying,  while  they  are  the  imāms of religion,  the  transmitters  of  the  sunnahs and  the  intermediaries  between  us  and  the  Messenger of  Allāh  (Allāh  bless  him  and  grant  him  peace);  and  the  second  group  accept  the  narration  of them,  adopting  a  path  in  actualising  the  outward  of  them  which  almost  leads  them  to  tashbīh. We  are  averse  to  both  approaches,  and  we  are  not  pleased  with  either  of  them  as  a methodology.  Thus,  it is  necessary  for  us  to  search  –  with  respect  to  the  hadīths  that  have  been transmitted  when  authentic  in  terms of  transmission  and  chain  –  for  an  interpretation  that emerges  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  of  the  foundations of  religion  and  the  views  of  the scholars,  and  we  do  not  nullify  their  narration  completely  when  their  routes are  accepted  and their  transmitters  righteous.”  (A‘lām  al-Hadīth,  p.  1907)

Al-Bayhaqī  rahimahullah quotes  this  statement  of  al-Khattabi  in  his  al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt  (2:192-3).

Hence,  al-Khattābī   rahimahullah accepts  figuratively  interpreting  the  sifāt  khabariyyah  mentioned  in  the hadīths,  but  only  in  the  context  in  which  he  was  living,  where  people  were  adopting  a  path  of affirmation  which  took  them  close  to  anthropomorphism.  In  the  same  passage,  he  offers  an interpretation  of  the  “foot”  of  Allāh  as  that  which  Allāh  has  sent  forth  into  the  fire. 

However,  al-Khattābī   rahimahullah says he  only  takes  this  approach  with  attributes  that  appear  infrequently in  some  hadīths.  With  regards  to  frequently  mentioned  sifāt  khabariyyah,  he  adopts  the  approach of  tafwīd.  He  says: “If  it is  said:  Why  do  you not  interpret  hand  and  face  in  this  manner  of  interpretation,  and consider  these  terms  metaphors  likewise? It  will be  said:  These  attributes  are  mentioned  in  the Book  of  Allāh  (Exalted  is  He)  with  their  names,  and  they  are  attributes  of  praise,  and  the default  is  that  every  attribute  mentioned  in  the  Book  and  are  authentic  by  reports  of  continuous transmission  or  narrated  through  the  route of  solitary  reporters  but  has  a  basis  in  the  Book  or emerges  from  some  of  its  principles,  then  we  profess  it and  we  let  it proceed  on  its  outward, without  giving  it  a  modality.  And  that  which  does  not  have  any  mention  in  the  Book,  nor  a basis  in  continuous  transmission  and  has  no  connection  to  the  principles  of  the  Book,  and  were we  to  let  it proceed  on  its  outward,  it would  lead  [some  people]  to  tashbīh,  we  will  interpret  it with  a  meaning  which  the  speech  accommodates and  by  which  the  meaning  of  tashbīh  will be eliminated.  This  is  the  difference  between  what  has  been  transmitted  of  the  mention  of  foot, leg  and  shin  [on  the  one  hand]  and  hand,  face  and  eye  [on  the  other].” (A‘lām  al-Hadīth,  1911)

By  the  statement  “we  let  it  proceed  on  its  outward,”  al-Khattābī  rahimahullah  means  leave  it  as  it has  come  in the  narrations  without  delving  into  its  interpretation  or  meaning.  He  negates “modality”  or  kayf, which  is  to  negate,  as  a  starting  principle,  the  literal meanings  of  these  attributes,  as  Allāh  is  free of  these  meanings.  As  he  says elsewhere  in  the  same  book: “The  meaning  of  yad  (hand)  according  to  us  is  not  a  physical appendage  [as  is  its  literal meaning].  Rather,  it is  an  attribute  brought  forth  by  restraint  [at  the  text].  Thus,  we  let  it proceed  as  it has  come,  and  we  do  not  give  it a  modality,  and  we  hold  back  to  where  the  Book and  the  authentically  transmitted  reports  kept  us.  This  is  the  way  of  Ahlus  Sunnah  wa  lJamā‘ah.”  (A‘lām  al-Hadīth,  p  2347)

The  Position  of  the  Salaf:Negating  Physical  Descriptions  of  Allāh

It  is  famously  transmitted  from  the  imām  of  the  people  of  Madīnah, Imam Mālik  ibn  Anas  Rahimahullah (93  –  179 H),  that  he  was  asked  about the  istiwā’ (ascension)  of  Allāh  as  mentioned  in  the  Qur’ān  (20:5 and  other  verses).  Imām  Mālik rahimahullah replied,  as  reported  by  al-Bayhaqī  rahimahullah with  his  chain:  

“The  istiwā’  is  known,  kayf  is  incomprehensible,  belief  in  it is  necessary  and  asking  about it  is innovation.”  (al-I‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād,  p.  119)

This  is  authentic  from  Imām  Mālik (rahimahullah).  It  has  also  been  reported  by  Abū  Nu‘aym  in  Hilyat  alAwliyā’,  al-Bayhaqī  in  al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt,  al-Lālakā’ī in  Sharh  Usūl  I‘tiqād  Ahl  al-Sunnah,  Qādī ‘Iyād  in  Tartīb  al-Madārik  and  others.  By,  “istiwā’  is  known”  Imām  Mālik  rahimahullah conveys  the  truth  of  what  the  Qur’ān  says.  In  other  words,  the  Qur’ān  certainly affirms the  istiwā’  of  Allāh  and  we  confirm  the  reality  of  istiwā’  as  the  Qur’ān  intends  it.  What is  the  reality  of  that  istiwā’??  Imām  Mālik rahimahullah says:  “Asking  about it  is  innovation!”

Moreover,  Imām Mālik (rahmatillah alaih) says there  is  something  positive  we  can  say  about the  istiwā’,  which  is:  kayf  is incomprehensible  for  it.  Kayf  means “how”.  How  is  an  istiwā’,  how  is  a  hand,  how  is  an  eye?? An istiwā’  may  be  quick,  slow,  from  a  short  distance,  a  long  distance  and  so  on.  A  hand  can  be  big or  small,  an  eye  can  be  round  or  thin,  blue  or  brown,  and  so  on.  These  all  fall  under  kayf.  This kayf  is  incomprehensible  for  Allāh,  as  Allāh  is  free  of  all  these  physical  qualities  of  creation.  In another  version,  Imām  Mālik rahimahullah said:  “Kayf  is  removed  (marfū‘)  from  Allāh.” As  in,  kayf  does  not  pertain  to  or  relate  to  Allāh.  Hence,  the  literal meanings  of  these  words  are  not  what  is  meant.  In  fact,  the  literal meaning  which  incorporates, by  necessity,  some  of  what  falls  under  kayf,  is  explicitly  negated.  Instead,  istiwā’  is  affirmed  for Allāh  with  a  meaning  that  is  known  to  Him,  and  which  to  ask  about is  innovation.  This,  in  a nutshell,  is  the  methodology  of  the  Salaf

a)  to  negate  bodily  attributes,

b)  to  affirm  the  sifāt khabariyya with  a  meaning  known  to  Allāh  and 

c)  to  admit  ignorance  of  that  meaning. 

Imām  al-Bayhaqī rahimahullah transmits  this  position  from  the  early  scholars,  declaring  it the  correct methodology.  He  says: “Further,  the  correct  methodology  in  all  this  is  sufficing  with  what  brings with  it  restraint  [at the  text],  without  giving  it a  modality.  This  is  what  the  earlier  ones from  our  scholars  adopted as  well as  those  who  followed  them  from  the  later  ones,  and  they  said:  The  istiwā’  on  the throne  has  been  stated  in  the  Book  in  various  verses and  have  been  transmitted  in  the  reports.” (al-I‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād,  p.  118)

  In  another  version  of  the  statement  from  Imām  Mālik rahimahullah which  al-Bayhaqī rahimahullah narrates  with  a  chain graded  excellent  (jayyid)  by  Ibn  Hajar  al-‘Asqalānī rahimahullah,  he  says: “The  Most  Merciful  ascended  the  Throne  as  He  described  Himself.  It  is  not  said  ‘how?’  and ‘how’  is  removed  from  Him.” (Al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt,  2:304-5)

In  al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt,  Imām  al-Bayhaqī rahimahullah shows  the  Salaf  would  negate  physical descriptions, while  affirming  what  has  been  transmitted  of  the  sifāt  khabariyyah.  He  says: “We  have  related  [the  position  of]  leaving  discussion  on  the  likes of  this  from  the  early  ones of our  companions.  This  is  along  with  their  belief  in  the  negation  of  limit,  tashbīh  and  tamthīl from  Allāh,  Glorified  and  Exalted  is  He.  Faqīh  Abū  Bakr  Ahmad  ibn  Muhammad  ibn  al-Hārith al-Asbahānī  reported  to  us:  Abū  Muhammad  ibn  Hayyān  reported  to  us:  Ishāq ibn  Ahmad  alFārisī narrated  to  us:  Hafs  ibn  ‘Umar  al-Mahraqānī  narrated  to  us:  Abū  Dāwūd  [al-Tayālisī] narrated  to  us:  He  said:  ‘Sufyān  al-Thawrī  (97  –  161  H),  Shu‘bah  (82  –  160  H),  Hammād  ibn Zayd  (98  –  179  H),  Hammād  ibn  Salamah  (91  –  167  H),  Sharīk  (95  –  177  H)  and  [al-Waddāh ibn  ‘Abdillāh]  Abū  ‘Awānah  (c.  95  –  176  H)  would  not  ascribe  a  limit,  nor  make  resemblance nor  similarity.  They  narrate  the  hadīth  without  saying  kayf. When  asked,  they  would  answer with  narration.’  Abū  Dāwūd  said:  ‘This  is  our  view.’  I  say:  And  our  elders  remained  on  this.” (al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt  2:334)

The  report  to  Abū  Dāwūd  al-Tayālisī (133  –  204  H)  is  sound.  The  position  of  these great imāms  of  the  atbā‘  al-tābi‘īn (third  generation  of  Muslims) is  that  whatever  has  been  transmitted in  authentic  reports  are  accepted  as  they  were  intended  without  taking  any  physical meanings from  them  like  limit  and  kayf.

This  was  the  way  of  all  the  major  scholars  of  the  Salaf.  Imām  al-Bayhaqī  rahimahullah related  with  a  sound chain

“Al-Awzā‘ī,  Mālik,  Sufyān  al-Thawrī and  al-Layth  ibn  Sa‘d  were  asked  about these  hadīths  [on the  sifāt  khabariyyah],  and  they  said:  ‘Let  them  pass  as  they  have  come  without  kayfiyyah.’” (alI‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād,  p.  123)

In  other  words,  convey  them,  read  them  and  believe  in  them  as  they  were  intended,  but  while holding  firmly  that  kayf  is  negated.

Imām  al-Bayhaqī rahimahullah also  related  from  Sufyān  ibn  ‘Uyaynah  with  an  authentic  chain: “All that  Allāh  has  described  of  Himself,  its  interpretation  is  its  recitation  and  silence  over it.”(al-I‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād,  p.  123)

In  the  same  report  from  his  al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt,  there  is  the  addition:   “No  one  may  explain  it,  neither  in  Arabic  nor  in  Fārsī.” (al-Asmā’  wal-Sifāt,  2:117)

In  the  same  report  from  Sharh  Usūl  I‘tiqād  Ahl  al-Sunnah,  al-Lālakā’ī (d.  418)  narrates  it as follows:   “Everything  Allāh  has  described  Himself  with  in  the  Qur’ān,  its  recitation  is  its  explanation. There  is  no  kayf  and  no  likeness.”  (Sharh  Usūl  I‘tiqād  Ahl  al-Sunnah,  p.  431)

This  is  a  reference  to  the  sifāt  khabariyyah  like  ascension,  hand,  eye  and  so  on,  the  literal meaning of  which  is  specific  to  created  beings.

Hence,  the  intent  of  these  attributes  as  they  appear  in  the revealed  sources  is  consigned  to  Allāh.  Other  attributes  like  knowledge,  power,  hearing,  seeing, mercy,  self-subsistence,  oneness  etc.  can  be  explained  and  expanded  upon,  in  terms of  their connections and  in  terms of  what  they  negate,  as  explained  earlier.

Thus,  Imām  al-Bayhaqī rahimahullah explained  Ibn  ‘Uyaynah’s  words  as  follows: “He  only  intended  thereby  –  and  Allāh  knows  best  –  that  which  the  explanation  of  which  leads to  ascribing  kayf.  And  ascribing  kayf  necessitates considering  Him  like  His  creation  in  the qualities  of  temporality.” (al-I‘tiqād  wa  l-Hidāyah  ilā  Sabīl  al-Rashād,  p.  123)

After  mentioning  the  report  in  al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt,  he  says:

I  say:  And  he  only  intended  –  and  Allāh  knows  best  –  the  sifāt  khabariyyah.”  (al-Asmā’  wa  l-Sifāt, 2:159)

However,  it is  possible  that  even  these attributes  like  yad  and  ‘ayn  are  understood  relationally,  in terms of  what  they  connect  to,  while  their  reality  as  they  subsist  in  Allāh’s  essence  is understood  to  be  unfathomable.

