Category Archives: Imam Abu Hanifa

The Methodology of Imam Abu Hanifa ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ in Fiqh


One indication to Imam Abu Hanifa’s ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ vast knowledge of the sources of the Shari’ah is his methodology in deriving rulings from the Shari’ah, since one of his primary sources is the authentic sunnah and the opinions of the Sahabah, as he himself explicitly stated:

Hafiz Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr narrates: ‘Abd al-Warith narrated to us: Qasim narrated to us: Ahmad ibn Zuhayr narrated to us: Yahya ibn Ma‘in narrated to us: ‘Ubayd ibn Abi Qurrah narrated to us from Yahya ibn Durays, he said: I was present with Sufyan al-Thawri ( ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ) when a man of great knowledge and piety came to him, and he said: “O Abu ‘Abd Allah! What do you have against Abu Hanifa?” He said: “And what does he have?” He said: “I heard him [i.e. Abu Hanifah] say a statement in which there is balance and proof: ‘Indeed I take [legal opinions] from the Book of Allah when I find it. That which I do not find therein, I take from the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger and the authentic narrations from him which have spread between the hands of trustworthy people from trustworthy people. If I do not find it in the Book of Allah, nor the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger, I take the opinion of his companions, [adopting the opinion of] whoever [of them] I wish, and I leave the opinion of whoever [of them] I wish. Moreover, I do not leave their opinion for another’s opinion. If the [legal] issue reaches [only] to Ibrahim, al-Sha‘bi, al-Hasan, ‘Ata, Ibn Sirin, Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyab – and he enumerated [other] men – then, [they are] a people who performed ijtihad , so I may perform ijtihad just as they performed ijtihad .’” Thereupon, Sufyan remained silent for a long period, and then he said some words of which there remained none in the gathering but he wrote them: “We hear harshness in speech and we fear it. We hear softness and we desire it. We do not judge the living; nor do we judge the dead. We accept what we hear. And we entrust what we do not know to its knower, and we put our opinion in doubt in favour of their opinion.” (Al-Intiqa’ fi Fada’il al-A’immati l-Thalathat al-Fuqaha’ , pp. 264-5)

This sanad is authentic: ‘Abd al-Warith ibn Sufyan al-Qurtubi (d. 395) is thiqah according to al-Dhahabi ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ  in Siyar A’lam al