Thus,  al-Bayhaqī  rahimahullah said  after  this: “Some  of  the  people  of  insight  amongst  them  adopted  the  view  that  by  the  right  hand  is  meant the  hand,  and  the  hand  of  Allāh  (Exalted  is  He)  is  an  expression  about  an  attribute  that  is  not  a physical appendage.  Thus,  wherever  it is  mentioned  in  the  Book  and  the  authentic  Sunnah,  the intent  of  its  mention  is  its  connection  to  what  came  about  in  that  which  is  mentioned  along with  it,  of  folding  up  and  grasping,  contracting  and  spreading  out,  eliminating  and  accepting, spending  and  other  than  that;  a  connection  of  an  intrinsic  attribute  with  its  consequence without  direct  physical contact  or  mutual touching.  There  is  no  tashbīh  in  this  at  all.” (Al-Asmā’ wa  l-Sifāt,  2:159)

Imām  al-Tahāwī rahimahullah said  in  his  famous  text on  ‘aqīdah  encapsulating  the  beliefs transmitted  from Imām  Abū  Hanīfah  and  his  two  students:

“The  vision  [of  Allāh]  is  true  for  the  inhabitants of  Paradise,  without  encompassing,  nor kayfiyyah.”

Here  kayfiyyah  is  categorically  negated  for  the  vision  of  Allāh  in  Paradise.  Kayfiyyah  with  regards to  vision  refers  to  distance,  opposition,  direction  and  so  on,  which  are  necessary  concomitants of  vision  in  the  phenomenal  world.  However,  the  vision  of  Allāh  in  the  afterlife  will be  without these  modalities  that  we  are  accustomed  to.  It  will be  a  beholding  of  Allāh  with  the  eyes bestowed  to  true  believers  after  resurrection.

The  mujassimah  (corporealists)  and  crypto-mujassimah  refuse  to  make  the  explicit  negations of kayf  and  physical descriptions  for  Allāh  in  the  way  the  Salaf  did.  Imām  al-Tahāwī rahimahullah  narrates from the  imāms of  the  Hanafī school:

“Our  Lord  bears  the  attributes  of  oneness  and  holds  the  characteristics  of  singularity.  Not  one of  creation  is  in  His  meaning.  He  is  transcendent  beyond  limits  and  boundaries,  parts,  limbs and  instruments.”

Imām  al-Tahāwī rahimahullah did  not  merely  say  that  we  are  not  permitted  to  say  that  He  does  not  have these  attributes.  Rather,  he  categorically  states that  Allāh  is  far-removed  from  them  due  to  His absolute  transcendence.

  Similarly,  Hāfiz  Abū  Bakr  al-Ismā‘īlī  (277  –  371  H) imāms of  hadīth  that  Allāh  is  free  of  limbs and  a  physical body: “Limbs and  appendages,  nor  length  and  breadth,  thickness  and  thinness  and  the  like  of  this,  of which  the  equivalent  is  found  in  creation,  are  not  believed  about Him.  And  that  there  is nothing  as  His  likeness.” (I‘tiqād  A’immat  al-Hadīth,  p  36)

Describing  the  vision  of  Allāh,  he  says: “And  that  is  without  belief  in  corporealism  with  respect  to  Allāh  –  Great  and  Glorious  is  He  – nor  assigning  limits.  But  they  will see  Him  –  Great  and  Glorious  is  He  –  with  their  eyes just  as He  pleases,  without  kayf.”  (I‘tiqād  A’immat  al-Hadīth  p.  43)

The  Salaf  would  often  say  Allāh  is  “above  the  creation”  (fawq  al-khalq)  or  above  the  Throne (fawq  al-‘arsh)  which  is  the  highest  point  of  creation.

The  reason  for  this  statement  was  to  refute the  Jahmī belief  that  Allāh  dwells  within  creation.  Hence,  this  is  not  a  positive  description  of Allāh,  but  a  way  of  expressing  the  negative  detail  of  Allāh  not  being  within  His  creation,  but being  far  removed  and  different  from  creation. 

This  is  why  the  Salaf  would  also  say  He  is “bā’in” (separate)  from  His  creation.  This  also  is  not  a  physical “separation”,  but  a  way  of expressing  that  the  creation  does  not  contain  the  Creator.  Abū  Sulaymān  al-Khattābī rahimahullah said: “The  meaning  of  the  statement  of  the  Muslims that  Allāh  is  over  the  throne  is  not  that  He  is touching  it or  settled  on  it or  bounded  by  one  of  its  directions,  but  that  He  is  different/separate from  all  His  creation.”  (A‘lām  al-Hadīth,  p.  1474)

Ibn  Hamdān  al-Hanbalī  (603  –  695  H)  said: “He  is  separate  from  His  creation.  Allāh  is  above  the  throne,  without  [physical]  limitation. [Physical]  limitation  is  of  the  throne  and  all  that  is  beneath  it.  And  Allāh  is  above  that  with  no place  and  no  limit.  [This  is]  because  He  existed  when  there  was  no  place,  and  then  He  created place,  and  He  is  as  He  was  before  He  created  place.”

The  above  encapsulates the  belief  of  the  Salaf.  Hence,  the  Salaf,  unlike  the  present-day so-called “Salafīs” who  claim  to  follow  the  Salaf,  would  explicitly  negate  boundaries,  parts,  limbs,  directions, physicality  and  kayfiyyāt  in  general for  Allāh  (subhānahū  wa  ta‘ālā).

Allāh  is  Unchanging  and Timeless

Moreover,  if Allāh  possesses  kayfiyyāt  like  movement,  physical  descent  and  ascent,  laughter, emotions  and  so  on,  it would  entail  changing  from  one  state  to  another  which  is  a  feature  of temporal things and  not  of  the  beginningless  unchanging  Creator.

  This  has  also  been expressed  by  one  of  the  imāms of  the  Salaf.  Abu  l-Shaykh  relates in  his  ‘Azamah  with  an authentic  chain  from  Imām  ‘Abd  al-‘Azīz  ibn  al-Mājishūn rahimahullah  (d  164  H),  a  narrator  of  hadīth  found in  the  six  collections and  a  prominent  jurist  of  Madīnah,  that  he  said: “…He  is  the  Last  that  will not  end  and  the  First  that  will not  perish,  the  beginningless  (qadīm) Who has  no  beginning.  He  did  not  come  into  being  as  [other]  things  came  into  being.  He  was not  small  and  then  became  large,  nor  was  He  weak  and  then  became  strong,  nor  deficient  and then  became  complete,  nor  ignorant  and  then  He  knew.  He  was  always strong,  lofty,  great  and transcendent.  The  blink  of  an  eye  did  not  pass  but  He  was  Allāh,  without  ceasing  to  be  Rabb. He  will remain  so  unceasingly  in  what  has  passed  and  likewise  in  what  remains  to  come.  And thus  He  is  now.  He  did  not  gain  new  knowledge  after  not  having  known,  nor  strength  after  a strength  that  was  not  in  Him.  He  did  not  alternate  from  one  state  to  another  state  with  increase or  decrease,  because  there  remains  no  [aspect]  of  sovereignty  and  magnitude  but  He  occupies it.  He  will never  increase  beyond  something  that  He  was  upon…”

The  above  is  the  clear  view  of  Ahlus  Sunnah as  transmitted  from  the  Salaf  and  the  imāms of ‘aqīdah,  and  subsequently  from  the  Ash‘arī  and  Māturīdī theologians,  as  well as  major  Hanbalī authorities  like  Abu  l-Fadl al-Tamīmī  (342  –  410  H) Jawzī  (510  –  597  H) 44, 48  and  Ibn  Hamdān  (603  –  695  H)(rahimahumullah)

The  Beliefs  of  the  Mujassimah

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  a  small  group  historically,  and  a  sizeable  group  in  recent  times,  of a  people  who  believe  that  the  sifāt  khabariyyah must  be  accepted  literally.  They  believe  that  Allāh is  literally  in  the  upward  direction,  with  physical parts  like  a  face,  two  hands,  fingers,  shape,  two eyes and  so  on.  They  believe  He  moves  up  and  down.  This  is  the  position  of  tashbīh  and  tajsīm.

While  Ahlus  Sunnah  deny  completely  any  and  all  resemblance  between  Allāh  and  creation  in their  descriptive  and  ontological realities,  some  modern  “Salafī”  authors  do  not  shy  away  from saying  they  accept  a  degree  of  resemblance  between  Allāh  and  His  creation.

  For  example,  one of  the  leaders  of  the  contemporary  Salafī movement,  Ibn  ‘Uthaymīn,  said: “To  negate  tashbīh  completely  between  the  attributes  of  Creator  and  of  creation  is  not  correct because  there  are  no  two  established  attributes  except  they  have  commonality  in  the  basic meaning,  and  this  commonality  is  a  kind  of  similarity.” (Fatāwā  Ibn  ‘Uthaymīn,  1:181)

He  also  said: “If  you ask:  what  is  the  shape  which  Allāh  has  that  Ādam  was  upon?  We  say:  Allāh  has  a  face, eye,  hand  and  leg,  but  it is  not  necessary  that  these  things  are  equivalent  to  man’s.  Thus,  there  is a  degree  of  similarity  but  it is  not  by  way  of  equivalence.” (Sharh  ‘Aqīdat  al-Wasatiyyah,  p.  110)

Clarifying  further,  he  said: “The  one  who  believes that  the  attributes  of  the  Creator  are  equivalent  to  the  attributes  of creation  is  misguided.  That  is,  the  attributes  of  the  Creator  are  not  equal to  the  attributes  of creation  by  the  clear  text of  the  Qur’ān…  And  it is  not  necessary  from  the  equivalence  of  two entities in  name  or  attribute  that  they  are  equal in  reality.  This  is  a  known  principle.  Does man not  have  a  face  and  a  camel  a  face?  They  are  common  in  name  but  do  not  conform  in  reality. The  camel  has  a  hand  and  the  ant  a  hand  –  are  the  two  hands  equal?  The  answer  is  no.  Then, why  do  you not  say  that  Allāh  has  a  face  that  is  not  equivalent  to  the  faces  of  creation  and  Allāh has  a  hand  that  is  not  equivalent  to  the  hands  of  creation?  Allāh  (Exalted  is  He)  said: ‘And  they esteem  not  Allah  as  He  has  the  right  to  be  esteemed,  when  the  whole  earth  is  His  handful  on the  Day  of  Resurrection,  and  the  heavens  are  rolled  in  His  right  hand.’ (39:67)  Is  there  a  hand from  the  hands  of  creation  that  is  like  this  hand?  No….This  is  why  it is  never  permissible  for you to  imagine  how  a  quality  from  the  qualities  of  Allāh  is  or  that  you believe  that  the  attributes of  Allāh  are  the  same  as  the  attributes  of  creation.” (Fatāwā  Ibn  ‘Uthaymīn,  1:177)

It  is  clear  from  these  statements  that  he  believes  the  “attributes”  of  hand,  face,  eye  and  so  on are  physical  parts  but  with  distinctive  features that  put  them  apart  from  creation.

This  becomes more  apparent  from  many  of  his  other  statements.  What  the  contemporary  Salafiyyah  do  not realise,  however,  is  that  by  affirming  a  likeness  in  the  base  meaning  of  the  attributes  of  Creator and  creation,  they  are  affirming  a  general  resemblance  between  the  two,  and  by  negating similarity  in  kayfiyyāt  (physical descriptions),  they  are  negating  similarity  in  only  minor  details. Hence,  what  they  affirm  in  resemblance  is  far  greater  than  what  they  negate. This  belief  has  its  roots  in  an  early  time.  Muqātil  ibn  Sulaymān  an  early  mufassir  from  the  atbā‘ al-tābi‘īn overemphasised  the  attributes  of  Allāh  in  opposition  to  the  Jahmiyyah  who  negated  it, resulting  in  affirming  a  similarity  between  Allāh  and  His  creation,  as  al-Khatīb  al-Baghdādī narrated  with  an  authentic  chain  from  Imām  Abū  Hanīfah rahimahullah (80  –  150  H): “Two  groups  of  the  worst  of  people  are  from  Khurāsān:  the  Jahmiyyah  and  the  Mushabbihah” or  he  said,  “Muqātiliyyah.”  (Tarikh  Baghdad  15:514) 54  

Hāfiz  Ibn  Hajar rahimahullah said  in  Tahdhīb  al-Tahdhīb:  “Muhammad  ibn  Samā‘ah  (130  –  233  H)  narrated from  Abū  Yūsuf  from  Abū  Hanīfah  that  he  said:  ‘Jahm  went  overboard  in  negation  until  he said:  He  [i.e.  Allah]  is  nothing,  and  Muqātil  went  overboard  in  affirmation  until  He  deemed Allah  to  be  like  His  creation.’”

Hāfiz  Ibn  Hajar rahimahullah  also  quotes  him  saying: “Two  repulsive  opinions  came  to  us  from  the  east: Jahm  the  negator  [of  Allah’s  attributes]  and  Muqātil,  the  anthropomorphist.” 
Hence,  the  Salaf  did  not  turn  a  blind  eye  to  the  anthropomorphism  that  found  its  way  into some  groups of  Muslims.  

The  belief-system  of  tashbīh,  though  in  existence  before,  was  popularised  and  defended  fiercely by  the  Damascene  Hanbalī  scholar,  Ahmad  ibn  ‘Abd  al-Halīm  Ibn  Taymiyyah  (661  –  728  H), an  undisputed  authority  of  the  contemporary  Salafiyyah.  He,  for  example,  explicitly  supported the  notion  that  the  attributes  of  Allāh,  including  the  sifāt  khabariyyah  like  eye,  hand,  face,  descent and  ascension,  must  be  understood  by  analogising  them  to  creation. He  supported  the  idea that  these  attributes  have  a  meaning  that  is  shared  between  creation  and  Creator.  He differentiates between  “intangible”  attributes  like  knowledge  and  power  and  “tangible” attributes  like  hand  and  face  for  Allāh.  He  defended  the  view  that  Allāh  has  boundaries  from all  six  physical directions,  up,  down,  left,  right,  front  and  back,  leaving  no  room  for  doubt  that he  believed  in  a  physical  body  for  Allāh.  His  claim  to  avoiding  tashbīhtajsīm  and  tamthīl, however,  is  on  the  grounds  that  Allāh  is  not  exactly  like  His  creation.  He  is  vastly  bigger,  with unknown  dimensions,  and  He  is  indivisible  as  His  parts  cannot  be  separated  one  from  the other,  and  He  doesn’t  have  a  digestive  system,  nor  are  His  limbs  made  of  blood  and  flesh  like human  beings.  Instead,  His  features  that  have  a  counterpart  in  creation  only  bear  a  generic resemblance  with  those  of  creatures,  while  their  physical descriptions  and  modalities  (kayfiyyāt) are  vastly  different.


Hence,  while  this  group  with  Ibn  Taymiyyah  at  its  head,  affirm  kayfiyyāt  (physical  descriptions) for  Allāh  while  negating  knowledge  of  them,  the  Salaf  and  Ahlus  Sunnah negate  the  very existence  of  kayfiyyāt  for  Allāh.  These  innovated  ascriptions  of  physical parts  to  Allāh,  delving into  the  ambiguous  attributes  of  Allāh  by  designating  their  literal  meanings  as  their  intent,  and affirming  a  basic  meaning  or  ontological  reality  of  these  attributes  that  are  similar  to  the qualities  of  creation,  are  extreme  violations  of  core  Islāmic  beliefs  on  the  oneness  of  Allāh  and His  absolute  dissimilarity  to  creation.


[ Acknowledgements: This  article  is  based  on  an  online  work  of  ‘Uthmān  Muhammad  al-Nāblusī  titled:  al-Sifāt al-‘Ilāhiyyah  bayna  Ahl  al-Tanzīh  wa  Ahl  al-Tashbīh, translated by Maulana Zameelur Rahmaan]

Imam Abu Hanifah [ rahmatullah alaih] on the Uncreatedness of the Qur’an

Because some of the students of the companions of Imam Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih supported and propogated the Mu’tazili doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’an, and campaigned for it during the infamous mihnah which began under the rein of caliph Abu al-‘Abbas al-Ma’mun (170 – 218), some began to suspect that this was the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih himself. In fact, in Orientalist circles, this view is still current, that Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih originated the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’an! But, Imam Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih, is innocent of this heresy. In examining a few narrations from al-Khatib al-Baghdadi’s biography of the Imam, I will show that the preponderant view amongst the companions of Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih was that of the uncreatedness of the Qur’an, and this is in fact traced authentically to the Imam himself, while a few followers of his school strayed and adopted the Mu’tazili and Jahmi doctrine.

1. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi narrated with his chain to al-Hakam ibn Bashir that he said: “I heard Sufyan ibn Sa‘id al-Thawri rahimahullah and al-Nu‘man ibn Thabit rahimahullah say: ‘The Qur’an is the uncreated speech of Allah.’” ( al-Qur’an kalam Allah ghayr makhluq) ( Tarikh Baghdad 15:517) Dr. Bashshar ‘Awwad Ma‘ruf comments: “Its isnad is hasan .”

This is, therefore, an authentic report establishing that Imam Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih believed in the uncreatedness of the Qur’an in accordance with the position of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah. This is further corroborated by Imam al-Tahawi’ rahimahullah’s transmission of the beliefs of Imam Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih in his famous creedal formula known as
al-‘Aqidat al-Tahawiyyah , and by al-Fiqh al-Akbar which is either the work of Imam Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih himself or at least accurately represents his views based on an early account from him – both of which state that the Qur’an is the uncreated speech of Allah.

2. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi narrated with a chain of trustworthy narrators, besides one narrator who is unknown, that Ibn al-Mubarak rahmatullah alaih came to Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih and Abu Hanifah  rahimahullah said to him: “What is this thing that has crept amongst you [i.e. the people of Khurasan]?” He said to him: “A man called Jahm.” He said: “What does he say?” He said: “He says the Qur’an is created.”

Thereupon, Abu Hanifah rahmatullah Alaih said [quoting the Qur’an]: “Grave is the word that comes out of their mouths! (Qur’an 18:5).” ( Tarikh Baghdad 15:517)

Although there is some question over the authenticity of this report due to the unidentifiable narrator in the chain, it is known that Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih opposed Jahm on the issue of the attributes of Allah and he also declared him a disbeliever as established elsewhere , so it is probable he addressed this false belief of Jahm also.

3. Al-Khatib narrated with his chain to Abu Bakr al-Marrudhi that he said: “I heard Abu ‘Abd Allah Ahmad ibn Hanbal rahmatullah alaih say: ‘It is not authentic according to us that Abu Hanifah would say the Qur’an is created.’” ( Tarikh Baghdad 15:517) Dr. Bashshar ‘Awwad Ma‘ruf comments: “Its isnad is sahih .”

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal rahmatullah alaih was the champion of the Ahl al-Sunnah during the period of the mihnah, and his major enemies besides the ruling elite were some scholars of the Hanafi school, in particular the judge Ahmad ibn Abi Dawud; and even as the charge that Abu Hanifah rahmatullah alaih supported the state doctrine was being propogated, Imam Ahmad rahmatullah alaih did not buy into this false propaganda and defended the Imam.

4. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi narrated with his chain to al-Nakha‘i that he said: Muhammad ibn Shadhan al-Jawhari narrated to us: He said: I heard Sulayman al-Juzjani and Mu‘lla ibn Mansur al-Razi say: “Abu Hanifah did not speak about [the createdness of] the Qur’an, nor Abu Yusuf, nor Zufar, nor Muhammad, nor any of their companions. Only Bishr al-Marisi and Ibn Abi Dawud spoke about [the createdness of] the Qur’an, so they tarnished [the good beliefs of] the companions of Abu Hanifah.” (Tarikh Baghdad 15:518).

Dr Bashshar says: “Its isnad is sahih .”

The scholars who are quoted in this report, Abu Sulayman al-Juzjani and Mu‘alla ibn Mansur, were major scholars of Hanafi jurisprudence, as known to muftis of the Hanafi school. They were authors of some Nawadir literature, and fatawa. They were also amongst the few scholars who openly opposed the view of the createdness of the Qur’an, although this was before al-Ma’mun’s inquisition.

Mu‘alla ibn Mansur al-Razi, Abu Ya‘la (150 – 211), is a narrator of hadith found in all the six famous collections of hadith. He narrated from the famous hadith-scholar Hammad ibn Zayd (98-179) as found in Sahih al-Bukhari , and he also narrated from ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Mubarak, Malik ibn Anas, al-Layth ibn Sa‘d rahimahumullah, and from the students of Imam Abu Hanifah, Yahya ibn Zakariyya ibn Abi Za’idah, Qadi Abu Yusuf, ‘Ali ibn Mushir and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani. Abu Zur‘ah al-Razi said: “Al-Mu‘alla was the best of the group – meaning, the champions of juristic opinion ( ashab al-ra’y ) – according to the people of knowledge. That was because he was ardent in his search for knowledge and he travelled and gave attention [to it]…al-Mu‘alla is reliable.” Yahya ibn Ma‘in rahimahullah said he is trustworthy. Yahya ibn Ma‘in narrated: “Al-Mu‘alla ibn Mansur al-Razi was one day praying, when his head was stung by a wasp, and he did not move until he completed his salah. When they looked, his head had become extremely swollen.” Al-‘Ijli said: “Trustworthy, a champion of sunnah. He was noble. They asked him to take the position of judge and he refused multiple times.” Ya‘qub ibn Shaybah said: “Trustworthy…proficeint, reliable, a jurist.” Ibn Sa‘d said: “He resided in Baghdad, sought hadith, and he was reliable, a master of hadith, opinion and jurisprudence.” Abu Hatim al-Razi said: “He was reliable in hadith and a champion of juristic opinion.” Ahmad ibn Kamil al-Qadi said: “Mu‘alla ibn Mansur was from the senior companions of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, and from their trustworthy ones in transmission and narration.” Abu Ahmad ibn ‘Adi said: “I hope there is no harm in him because I did not find any objectionable hadith from him.” It was narrated from him that he said: “Whoever says the Qur’an is created is according to me a disbeliever.” Al-Khatib said: “He was a jurist from the champions of opinion. He took from Qadi Abu Yusuf and he was trustworthy.” ( Tahdhib al-Kamal 28:291-7) Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani wrote in al-Taqrib , “Mu’alla ibn Mansur al-Razi, Abu Ya’la, a resident of Baghdad, a trustworthy Sunni jurist, he was asked to become judge and he refused, those who claimed Ahmad accused him of lying erred.”

Regarding Abu Sulayman al-Juzjani, al-Dhahabi  rahimahullah says: “‘Allamah Imam Abu Sulayman Musa ibn Sulayman al-Juzajani al-Hanafi, the companion of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. He narrated from them and from Ibn al-Mubarak. Qadi Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Birti, Bishr ibn Musa, Abu Hatim al-Razi and others narrated from him. He was reliable ( saduq) and dear to the scholars of hadith. Ibn Abi Hatim said: “He would anathematise those who held the Qur’an was created.” ( al-Jarh wa al-Ta‘dil 8:145) It was said that al-Ma’mun offered him the position of judge and he refused, and he gave the excuse that he is not qualified for it so he excused him. He became noble in the eyes of the people due to his refusal. He authored books.” ( Siyar A’lam al-Nubala 10:194 )
Al-Khatib described him as: “Musa ibn Sulayman, Abu Sulayman al-Juzjani. He heard ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Mubarak, ‘Amr ibn Jumay‘ and Abu Yusuf and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, the two companions of Abu Hanifah. He was a faqih with insight into juristic opinion. He adopted the methodology of the Sunnah regarding the Qur’an [i.e. that it is uncreated]. He lived in Baghdad and narrated therein. ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Hasan al-Hashimi, Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Isa al-Birti and Bishr ibn Musa al-Asadi narrated from him. Ibn Abi Hatim said: ‘My father wrote from him and he said he was reliable.’” ( Tarikh Baghdad 15:26-7)

Abu Sulayman al-Juzjani and Mu’alla ibn Mansur were of course more aware of the views of their teachers and their grand-teacher than others.

Therefore, although Bishr ibn Ghiyath al-Marisi (140 – 218) and Ahmad ibn Abi Dawud (full name: Ahmad ibn Faraj ibn Hariz) (160 – 240) stood as proponents of the Mu’tazili doctrine while claiming to belong to the Hanafi school, true followers of the madhhab opposed them, and clarified the position of their teachers and the teacher of their teachers. “Bishr” in Arabic means “joy” and “Ahmad” means “the most praised.” Based on this, Imam al-Dhahabi rahimahullah wrote under the biography of Bishr al-Marisi: “He was the bishr (joy) of evil while Bishr [ibn al-Harith] al-Hafi [the famous ascetic] (152 – 227) was the bishr of goodness, just as Ahmad ibn Hanbal was the ahmad (the most praised one) in the Sunnah and Ahmad ibn Abi Dawud was the ahmad in bid’ah.” ( Siyar A’lam al-Nubala 10:202)

Who are the “Salafis??”

By Maulana Ahmad Sadeq Desai d.b

Salafi’ism  is  a  deviated  sect  which  had  mushroomed about  250  years  ago  with  the  advent  of  Muhammad  Ibn Abdul  Wahhaab,  the  spiritual  patron  of  the  Najdis  from the  family  of  Saud  who  were  installed  as  the  rulers  of Arabia  by  the  British  colonialists  who  had  guided, conspired  with  and  armed  the  Najdis  to  rebel  against  the last  Khalifah  of  Islam,  namely,  Sultan  Abdul  Hameed  of the  Uthmaani  (Ottoman)  Empire.  Britain  had  conspired with  the  Saudi  Salafis  who  were  organized  and  led  by  the Englishman,  Thomas  Lawrence,  known  by  the  nickname, Lawrence  of  Arabia,  against  the  Khalifah  of  Islam.

The  cornerstone  of  the  Salafi  movement  is  the rejection  of  the  Taqleed  of  the  Four  Math-habs  of  the Ahlus  Sunnah  Wal  Jama’ah.  On  the  basis  of  their  hollow slogan  of  ‘the  Qur  ’aan  and  the  Sunnah  ’,  they  refute  the authentic  position  of  the  Shariah  which  was  transmitted down  the  centuries  from  the  Salf-e-Saaliheen  (the  Pious Predecessors)  of  the  Khairul  Quroon  epoch  (the  initial three  Noblest Ages  of Islam).

While  the  Salafis  vehemently  and  vociferously denounce  and  refute  the  Taqleed  of  the  Four  Math-habs of  the  Sunnah,  they  covertly  subscribe  to  the  Taqleed  of Ibn  Taimiyyah  who  flourished  in  the  8th  century  of  the Hijri  era.  Although  they  accuse  the  followers  of  the  Four Math-habs  of  being  ‘blind  followers’  of  the  illustrious Imaams  (Aimmah  Mujtahideen)  of  the  inceptional  era  of Islam,  they  (the  Salafis)  are  guilty  of  the  blindest  taqleed. They  reject  the  Taqleed  of  the  Aimmah  Mujtahideen,  but they  fanatically  cling  to  the  taqleed  of  Ibn  Taimiyyah who  appeared  more  than  700  years  after  Rasulullah (sallallahu  alayhi  wasallam). A  despicable  trait  of  Salafis  is  their  Shiah  type  of Taqyah  (Holy  Hypocrisy).  They  reject  the  authentic  and Islamically  rational  and  logical  Taqleed  of  the  Four Math-habs  while  they  blindly  follow  Ibn  Taimiyyah without  having  the  honesty  and  decency  of  stating  their belief  in  this  deviated  doctrine  of  the  blind  taqleed  of  a man  who  appeared  more  than  seven  centuries  after Rasulullah  (sallallahu  alayhi  wasallam). 

Their  deception constrains  them  to  raise  the  slogan  of  the  Qur’aan  and Sunnah. However,  they  are  not  the  true  and  honest  followers of  the  Qur’aan  and  Sunnah.  Whereas  the  Ahlus  Sunnah (the  Four  Math-habs)  accept  the  interpretations  of  the Qur’aan  and  Hadith  presented  by  the  Sahaabah,  the Salafis  subject  the  Qur’aan  and  Hadith  to  the  whimsical and  baseless  interpretation  of  Ibn  Taimiyyah.  Then  they audaciously  claim  to  deduce  the  rulings  from  the  Qur’aan and  Hadith. It  is  their  baseless  slogan—Qur’aan  and  Sunnah— which  makes  Salafi’ism  the  greatest  threat  to  the  correct Deen  of  the  ignorant  masses.

  The  ignorant  and  unwary are  misled  into  the  math-hab  of  dhalaal  (way  of deviation)  of  the  Salafis  when  this  slogan  is  dinned  into their  ears.  In  a  nutshell,  Salafi’ism  is  the  blindest following.  It  is  the  substitution  of  authentic  and  rational following  of  the  early  authorities  (Salf-e-Saaliheen)  of Islam  for  the  taqleed  of  Ibn  Taimiyyah  of  the  8th  century.

Another  characteristic  of  Salafis  is  their  lack  of Taqwa  and  Tawaadhu’  (Humility).  They  are  generally hard-hearted, and  extremely  disrespectful  in  their criticism  of  the  Aimmah  of  the  Math-habs.  This characteristic  is  the  natural  effect  of  following  baatil (falsehood).  Whoever  strays  from  the  Path  of  the  Salf-e- Saaliheen, must  necessarily  stumble,  grope  and ultimately  fall  into  the  abyss  of  dhalaal  (deviation).  They are  akin  to  the  early  deviated  sect,  the  Khawaarij  whose followers  exhibited  external  signs  of  piety  while  they were  morally  and  spiritually  bankrupt.

True Jihad- Tarnished by the Salafis/Modernists



forthcoming in this section is a compilation of articles which illustrate the huge difference between the lofty institution of Jihad and the murderous atrocities perpetrated by spiritually barren pseudo-Jihadis who, devoid of taqwa and waraa (abstinence from all doubtful matters and even some permissible matters), acquire enough room to justify their actions by loosening the reins of rigid adherence (taqleed) to one of the four accepted madh-habs (schools of thought codified over a millenium ago which comprise of all the rulings of Islam).

In the same manner in which lengthy arguments based on Qur’an, Sunnah, and new ijtihad (interpretations) based on unprecedented scenarios of warfare, are used to justify dubious actions on the battlefield, every other alteration to the Deen (religion) is justified and legalized today by bypassing rigid taqleed (adherence) to one of the four accepted madh-habs, and opting instead for direct ijtihad (formulating of rulings) using the Qur’an and Sunnah, – an ijtihad that is violently subject to variation according to the chaotically fluctuating intellects of modern day scholars.

Modernists and Salafis of all breeds should take note that the very same slogans of “Quran and Hadith” that they themselves use to ‘reform’ or ‘modernise’ the religion, are also used by these pseudo-Jihadis to justify their ‘Jihad’, which effectively opens the door for each person to create a tailor-made version of ‘Islam’.

The natural consequence of granting any scope to scholars today to leave one of the four madh-habs for what is believed to be the ‘stronger ruling’, is unlimited versions of ‘Islam’, with each scholar absolutely convinced that his particular version is the Haqq (truth), no matter how mutated it may seem to others.

Those who hold a ‘softspot’ for modernist and Salafi breeds of their particular inclination, should realise that their ‘softspot’ is in fact Nifaaq (hypocrisy), according to the clear explicit statements of the Salaf-us-Saliheen who had adopted extreme harshness towards even the slightest of deviations in the Deen, and who regarded the potential danger of Baatil sects to be even worse than that of the Kuffaar.

The Ummah is not in need of Mushtabah (doubtful) and Haraam Asbaab (means). The clearly Halaal bounds of Allah’s glorious Shariah are more than sufficient to deliver victory to our doorsteps, no matter how limited and restricted such bounds may seem to our puny intellects colonized by the effects of materialism. The use of Mushtabah Asbaab (doubtful means) is, in fact, an open statement expressing a lack of Tawakkul (trust) in the clearly Halaal bounds set by Allah (azza wa jal). As a result Allah (azza wa jal) abandons us to our Asbaab (means) and withdraws his Nusrat (Divine Help) – a Nusrat without which all the means, weaponry, man-power, technology, etc. in the world will not be able to extricate the Ummah from its current state of abject humiliation.

Thus, while the Jihaad of the small band of Sahabah (radhiyallahu anhum) was met with resounding victory after victory, without barely any means whatsoever, eventually delivering the whole world into their hands within a few years, all Jihaad efforts of groups influenced by Salafis and modernists, over the past century, have ended in catastrophe after catastrophe.

May Allah (azza wa jal) inspire this downtrodden Ummah to submit to the pure orthodox Shariah completely, adopt Taqwa and Waraa’ in all matters, and thus be deserving of His (azza wa jal) Nusrat.

The Methodology of Imam Abu Hanifa ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ in Fiqh


One indication to Imam Abu Hanifa’s ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ vast knowledge of the sources of the Shari’ah is his methodology in deriving rulings from the Shari’ah, since one of his primary sources is the authentic sunnah and the opinions of the Sahabah, as he himself explicitly stated:

Hafiz Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr narrates: ‘Abd al-Warith narrated to us: Qasim narrated to us: Ahmad ibn Zuhayr narrated to us: Yahya ibn Ma‘in narrated to us: ‘Ubayd ibn Abi Qurrah narrated to us from Yahya ibn Durays, he said: I was present with Sufyan al-Thawri ( ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ) when a man of great knowledge and piety came to him, and he said: “O Abu ‘Abd Allah! What do you have against Abu Hanifa?” He said: “And what does he have?” He said: “I heard him [i.e. Abu Hanifah] say a statement in which there is balance and proof: ‘Indeed I take [legal opinions] from the Book of Allah when I find it. That which I do not find therein, I take from the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger and the authentic narrations from him which have spread between the hands of trustworthy people from trustworthy people. If I do not find it in the Book of Allah, nor the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger, I take the opinion of his companions, [adopting the opinion of] whoever [of them] I wish, and I leave the opinion of whoever [of them] I wish. Moreover, I do not leave their opinion for another’s opinion. If the [legal] issue reaches [only] to Ibrahim, al-Sha‘bi, al-Hasan, ‘Ata, Ibn Sirin, Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab – and he enumerated [other] men – then, [they are] a people who performed ijtihad , so I may perform ijtihad just as they performed ijtihad .’” Thereupon, Sufyan remained silent for a long period, and then he said some words of which there remained none in the gathering but he wrote them: “We hear harshness in speech and we fear it. We hear softness and we desire it. We do not judge the living; nor do we judge the dead. We accept what we hear. And we entrust what we do not know to its knower, and we put our opinion in doubt in favour of their opinion.” (Al-Intiqa’ fi Fada’il al-A’immati l-Thalathat al-Fuqaha’ , pp. 264-5)

This sanad is authentic: ‘Abd al-Warith ibn Sufyan al-Qurtubi (d. 395) is thiqah according to al-Dhahabi ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ  in Siyar A’lam al-Nubala (Misbah al-Arib 2:297); al-Qasim ibn Asbagh al-Qurtubi (247 – 340) was called “the great hafiz ” and “the muhaddith of Cordoba” by al-‘Asqalani  ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ  and is
saduq (Lisan al-Mizan (6:367-8); Ahmad ibn Zuhayr ibn Harb (d. 299) is thiqah according to al-Daraqutni and Khatib; ‘Ubayd ibn Abi Qurrah is a shaykh of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ    and is thiqah according to Ya‘qub ibn Shaybah and Yahya ibn Ma‘in ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ (Tarikh Baghdad 12:386-9); Yahya ibn al-Durays (d. 203) is a narrator of Muslim, and is thiqah according to Ibn Ma‘in ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ (Tahrir al-Taqrib 4:89).

Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi transmitted the same narration with a different chain leading up to Yahya ibn Ma‘in ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ  after which the chain is the same, and Dr. Bashshar ‘Awwad Ma‘ruf commented on it, “This is a report with a sahih isnad, and its narrators are trustworthy and well-known.” (Tarikh Baghdad 15:504)

Several other narrations with similar wordings from Imam Abu Hanifa ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ about his methodology have been reported in al-Intiqa’ by Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (pp. 266-7). These narrations from Imam Abu Hanifa ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ   regarding his methodology in deriving laws reveal the baselessness of the allegation that in most of his opinions he relied on analogy and parted from the transmitted sources of the Shari’ah. In fact, the Qur’an, well-known sunnah and narrations from the Sahabah were the primary foundations of his madhhab.


One of the essential characteristics of  the religion of Islam  is its insistence that the sovereignty of Allah, the Most  High, requires that the State and all its institutions submit to Allah’s laws. If  Allah, the Most High, is Sovereign, then Parliament, for example, cannot  be sovereign. The Sovereignty of Allah, the Most High, implies the supremacy of the religion of Islam  and, in particular, the sacred law or  Sharî‘ah. That supremacy of Islam over the State, and over public life, was symbolized by the institution of the Khalîfate. Even when the office of the  Khalîfate  had been transformed into dynastic monarchy, the  Khalîfate  still performed that symbolic role of supreme strategic importance.

European civilization, on the other  hand, experienced a conflict between religion and the State which resulted in  the secularization of politics. The final chapter of the conflict, which sealed the fate of religion in Europe, and brought an essentially godless civilization into being, was the French and Bolshevik Revolutions. The sphere of  religion was reduced to individual and group worship, and the Pope and Euro-Christianity were excluded as actors in the conduct of State. Allah, the  Most High, was no longer recognized to be Sovereign (al-Akbar). Instead it was the people who now recognized themselves as sovereign, and they vested that sovereignty in the new secular model of a State. The State was ‘al-Akbar’. Islam,  the religion, recognized such an act to be  shirk, the greatest of all sins, and the one sin which Allah, the Most High, will never forgive!

Godless European civilization embarked upon an unholy crusade to transform the entire world,  and to remold it after the new European model of the secular State and godless society. The rest of the world was colonized or had its essential freedom  taken away. It was then secularized, and is fast being reduced to a godless society. This  included the world of Islam.  In fact the world of Islam  was the special target of godless European civilization. The process of reducing the world of  Islam  to a godless society commenced with the secularization of public life. The Ottoman Islamic Empire was targeted. It had to be destroyed. It  could not be destroyed so long as the Khalîfate  remained a powerful institution of  the sacred model of society which recognized the sovereignty of Allah, the Most High. And so the Khalîfate had to be destroyed.

The destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which was effected in the first world war, resulted in the emergence  of the secular State of Turkey. The government was constituted of secularized westernized Turkish nationalists who worked hand-in-glove with an  under-ground Jewish movement. They first reduced the now powerless  Khalîfate  to an office which resembled that of the Pope, and then they abolished it.  But the secularization process in the world of Islam  was sealed when the  Hijâz, under the rule of ‘Abdul ‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, also joined Mustafa. Kamal (Ataturk) in the rejection of the supremacy of Islam over the State. And so Arabia, the heartland of Islam, also embraced the secular model of a State. The birth of the State of Saudi Arabia coincided with the destruction of the  Dâr al-Islâm  which had been established by Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah, the Most High, be upon him) and from  that point onward the  Haramayn  and Hijâz fell into the control of forces  which would stop at nothing to obstruct the re-emergence of the  Khalîfate  and the restoration of authenticity to the collective life of the Ummah.

So long as the Hijâz remained  Dâr al-Islâm, every Muslim  was guaranteed by the  Sharî‘ah  the right of entry into that territory. He did not need a visa. There was no such thing as Saudi sovereignty. There was no such thing as Saudi citizenship. The right of entry into any part of  Dâr al-Islâm  was one of several rights which Muslims had. They  also had the right to reside in  Dâr al-Islâm; they did not need residence permits; the right to seek their livelihood in any part of  Dâr al-Islam; they did not need work permits; and the right to participate  in the political process (Sh ûrâ); they did not need Saudi citizenship etc. The birth of the Nation State of Saudi Arabia resulted in the denial, and, eventually, the elimination of all these rights of Muslims. The huge oil-wealth of Arabia belonged to the world of Islam.  When the State of Saudi Arabia was born, the Saudis robbed the rest of the Muslims of what belonged to all Muslims and what  was to serve the interests of the Ummah  . Then the Saudis handed over the effective control of the oil to the Americans in exchange for an American  security guarantee. That, also, was treason.

The destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the emergence of  the State of Saudi Arabia were events which changed the  very face of the world of Islam in such a way as to result  in a return to the pre-Hijrah  stage of Islamic civilization. Nowhere in the world today does  Dâr al-Islâm  exist. Islamic civilization now exists in the post-Kh alîfate  era of its history. And, as it was in Makkah fourteen hundred years ago,  so too today, the Muslim  community around the world is subjected to an all-embracing  Jâhiliyyah  which dominates the world. The origin of that  Jâhiliyyah  is, of course, modern post-Christian western secular and materialist western civilization. It was, perhaps, with particular reference to  this age, that the Prophet of Islam   (divinely blessed is he and in eternal peace) is reported to have said :

Whosoever dies without having witnessed  (during his lifetime)  the institution of  bay‘ah  (the oath of allegiance by the people through which an appointment to the position of leadership over the Jamâ‘ah is legitimized)  has certainly died a death of Jâhiliyyah  (This could also imply a death in an age which has witnessed the return to the pre-Hijrah Jâhiliyyah).’ (Muslim)

If this  Ummah  is ever to succeed in restoring the supremacy of Islam over the State in the world of Islam,  it is  imperative that Muslims be taught the history of the collapse of the Khalîfate  and its replacement, in the heartland of Islam,  by the secular Saudi-Wahhâbî  nation-State on its ruins. This was an act of supreme betrayal of Islam.

Allah, the Most High and All-powerful, revealed the  Dîn  of Islam  to the Holy Prophet Muhammad  Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam that it establish its supremacy over all other religions. This required the prior submission by the  Ummah  to the supremacy of Islam in both the private and public life of Muslims.

The office of the  Khalîfate  functioned as the ultimate symbol of Islam  as a dominant force in public life. Without the  Khalîfate  the world of Islam would never have political power. There was, moreover, a permanent link between the  Khalîfate  and control over the  Haramayn, i.e. the sacred territories in Makkah and Madînah. Anyone who could succeed in severing that link, would cripple the institution of the  Khalîfate  and, eventually, render the world of Islam powerless!

Throughout the 1400 years of the history of the Ummah  of Prophet Muhammad Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam, no one has ever been successfully appointed to the  Khalîfate, and has had his appointment legitimized by the  bay‘ah, or oath of allegiance of the Muslims, without such a person  having either actual control, or the capacity to exercise control, over the Hijâz in general and the  Haramayn  in particular. The office of the  Khalîfate, and authority over the  Haramayn, have always been inseparably linked in  the religio-political consciousness of the Ummah. The inseparable link also had a foundation in the  Sharî‘ah  in so far as the Hajj  was an institution binding on the members of the  Ummah, and  Hajj involved physical travel to the Hijâz.  No one, therefore could be recognized to be the supreme leader of the Muslims who did not have the authority, and the means of exercising responsibility for the organization and administration of the  Hajj. And this, of course, included freedom  and security for the pilgrims and, hence, required control over the Hijâz. As a consequence, even  when the seat of the  Khulafâ  (ie.  Khalîfate  was shifted from  the Hijâz to Kûfah (Iraq), Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and even Istanbul, the Kh alîfs) always took the greatest care to maintain their authority and control over the Hijâz. This basically continued uninterruptedly until the demise of the Ottoman Islamic Empire in the First World War. The enemies of Islam  paid very  careful attention to the study and understanding of the link between the  Khalîfate, the preservation of faith (Îmân) among Muslims, the power of Islam  as a world-wide force, and control over the  Haramayn. They then planned their diabolical strategy to render Islam  powerless, and to confine  it to a personal private faith with no authority over public life. In other words they planned their strategy to secularize Islam,  and, in so doing,  to reduce Muslims to the godless European way of life. They achieved considerable success!

The British, realizing the paramount  importance of the Hijâz and the Haramayn  for the legitimacy and even survival of the Ottoman  Khalîfate, concentrated their diplomacy in the  First World War on wresting the Hijâz from  the control of the Ottoman  Khalîf. This was achieved when  Sharîf Husayn, the Ottoman-appointed  Sharîf  of Makkah, and great grandfather of the now deceased King Husayn of Jordan, was successfully induced by the British to rebel against the Ottoman  Khalîf and to establish his own authority over the Hijâz under benign British alliance and protection. The British also successfully concluded a Treaty of Collaboration in 1916 with ‘Abd ul-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd. That Treaty further destablized Ottoman rule over the Hijâz.

By 1916, and in the very midst of  the first world war, the Ottoman  Khalîf had lost control over Makkah and Jeddah, ie. the lower Hijâz. His control over Madînah was maintained throughout the war and only came to an end in 1919 when certain Ottoman troops within the city of Madînah were induced to betray and rebel  against their commander, Fakh rî Pasha after his heroic defense of the city.

After the Ottoman Khalîf  had lost control over the Hijâz, the  Khalîfate  was so crippled that it lingered on in Istanbul  for just a few more years before it collapsed completely. And this was a truly outstanding success for British diplomacy. The weakening of the  Khalîfate  destabilized the entire structure of the Ottoman Islamic Empire. It  eventually collapsed. In 1919 British troops, under the leadership of General  Allenby, captured Jerusalem.  It is significant that the British General, upon  entering the Holy City, proclaimed that ‘…  the crusades  were  finally over…’ If there was any doubt whatsoever of the extreme danger to Islam posed by British diplomacy in the Arabian peninsula, this statement of  Allenby should have put those doubts to rest.

What Allenby meant was that Islam  was  now a tiger without teeth. Its fate was to remain permanently powerless and, therefore, incapable of responding to the loss of Jerusalem  in the manner in which Sultân Salâhuddîn Ayyûbî Rahimahullah (Saladin) had responded when Jerusalem was lost to the Crusaders.

The Arabs had been deceived to fight with Allenby, in his army, against the Turks, to wrest Jerusalem from the rule of the Ottoman Khalîf. Those Arabs were now waiting to ravage the carcass left by the British victory over Istanbul. They coveted local rule over the Hijâz, but it was still necessary to wait and see whether the Ottoman  Khalîf  would ever be able to regain the strength necessary to seek to re-impose his rule over the Hijâz. When, on March 3, 1924, the Ottoman  Khalîfate  was abolished, it became clear that no such threat existed. And it was precisely on that day that the clients of Britain began their fight over the carcass left by their betrayal of the Ottoman Islamic rule.

On March 7, 1924,  Sharîf  al-Husayn pre-emptively claimed the  Khalîfate for himself. His most important credential  was that he exercised de facto local control over the Hijâz. He  also boasted of being  Hâshimite, i.e. belonging to the same clan –  Banû Hâshim  – of the tribe of the Quraysh , to which the Holy Prophet (Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam)  himself belonged. In fact this weighed so heavily amongst the people that the Chief  Qâdî  of Trans-Jordan promptly accepted the claim and recognized Husayn as  Khalîf.

His other credential, which was of  dubious value amongst the Muslim masses, but which weighed heavily in  the power-politics of the peninsula, was that the  Sharîf  was an ally of Britain, the super-power of the day, and had received considerable financial,  diplomatic and military support from Britain in his successful rebellion against Ottoman authority in the Hijâz. In claiming the  Khalîfate  for himself, however,  Sharîf Husayn committed the monstrous blunder of not first seeking the permission of the British to act as he did. It is the essence of the client-State status that freedom is effectively curtailed.  Sharîf  Husayn had violated the basic rule of conduct for clientStates. How would the British react ??

British diplomacy in Jazîrat ul-‘Arab  (i.e. the Arabian peninsula) was multidimensional and yet integrated. There  was, first of all, the objective of wresting control of the  Haramayn  from  the  Khalîf. This was meant to weaken his legitimacy, and thus his influence and control over the rest of the world of Islam,  and so facilitate the defeat of the Ottomans in the world war.Secondly, Britain wanted a friendly regime  in control of the Hijâz so that it could better be able to manipulate the  politics of the peninsula in pursuit of the long term goal of destroying Islam. Thirdly, British politics in the peninsula, and the defeat of the Ottomans, were strategically linked to Zionism’s efforts to create a Jewish National Home  in Palestine. And this integrated diplomacy was finally  made clear with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

The ‘ super-power ’ (of the day), and  the so-called ‘ chosen people ’ of Allah, the Most High, would hence be  locked in a highly deceptive embrace of truly calamitous consequences for Muslims, Jews, Christians, and for the rest of mankind. The objective of the integrated diplomacy was to dismantle the entire Islamic Public Order so as  to render Islam  powerless to prevent Zionism  from  achieving its goal. So  long as the institution of the  Khalîfate remained it was always possible for the Islamic Public Order to linger on and, eventually, be revived. The attack on the institution of the  Khalîfate was, therefore, vitally necessary.

It was quite clear to the British and the Zionists that a Jewish National Home – the Jewish State of Israel – could not  be established in Muslim  Palestine, and could never hope to survive so  long as the world of Islam had a Khalîf capable of mobilizing its formidable resources and religious fervor and directing it to military ends. And so the control over the Hijâz, which was of paramount importance in the politics of  the peninsula, was a matter to which British diplomacy directed supreme attention.

The claim to the  Khalîfate  by the Hâshimite British client,  Sharîf  al-Husayn, was incompatible with British diplomatic objectives. It was always possible that the claim could have succeeded.  Sharîf  al-Husayn could then have mobilized the world of Islam  to such an  extent as to re-establish the Islamic Public Order and Pax Islamica in the symbolically powerful heartland of Islam,  and so pose a threat to Britain’s  influence and control over large parts of  Dâr al-Islâm. A revitalized world of Islam  would also have made Jewish control over Palestine and Jerusalem quite impossible.

Britain responded to the claim  to the  Khalîfate  by  Sharîf  al-Husayn by giving her blessings to the other British client in the peninsula, ‘Abd al‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, to move against Husayn, and to wrest control of the Hijâz from  him.  This was the perfection of  the art of double-crossing and of hypocrisy. One British client was used to eliminate another (British) client.

In so far as the Muslim  World was concerned the first world war was much more than a mere European war. It  was, rather, a war which brought about upheavals and changes in the Muslim  World which were unprecedented in its thirteen hundred years of existence.

Firstly, the greatest Muslim  power  and seat of the contemporary  Khalîfate, the Ottoman Islamic Empire, entered the war on the side  of the Central Powers. While this decision is still clouded in some  controversy since, up to the very last moment, the Ottoman leadership had not decided whether to enter the war or not, and if so, which  side to support, there were grounds for speculating a British-Zionist role in the affair.

The Jewish-Zionist leaders had made  a number of unsuccessful efforts at striking a deal with the  Khalîf  for Jewish control over Jerusalem.  They even offered to buy the holy city. Britain  had supported these Jewish-Zionist efforts zealously.

Among Britain’s  major political and military goals in the war were the subjugation of Islam as a power in the  world, the conquest of Jerusalem,  and the creation in Palestine of a Jewish home-land which would constantly disrupt and police the Muslim  Middle East on behalf of the West.

The Ottoman leadership predictably  attempted to mobilize support for its war effort from  the entire Muslim  world. In this connection, on November 23, 1914 the  Shaykh  al-Islâm  of the Ottoman Islamic Empire issued a  fatwâ (Islamic legal ruling) and a proclamation declaring  jihâd  (ie.  war conducted in accordance with Allah’s law) and commanding all Muslims to fight against the Allied Powers. British  diplomacy, however, succeeded in promoting and exploiting Arab nationalism  in the Arabian peninsula as an effective means of attacking and undermining the formidable strength of the universal Islamic fraternity. As a consequence the Arabs rebelled against Ottoman rule on the basis of a British offer of assistance to achieve national independence.

In less than two years after  the commencement of the war  Sharîf  al-Husayn, self-styled ‘ King of the Arabs ’,  firm  ally of the British, and great-grandfather of Jordan’s now deceased King Husayn, had successfully rebelled against the Ottoman authority  and was installed as King of the Hijâz,  the heart-land of Islam.  And as a consequence of the loss of the cities of Makkah and, eventually, Madînah, the pan-Islamic appeal of the Ottoman Khalîf suffered irreparable damage.

The British followed up their success in the Hijâz  by installing the sons of Husayn as Kings in Iraq and Trans-Jordan as well. And by 1919 the British General, Allenby, with Arab troops  fighting loyally with him,  marched triumphantly into Jerusalem  and declared  that the crusades had finally come to an end. Palestine remained a British Mandate territory (mandated by the League of Nations) until the British withdrew in 1948 and the Zionist Jews declared the establishment  of the State of Israel. Muslim  Nationalists had in effect fought against the central  Khalîfate  to unwittingly effectuate the establishment of the Zionist State. 

The Ottoman Islamic Empire was badly defeated in the war. The Allied Powers combined their military prowess with a psychological weapon which had far-reaching effects for Islam.  The British and French succeeded in winning Muslim  military support (by means more foul than fair) from  India, the Maghrib and other areas and so both Arab and non-Arab Muslims fought against their brother Muslim  Turks. The result was that the Ottoman Islamic Empire was not only defeated but its  universal Islamic foundations were destroyed.

In the wake of the loss of the cities of Makkah and Madînah and the Arabian peninsula , and after brother-Muslims  had fought against them  in the war, the Turkish nationalist forces, who had  been in constant conflict with the Khalîf, now felt themselves free from any  impelling attachment to the world of Islam.  Out of the ashes of Ottoman defeat in the first world war the secular Turkish nationalist forces, led by Mustafa Kamal (Ataturk) moved swiftly to transform  their political order from  the old model of  Dâr al-Islâm, or the Islamic Public Order, to the western model of a modem  secular nation-State, the Republic of Turkey. 

It was no surprise, therefore, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted, on March 3, 1924, law  abolishing the  Kh Law stated :

The  Khalîfate. The office of the  Khalîfate  is abolished, since the  Khalîfate  is essentially comprised in the meaning and signification of the words Government (Hukûmah) and Republic (Jumhuriyyah).’

The passage of this law marked a decisive moment in the history of the Ummah.  After a period of thirteen hundred years during which the institution of the  Khalîfate  was almost universally recognized by Muslims as essential to their religion, even when the seat of the  Khalîfate  was filled in ways which were contrary to the principles of Islam,  the world of Islam found itself in the fourteenth century of its existence without a  Khalîf. Indeed so definite and permanent was the change that one could, perhaps, be forgiven for concluding that the world Islam  had now passed into the post-Khalîfate  period of its existence. This, of course, is an incorrect conclusion, since the Holy Prophet Muhammad Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam  has himself prophesied the emergence of a true  Khalîf  from  amongst his descendents,  Imâm al-Mahdî ,  who will lead a Muslim  army  which will destroy the stranglehold of  Shirk  and  Kufr  over the world (contemporary manifestations being both the Saudi State, and the State of Israel).

Britain had cultivated Ibn Sa‘ûd’s friendship and alliance during the war against the Khalîfate and, as usual, had employed financial diplomacy (i.e. bribery). Ibn Sa‘ûd received a monthly sum  of 5000 pounds sterling from  the British Treasury in return for his benevolent neutrality in Husayn’s rebellion against the Khalîf, the imposition of  Hâshimite  rule over the Hijâz, and Britain’s  diplomatic and military efforts  in the peninsula directed against the Ottomans. He diabolically rationalized  this manifest violation of the command of Allah, the Most High, and His Prophet    not to take Jews and Christians as protecting friends by explaining it away as  Jizyah  ( tax imposed on free non-Muslims under Muslim rule). 

But British diplomacy in respect of Ibn  Sa‘ûd was directed to ends of far greater strategic importance than mere  benevolent neutrality  in the war and the disposal of the injudicious  Sharîf  Husayn. Ibn Sa‘ûd had a far greater potential which Britain now moved to exploit, consequent on  Sharif Husayn’s claim to the  Khalîfate. The Saudi power in the Najd, which had reemerged with the capture of Riyadh  in 1902, was the product of an old alliance between a tribal chief and the religious leader of the  Wahhâbî religious sect. That alliance ensured that  while the descendants of the tribal chief would wield political power over territory ruled by the alliance, religious affairs would be subject to the authority of the descendants of the religious chief. As a consequence it  was inevitable that the Najdî Saudis would be under pressure from  the  Wahhâbîs  to seek to force the submission of the heart-land of Islam  (the Hijâz) to the  Wahhâbî  perception of the true faith.

Britain was only too pleased to give the  green light to Ibn Sa‘ûd to move his forces against Husayn four days after the Hâshimite had claimed the Khalîfate  for himself. Ibn Sa‘ûd was impatient to move against Husayn since, as strange as it may appear, both Jewish control over Jerusalem,  and Wahhâbî  control over Hijâz, faced a similar threat. Neither could be achieved, and neither could hope to survive, if the world of Islam  had a Khalîf. (Indeed, the destruction of the Saudi State may very well take place when the  Khalîfate is restored at the time of Imâm al-Mahdî).

By supporting Ibn Sa‘ûd the British were  now ensuring that so long as the Saudi-Wahhâbîs ruled over the Hijâz, the  Khalîfate  could never be revived. The British further calculated that without the  Khalîfate  the Islamic Public Order could not survive and the world of  Islam would then be so weakened that it could never be mobilized to prevent the creation of the Jewish State of Israel. Britain also knew that the  Wahhâbîs, themselves, could never claim the  Khalîfate, firstly because they knew that if  they did so they would meet the same  fate as  Sharîf  al-Husayn, and secondly  because they had the good sense to know that a  Wahhâbî  Khalîf  would always be totally unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of  Muslims the world over. And so, by withdrawing support from  Husayn and supporting Ibn Sa‘ûd, Britain was in fact pursuing her relentless attack on the institution of the  Khalifate theo-centric Islamic Public Order.

Khalîfate  and the Within a few months Ibn Sa‘ûd was able to conquer Makkah and Husayn fled to Jeddah. The British eventually  intervened to remove him  physically from  the peninsula by offering him  a comfortable exile in Cyprus. And soon Madînah and Jiddah were also under Saudi-Wahhâbî rule.

More than a century earlier, however, the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance had succeeded in overcoming the defenses of  Taif and Makkah and there ensued a blood-bath of truly astonishing proportions. The  Wahhâbîs, in their fanatical zeal, considered the Muslims resident in the Hijâz to be engaged in shirk and, as a consequence, held that it was permissible to kill them. The Khalîf  in Istanbul got the Mamluke Khedive  of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to send an army  to the Hijâz under the leadership of his son Ismail. The SaudiWahhâbî  warriors were unceremoniously driven out of Hijâz and into the desert. A century later, however, there was no  Khalîf  and all the powerful Muslim communities were under western colonial rule. In addition, Ibn Sa‘ûd enjoyed the protecting friendship of Great Britain which was the super-power of the day. There was, therefore, no immediate possibility whatsoever of dislodging the Saudi-Wahhâbî forces from the Haramayn and Hijâz.

Although Ibn Sa‘ûd was safely  in control of Hijâz at the commencement of his rule in 1924 he was still confronted with a truly formidable problem. Namely, he had to devise some  strategy which could avert the long-term possibility of a repetition of the disaster which visited the previous SaudiWahhâbî  rule over the Hijâz . It would appear that he first thought of a policy of conciliation with non-Wahhâbî  Muslims and of using his control over the Hijâz to further the cause of the unity of the  Ummah. Thus shortly after gaining control over Makkah and  receiving from its inhabitants their recognition of him  as Sultan of the Hijâz, he issued a proclamation to the entire world of Islam  to the effect that the Hijâz, with its  Haramayn, belonged to the entire world of Islam  and that he, Ibn Sa‘ûd, held control over the Hijâz as a trust only, and on behalf of the entire world of Islam.  He then went on to invite the entire world  of Islam  to send its representatives to Makkah so that, on the basis of  Shûrâ  and  Ijmâ’, a just, efficient and representative administration could be established over the Hijâz.

This important announcement was entirely consistent with the provisions of the Islamic Public Order. The Hijâz was still the  Dâr al-Islâm  which had been established by the Holy Prophet  . As yet there was no hint of any Saudi State which would claim  territorial sovereignty over the Hijâz. The rights of the Muslims in the territory of  Dâr al-Islâm  were being publicly recognized and respected. But, unfortunately, this concern for the unity of the world of Islam  and this fervent declaration concerning the status of the Hijâz did not represent the actual Saudi-Wahhâbî  designs over the Hijâz. It was simply a case of politics of expediency and was designed to protect the Saudi-Wahhâbîs in the wake of a significant initiative undertaken by the formiddable Indian  Khilâfah  Movement & Al-Azhar University in Cairo shortly after the abolition of the Ottoman  Kh alîfate. Indeed the Azhar initiative had perilous implications for Ibn Sa‘ûd and the Saudi-Wahhâbî rule over the Hijâz. It also constituted a troublesome ‘fly in the ointment’ for the victorious Zionists and British.  Al-Azhar University proposed to convene an International Islamic  Khalîfate  Congress (Mu‘tamar al-Kh ilâfah) in Cairo which would, among other things, attempt to appoint a new  Khalif over the world of Islam.

Had the  Wahhâbîs been genuinely devoted to  Islam  they would have welcomed these efforts to  achieve conformity with  an essential requirement of the  Sharî‘ah, i.e. the establishment of a genuine  Khalîfate. The  Wahhâbîs had long argued that the post-Râshidûn Khalîfate  was invalid because, among other things, the  Khalîfate  was not constituted  in a manner which conformed with the requirements of the  Shari’ah. Now that the ‘invalid Khalîfate’  had been abolished and the leading center of Islamic learning of the day was convening an international Islamic congress to discuss the question of the  Khalîfate, and to effect the appointment of a new  Khalîf, the Wahhâbîs should have welcomed this initiative. In addition, they should also have extended every possible cooperation,  and should have participated in a serious way in the Congress in order to ensure that the genuine  Khalîfate was restored.

But the  Wahhâbîs had no such sincere devotion to Islam.  Their attitude was essentially one of selective religiosity, expediency, opportunism  and parochialism. 
The  Wahhâbîs knew that the world of  Islam  would never have accepted a  Wahhâbî  Khalîf  and, as a consequence, they found it expedient to repudiate an essential requirement of  the Islamic Public Order. They marshaled all their energies to sabotage the Cairo  Khalîfate  Congress. Their strategy was to organize a rival congress  in Makkah at the time of the Hajj of 1926. That meant that the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ would take place within a month of ‘ Cairo Congress ’, making it  difficult for delegates to attend both conferences. Since the ‘ Makkah Conference ’ was timed to coincide with the  Hajj, and since it had the active support of the British, it had a clear advantage over the Cairo Conference.

Secondly they specifically excluded  from  the agenda of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ the question of the  Khalîfate. This transparent attempt to sabotage the ‘ Cairo Conference ’ and to bury the  Khalîfate  was more than ample evidence to expose the  hollow credentials of the  Wahhâbîs as socalled champions of the  Sh arî‘ah and of Islam.

The response of the world of Islam  to this rivalry, ie. the ‘ Cairo  Khalîfate Congress ’ of May/June 1926, and  the rival Makkah ‘ World Muslim Congress ’ of July 1926, is a subject which deserves serious research, as well as how much British machination was  involved in ensuring, for example, that the important Muslim  community  of India which had supported the Ottoman  Khalîfate  to such an extent that they had established the formidable Khilâfah  Movement, would stay away from  the  Khalîfate  Congress of Cairo and, instead, attend the rival ‘ Makkah  Congress ’ from  the agenda of which the question of the  Khalîfate was specifically excluded.

  It was clear, however, that in this rivalry the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ achieved a tactical victory over Cairo – a victory which had enormous implications for the very survival of the institution of the  Khalîfate  and the orthodox Islamic Public Order (i.e.  Dâr al-Islâm). Those who organized the ‘ Cairo Congress’ wished to ensure conformity with  the orthodox Islamic system  of political organization. But they were intellectually incapable of articulating a conception of the Islamic Public Order (Dâr al-Islâm) and the Islamic Conception of an International Order which could convince a skeptical world of Islam.  And they could not  respond to the new and unique situation in which Muslims had found themselves  by articulating the alternative of the establishment of the authentic  Jamâ‘ah  and  Amîr  wherever in the world it could be established.

Those who organized the ‘ Makkah Congress ’, on the other hand, were unwilling, because of vested interests,  to remain faithful to the orthodox Islamic Public Order with its  Khalîfate,  Dâr al-Islâm, etc. Instead they chose to accept the rival system of political  organization which had emerged in modem  western civilization and which had  just penetrated the very seat of the Ottoman  Khalîfate, namely the secular nation-State system. And they did so because it was only in the nation-State system that the Saudi-Wahhâbîs could realistically pursue an effort  to win recognition and legitimacy for their rule over the Hijâz and thus ensure  the survival of the Saudi State. They camouflaged their true designs and made  an elaborate attempt to dupe the world of Islam. And their success in  this game of deception was amply demonstrated in the representative character of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’.

The tactical victory of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’
in its rivalry with the ‘ Cairo Congress ’ played a significant role in  paving the way for the rest of the world of Islam,  including the very heart-land of Islam,  to eventually follow the example of Mustafa Kamal and his model of the secular State of Turkey. The history of the world of Islam  since 1924 records, on the one hand, the evils which were continuously injected into the body of the Ummah through this alien system  of political organization and, on the other, the naive, confused and superficial attempts  of modern Islamic scholarship to reconstruct a new Islamic Public Order on the secular foundations of the nation-State system.

What emerged from those efforts was  the goal of ‘ Islamization ’ and of establishing the ‘Islamic State within the system  of nation-States’. But both of these were futile goals for it was,  and still is, impossible for them  to be achieved without first dismantling some  of the essential apparatus of the Khalîfate system.

Eminent Islamic scholars such as Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Abul Ala Maududi, Dr. Ismail Faruqi etc. ventured into  Ijtihâd  (i.e. independent reasoning) to reconstruct an Islamic Public Order in post-Khalîfate  Islam.  Their efforts resulted in the concepts of the ‘ Islamic State ’ and ‘ Islamization ’. Despite being great thinkers of the time they  appeared not to have adequately understood the true nature and consequences of the change which was taking place. Dr Iqbal, for example, has stated that ‘… according to  Sh ar‘î  law  the appointment of an  Imâm  or  Khalîf  is absolutely indispensable. Turkeys ijtihâd  is that according to the spirit of Islam the  Kh alîfate  or Imâmate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected assembly  (e.g. the Turkish Grand National Assembly or Parliament).  Personally I believe the Turkish view  is perfectly sound…’ Unfortunately, however, the efforts for Islamization and for establishing the  Islamic State resulted in the orthodox Islamic system  of the political organization of the Ummah or the Islamic Public Order (i.e. Pax Islamica and  Dâr al-Islâm) being relegated to total obscurity. As a consequence political thought in the world of Islam was gravely misdirected, and the immense confusion so created persists to the present day. 

The World Muslim Congress which convened in June 1926 as a result of the efforts of King ‘Abdul ‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd  was hailed as the first such meeting in the History of Islam.  And indeed  it was, for all the wrong reasons. The Congress received two messages from  the King. In the first, the opening address of the Congress, the King made  reference to the sorry history of the Hijâz ending with the despotism  of  Husayn who, among his other sins, placed the Hijâz under foreign non-Muslim  influence. This being prohibited by the Prophet  , a justification was therefore presented for the Najdî conquest of the Hijâz. As a result of  that conquest, the King was pleased to point out there was now security in the Hijâz. The Congress was invited to hold its sessions in that atmosphere of  security and of total liberty. The only constraints on the conference were the restraints of the Islamic Law and of not meddling in international politics nor  in the differences which separate certain Muslim  peoples from  their governments. And yet Ibn Sa‘ûd was less than honest in his opening statement since he was just as guilty as was Husayn in aiding and abetting the penetration of British influence in the peninsula.

  Two things stand out in the  King’s address. Firstly the  Wahhâbî  leadership was showing its best possible face in  order to court the support of the Congress, – thus the security and total liberty promised. But secondly, and more important, the ban on international politics in the discussions of the Congress clearly implied that  the security of the Saudi-Wahhâbî  State and the maintenance of its relations with  its allies (Britain in particular) took precedence over the considered opinions of the  Ummah  even when expressed through  Sh ûrâ  in an Islamic Conference ‘ unprecedented ’ in the history of Islam.

The King gave to the Congress the safe  task of examining the necessary ways and means for making the holy places the best centers of Islamic culture and education, the most perfect  region in terms of prosperity and hygiene, and the Muslim  country which is most conspicuous for its recognition of Islam  . It was very clear  from  this address that the King was attempting to foist on the Congress an  artificial division between religion and politics, and a new theory to the effect that the proper subject matter for the consideration of Islamic Congresses was the subject matter of religion and religious affairs. And this was a  bid‘ah  (ie. blameworthy innovation) of a truly reprehensible nature since it was in such manifest conflict with the Qur’ânic  guidance, the  Sunnah  of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam and the very foundations of the Islamic legacy. The King was, in fact, making an attempt to transform alIslam,  which was  al-Dîn, into religion in the narrow and distorted sense in which the term was used in secular western civilization.

On July 2nd  , 1926, on the occasion of the 15th   plenary session, the King addressed a second message to the Congress, through which he sought to achieve one of the main objectives of the  Wahhâbî  initiative, to wit, the international Islamic recognition and acceptance of Saudi-Wahhâbî  control over the Hijâz. 

The King expounded his politique for the Hijâz as follows :

1) We do not admit any foreign intervention in this sacred country, whatever may be its nature.

2) We do not admit any privileges  open to some  and denied to others; whatever takes place in this  country must conform  with the Sh arî‘ah.

3) The Hijâz must have a special neutral regime. It must neither make war nor be attacked, and this  neutrality must  be  guaranteed  by all the independent Muslim States.

What the King was attempting to do in  this address was nothing less than propounding a new Islamic political theory. It was as though the SaudiWahhâbîs were convinced that they were  the only Muslims, and hence Hijâz and Najd, which were under their control, was the real  Dâr al-Islam. Thus all territories outside of Hijâz and  Najd (or modem  Saudi Arabia) were foreign. And when the King spoke about  the need to prevent any foreign intervention in the Hijâz, he was  referring specifically to the kind of intervention which had ousted the  Wahhâbîs from the Hijâz more than a century earlier. 

The second point made was, of course, quite admirable i.e. a nondiscriminatory application of the injunctions of the  Sh arî‘ah. But the second point was incompatible with the first. The world of Islam  was being accorded the status of foreigners who,  naturally, would not be eligible to all the privileges open to the Saudi-Wahhâbîs. Foreigners, for example, would need a visa in order to enter  the Hijâz even for performing the  Hajj. The Saudi-Wahhâbîs would not require a visa since they were citizens of the new-born State of Saudi Arabia and  so the Hijâz belonged to them. NonSaudi Muslims could now be  imprisoned if they extended their stay in Hijâz after the expiry of their visas for they  were now foreigners and the Hijâz, which was no longer Dâr al-Islâm, did not belong to them.

The King had, in fact, dismantled the  Dâr al-Islâm  which had been established by the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam himself, and by his companions , in the Hijâz, had dispossessed the world of Islam  of its very heartland, had insulted the Muslims, and was destined to get away with that audacious behavior for more than seven decades.

The third point made in the King’s  address was quite remarkable. There could be no doubt at all that it  was a manifest statement of  bid‘ah. Neither in the  Qur’ân, nor in the  Sunnah  of the Prophet  , nor in the entire Islamic legacy is there any concept of the  neutrality of the Hijâz. Indeed the statement that the Hijâz must not make war amounted to taking the very heartland of Islam  out of  jihâd, and was thus in manifest conflict with explicit commands of the  Qur’ân. Here again the King was walking the path of kufr. In respect of the request of the King  that all independent Islamic States should recognize the neutrality of his regime, it was clear that this was a scarcely disguised attempt to win recognition from  the world of Islam  of Saudi-Wahhâbî rule over the Hijâz.

As such the  Khalîfate  question was never discussed. This was a major triumph for the new secular approach  to Muslim ‘ unity ’. The conference did, however, enter into politics in  approving a resolution demanding the return of Ma‘ân and ‘Aqabah to Hijâzî control since the British annexation of these territories to Trans-jordan  (over which Britain was the mandate power) violated the command of the Prophet  Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam that the Arabian peninsular must remain free of all non-Islamic influence.

This however was not entirely the case.  One of the effects of the war of 1914-18 was to eliminate the Turks from  Arabia and to extend the British sphere of influence over the whole peninsula. But it is very important to note that in this unique and momentous achievement of the British in which the command of the Prophet  Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam was compromised for the first time in thirteen hundred years, the British were aided and abetted by both Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ûd. Indeed both commanded a price  for their services to Britain. The Arab forces of Husayn actually fought alongside the British against the Turks. Ibn Sa‘ûd’s benevolent neutrality in this struggle enhanced the chances of Britain’s  success. Up to  1920 when his monthly payments from the British were stopped, Husayn had received about six million pounds sterling. Ibn Sa‘ûd, who received from  the same British Government a more modest 350,000 pounds at the rate of  5000 pounds a month, diabolically explained it away as  jizyah  (a tax paid by a subject non-Muslim  people resident in the territory of Dâr al-Islâm).

It was Britain (the mandate power  in Trans-jordan) which had annexed Ma‘ân and ‘Aqabah to Trans-jordan in 1925. Although ex-King Husayn protested the annexation from  his exile  in Cyprus and Ibn Sa‘ûd moved the World Muslim  Congress to adopt a resolution protesting the annexation, the British action was clearly a fait accomplishment.

It is interesting to note that  if the command of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam  had not been compromised by Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ûd in  their misguided assistance to the British, and in their attempt to rid the peninsular of Ottoman influence, it would not have been possible for the Balfour Declaration to be fulfilled and for the Zionist State to be established in Muslim  Palestine. It is also interesting to note that if ‘Aqabah had remained under Hijâzî control, Saudi Arabia would have been a front-line State in the present Middle East conflict. History may one day reveal that one of the reasons for the British annexation of Ma‘ân and  ‘Aqabah was to create a  buffer zone between the volatile heartland of Islam and the Jewish national home in Palestine which the Balfour Declaration envisaged. It should be clear that a direct confrontation between the Hijâz (now part of Saudi Arabia) and the Jewish National Home in Palestine (now the State of Israel) would arouse uncontrollable Islamic passions, a factor which still constitutes the only serious threat to the survival of the Zionist State. 

And so became manifest the contemporaneous destruction of the institution of Khalîfate and the symbiotic character of the emergence and future existence of the Saudi-Wahhâbî State and the State of Israel.

Why was the  Khalîfate  not restored somewhere else after it collapsed in Istanbul ? Why have we had no  Khalîfate  for more than seventy years now? The reason for this is the nature of the  age in which we now  live. This is the age when the greatest force of evil ever created by  Allah has been released (eventually to appear as a human  being). This is the age of  al-Masîh adDajjâl (ie. anti-Christ) and of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj (ie. Gog and Magog).

When viewed from an essentially  Qur’ânic  perspective, the abolition of the Ottoman  Khilâfah  appears to have occurred at the same time that other events of supreme  Qur’ânic  importance were unfolding. For example, the Ottoman empire would not have been defeated and destroyed had fundamental change not come  to Europe, transforming European civilization into a major actor on the stage of  the world. The French and Bolshevik revolutions marked the turning points  in the transformation of Western and Eastern European civilizations from  civilizations based on faith (in Christianity) to essentially godless civilizations. The scientific and industrial revolutions and the emergence of the capitalist economy resulted in those godless civilizations becoming predatory and having the power with which to prey upon all mankind. Those godless European civilizations then embarked upon an effort to transform  all the rest of the world to godlessness! The Ottoman Empire stood  in the way of Europe since it was established on foundations which were essentially sacred. The institution of the  Kh alîfate  established and legitimized Islam’s sacred model of a public order and a world order.  That public order, or  Jamâ‘ah, was absolutely essential for the preservation of the integrity and faith of the World of Islam. And so, the  Khalîfate  had to be targeted and  destroyed in order for the penetration and destruction of faith in the world of Islam to be ever realized.

With the destruction of the  Khalîfate  in 1924, the last major hurdle in the way of those who were determined to  reduce all of mankind to godlessness was now removed. The stage was thus set for the fulfillment of the words of the  Hadîth  al-Qudsî  in  Sahîh Bukh ârî  narrated by Abû Sa‘îd Khudrî Radiyallahu Anhu, in which Allah, the Supreme, informed Âdam Alaihissalaam that 999 out of every 1000 persons (of this age) would enter into Hell. In other words, the destruction of the  Khalîfate  by the modern godless European  world provided evidence that the age of  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj  had commenced. (See  Qur’ân,   al-Kahf,  18:98-99)

Indeed, for one of the greatest Islamic scholars of the age, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, the age of  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj  had commenced even earlier. He declared in 1917, perhaps after the Bolshevik revolution, that ‘… all the armed forces of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj  have now been released …

Khul gayah Yajûj awr Majûj kay lash kar tamâm Chasmay Muslim daykhlay tafsîr harf e yansilûn

Iqbal advised that the attention of Muslims should now be directed to the verse of the  Qur’ân  (Al-Anbiyâ’:  21: 96) which ended with the word ‘ yansilûn ’, and which spoke of the re-emergence of the Jewish State of Israel. And that is the subject to which we now turn.

At the same time that the objective of the destruction of the  Khalîfate  was being pursued by modern, godless, European civilization, another more sinister revolution was taking place in  the Jewish world. A godless, Zionist Movement emerged amongst Eastern European Jews. It declared that the Holy Land of Palestine belonged to the Jews because God gave it to them. The Zionist movement misled the Jews into believing that it was their inalienable right and divinely ordained  destiny to restore the Jewish State of Israel 2000 years after it was destroyed  by Allah, the Most High. It totally ignored the fact that Jews had both corrupted and betrayed the religion of ‘Abraham  ’ and, as a consequence, no  longer had any right to the Holy Land ! Jews swallowed the bait of the Zionist Movement. The supreme goal of Jews now became the goal of establishing the State of Israel regardless of the means which were to be employed  to achieve this goal. Zionism  was created by a truly evil force. A force about which Allah had warned – the release of  al-Masîh ad-Dajjâl  and of the Gog and Magog (Ya’jûj  and Ma’jûj).

And so we witnessed the amazing  phenomenon – amazing for those who ponder over the  Qur’ân  – of the destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the restoration of the State of Israel as  contemporaneous events. The same evil forces were at work in both  cases. This was confirmed in  Sûrah al-Anbiyâ’ of the  Qur’ân  in verses 95 and 96 where Allah spoke of a  qaryah  (town) (i.e. the city of Jerusalem,  symbolizing the State of Israel) which He destroyed and then pronounced the restoration of that  qaryah  (ie. the restoration of the State of Israel) to be  harâm  (prohibited) until the (commencement of the) release of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj.

And it is prohibited for a town  (ie.  Jerusalem is referred to here  )  whose people We have punished  (with expulsion from that territory, ie. the Holy Land),  that they may not return  (ie. to restore the State of Israel),  until  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj  are released and they descend from every direction. (ie. they take control of the world). ’ (Qur’ân, al-Anbiyâ’,  21:96)

Since the Jews were now deceived and put on a path which led, progressively, to the greatest oppression and wickedness in their conduct with mankind, in general,  and with Muslims, in particular, a third event now took place at just this same  time. It  was a sign from  Allah which was spoken of in the  Qur’ân, a sign which was meant to warn both modern western civilization and the Jews: ‘…If you live like Pharaoh  (ie. rejecting the Truth, demonizing Islam, and oppressing the Muslims),  you will die the way he died…’ (See  Qur’ân,  Yûnus  :10:92). That event was the discovery of the body of Pharaoh by Loret in 1898 at Thebes in the King’s Valley of Lower Egypt. The discovery of Pharoah’s body  confirmed what Allah had declared at the moment of his death ( ie. the death of Pharoah) :

This day We  (have decided to)  preserve your body  (from destruction)  so that you  (ie. your body)  may be come a sign to (a people)  who will come after you,  for most people are heedless of Our signs.’         _(Qur’ân, Yûnus, 10:92-93)

And the specific warning to the Jews, at  the moment of their last and greatest act of wickedness and oppression, was that not a single one of them  would escape the fate of Pharoah. Just as Pharoah had declared his faith in Allah at the moment of his death, and that did not save him  from  the hell-fire, so too would the Jews have to declare their faith in ‘Îsâ (Jesus) as the Messiah at the moment of their death, but that  would not save them  from  the hell-fire. (Qur’ân, an-Nisâ’: 4:159) 

Complicit in this final onslaught against Islam  are the Saudi-Wahhâbîs. It should be known that the Holy Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallamsaid : 

The violent and torturous people are in the East, and Shaytân  will arouse dissension from there.’ pointing towards the Najd.  (Mish kât

Another title used in reference to the  Wahhâbîs is ‘ Najdî ’. They hail from Dar’iyyah in the Najd. The disunion predicted in the above  hadîth   emerged twelve centuries later. The  Wahhâbîs spewed forth from  the Najd into the Hijâz, plundering the possessions of  Muslims, killing the men and enslaving the women and children. They committed  the basest evils, evils reminiscent of the Mongol sack of the Islamic empire centuries before.

Three other related events took place and,  indeed, are still taking place, all of which are directly related to the release of those evil forces created by Allah. They all flowed from the emergence of  materialism  and secularism  as the philosophical foundation of the modern western civilization. These were the events :

i) The emergence of  ribâ  (interest) at the very foundation of the European economy, and the subsequent deadly embrace of the entire world economy by  ribâ. The Ottoman Empire was the special target, however, and the decline of this great Islamic State began when it was penetrated by Jewish bankers with  ribâ  during the rule of Mahmûd II (1808-39). By 1896 the stranglehold of  ribâ  on the Ottoman economy had put the  Sultân  in such dire straits that the Zionist leader, Herzl, could finally visit Sultan ‘Abdul Hamîd II  and play the card of financial diplomacy which  ribâ  made possible, i.e. black mail. In return for Palestine he offered ‘…to regulate  the entire finances of the Ottoman State…’. ‘Abdul Hamîd refused.  He was overthrown by the complicit Nationalist forces, the  Khalîfate  was abolished – and  the Jewish bankers rubbed their hands and declared ‘ mission accomplished ’!

ii) The emergence of  shirk  at the very foundation of the new European political philosophy. Allah is no longer sovereign. The modern secular State is now sovereign. That modern  European model  of a State then embraced all of mankind in its deadly embrace, but the seat of the Khalîfate was the special target. After the  Khalîfate  was abolished the new, modern, secular State of  Turkey emerged with that  sh irk  at its very foundation. From  Turkey it went to  ‘Abd ul-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd who then transformed the heartland of Islam  into  the modern State of Saudi Arabia based on the same  shirk. Pakistan followed in  tame  imitation and the great effort of Iqbal became an exercise in futility.

iii) The emergence of a new philosophy of  feminism  at the very heart of the new, European, secular society.  It brought in its wake a sexual revolution which dismantled the edifice of sexual morality. Sexual freedom  resulted in an unprecedented explosion of sexual promiscuity and sexual perversions. This was the  kath r al-khabath  (excessive immorality and  sexual perversion) which the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam had declared to be the sign of the great  Fitnah  of   the  Dajjâl  and the  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj. This destructive sexuality now targeted all of mankind, but the special target was again the World of Islam.

As these events were taking place,  the world of Islam witnessed the emergence many lesser  Dajjâls  (false Prophets); Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the false Prophet of Qadian and founder  of the Ahmadiyyah Movement, Elijah Muhammad, the founder of the Nation  of Islâm  in the U.S.A. et al. The primary role of these and their like  was one of corrupting Muslim  thought and belief, especially as it related to the accurate perception of the transcendental reality which was now unfolding in the Age of  fitan. These were and are tools of the forces which  were at work planning the destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the universal Ummah, and their primary role was one of diverting Islamic thought from  that  supreme attack which was being launched on the Ummah, and  reducing the Islamic intelligentsia to a state of intellectual confusion. They have been eminently successful.

We embarked on this cursory analysis  in respect of the transcendental dimension of the historical reality  which witnessed the abolition of the Khalîfate, in order to demonstrate that the restoration of the  Khalîfate  was not possible during these last eight decades. After all, some of those who are hesitant about giving the  bay‘ah  (oath of allegiance) to an  Amîr  of a Jamâ‘ah  have asked the question : ‘  Why was the Khalîfate not restored somewhere else after it collapsed in Istanbul ? Why have we had no Khalîfate for more than seventy years now ? ’ The reason for this is the nature of the age in which we now live. This is the age when the greatest force of evil ever created by Allah has been released (eventually to appear as a human being – Dajjâl). This is the age of al-Masîh ad-Dajjâl and of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj. That authentic Jamâ‘ah which is struggling for the restoration of the Khalîfate cannot possibly succeed in its efforts unless it first has an accurate perception of today’s objective reality and recognizes this age as the Age of the Dajjâl. That authentic Jamâ‘ah did not exist in 1924. How, then, was it possible to wage a successful struggle for the restoration of the Khalîfate?

We turn now to explain the ‘political reality’ of the age which witnessed the collapse of the  Khalîfate, and of the period of time which has elapsed since 1924. Sharîf  al-Husayn, great-grandfather of  the now deceased King Husayn of Jordan, claimed the  Khalîfate on March 7, 1924, four days after the announcement from  the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolishing the Khalîfate. He had been appointed by the Ottoman  Khalîf  as the  Sharîf  of Makkah, but had rebelled against Istanbul and, as a client of the British, had fully co-operated in the British effort  to defeat the Ottoman Empire. His reward was a princely seven million  Sterling pounds pay-off from  the British Treasury. In claiming the  Khalîfate, however, he was in conflict with the basic British and Zionist objective in  the war against the Ottoman Empire. The war was not just a war against Turks. It was a war against Islam. The objective was the destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the emasculation of the Muslim world so that the Jewish State  of Israel could be restored, and the faith of Muslims destroyed.

Sharîf al-Husayn’s claim to the  Khalîfate  threatened the entire scheme  of the British and the Zionists. And so they had  to get rid of him.  They did it with diabolical cunning. They gave the green  light to another British client, ‘Abd al-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, head of the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance which had briefly captured Makkah about a hundred years previously, to attack Husayn. ‘Abd
al-‘Azîz cooperated with the British in  the destruction of the Ottoman Empire through concluding a treaty of ‘ Benevolent Neutrality ’ with the British in 1916. His pay-off from  the British Treasury for his treachery against Islam  was a less princely sum  of five thousand Sterling pounds a month. He explained to his gullible so-called  Salafî Ikh wân  (an armed forced of  Wahhâbî  zealots used by the Saudi King) that this was  jizyah  (a punitive tax imposed by  Dâr al-Islâm  on Christian and Jewish residents). They accepted his explanation, and so, perhaps, do well-paid Saudi clients around the world !

The British-Zionist political strategy succeeded in replacing Husayn with a Saudî-Wahhâbî  monarchy which effectively prevented the restoration of the Khalîfate. The plan was simple, yet brilliant. No one could possibly be recognized as  Khalîf, and win legitimacy for his  Khalîfate, unless he controlled the  Haramayn  (i.e. Makkah and Madînah) and the  Hajj. No one could succeed in controlling the  Haramayn  and the  Hajj  so long as the Saudi regime, supported militarily by the West,  remained in control of Arabia. And the Saudi-Wahhâbîs would never be so stupid as to claim  the  Khalifate for themselves. After all, what happened to khalîfate of Sharif  al-Husayn was supposed to function as a warning. It did! And the so-called  Salafî Wahhâbîs  and the Saudi kingdom  abandoned the  Khalîfate! In doing so they committed an unprecedented act of treachery against Islam. The reality is that the  Khalîfate  could not, and still cannot, be restored until Arabia is liberated and  Dâr al-Islâm  is restored.

And while the struggle to restore the  Khalîfate  must never cease, we also recognize the possibility that the liberation of Arabia may, in all  likelihood, not take place until the advent of  Imâm al-Mahdî. When the  Imâm al-Mahdî  does emerge, however, he will need the  Jamâ‘ah  of Muslims to support him  and to struggle with him.  This, then, is the imperative for the creation  of the authentic Islamic revolutionary movement or Jamâ‘ah.


The destruction of the  Khalîfate  of Islam  was the result of a diabolical conspiracy hatched by the British and  the Zionist Jews.

The Saudis and the so-called Salafî-Wahhâbîs acted as willing accomplices  in that crime against Islam. The  Khalîfate  symbolized a system  of political organization (ie.  Dâr alIslâm) which recognized the supremacy of  Islam  in public life, and in the international relations of the Muslim  world. The emergence of the secular nation-states of Turkey and Saudi  Arabia, at the seat of the  Khalîfate  and in the very heart-land of Islam,  paved  the way for the secularization of the system  of political organization of  the Muslim  world. And since it was governments of secular nation-States within the Muslim  world which would now represent the World of Islam,  the implication was that Islam  would no longer rule supreme over public life or over the international relations of the Muslim world. Rather the secular  State now claimed sovereignty. Recognition of that sovereignty amounted to an act of  shirk. And so, the whole world of Islam  now found itself, in  so far as its collective existence was concerned, within the embrace of  shirk,

A more blunt way of saying the same  thing would be to say that in so far as public life in the Muslim  world was concerned, Allah, the Most High, would no longer be  Akbar  ! No Muslim  can read these  lines without feeling great anger against those who betrayed Allah, the Most High, and the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam! The quality of faith (Îmân) of a Muslim  can, in fact, be gauged through the manner in which he responds to this pathetic situation. The World of Islam  is today without  power. The conclusion is that the institution of the  Khalîfate, which forms part of  Dâr al-Islâm, is indispensable for the restoration of  power. Without power there will be many more Bosnias, Kashmirs, Algerias, Chechnyas, Palestines etc. The only way this deplorable state of affairs can be changed is through the restoration of the supremacy of Islam  in  the public life of Muslims and in the international relations of the Muslim  world. That requires the restoration of Dâr al-Islâm  and the  Khalîfate. We need, therefore,  to articulate anew the provisions of the Islamic Public Order (Dâr al-Islâm) and Islam’s Conception of an International Order, and to demonstrate their clear superiority over the secular rival which has emerged from  western civilization. We also need to recognize,  as this series has made clear, that it is impossible, and will remain  impossible, to restore the  Khalîfate  so long as the Hijâz remains under the control of the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance. Power cannot be restored without the liberation of the  Haramayn  and the  Hajj  from the control of those who participated in the destruction of the  Khalîfate. The goal of destroying the  Hajj  is now within the grasp of the enemies of Islam. 

All that is required for that goal to be fully realised is that  Masjid alAqsâ  be destroyed. The Jewish State of Israel can do that at any time. It is just a matter of choosing the opportune moment. The present Saudi regime has, from  its inception, adopted a non-reversible position of acceptance of, and accommodation with, the Jewish State of Israel. The destruction of Masjid al-Aqsâ  will, as a result, create greater opposition against Saudi rule over Arabia. The Saudi regime  will not  be able to control the rage which Muslims will openly express at the time of the  Hajj. And yet if the Saudi regime  is seen to be unable to control the  Hajj, then the internal opposition within Saudi Arabia will put the  Hajj  to effective use in destabilizing the regime. This is the scenario which  will most likely lead the Saudis to suspend the  Hajj  in order to preserve their rule. Any suspension of the  Hajj by the Saudis, as a consequence of security considerations, will be exploited by the West to ensure that the  Hajj  cannot be resumed. They have the resources to ensure this. 

The liberation of the  Haramayn  and the  Hajj  will be possible when the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance breaks down. There are  indications that the alliance is already under great pressure and  can fall apart. There are many Saudi ‘Ulamâ’  who are now imprisoned or under  house arrest. The issues which are most likely to tear the alliance apart would be Saudi ‘ recognition ’ of the Jewish State of Israel (something which has already taken place de facto, and cannot be indefinitely concealed),  and the immanent likelihood of the destruction of Masjid al-Aqsâ by the Jews. 

As events unfold they will confirm  the basic points argued in this treatise.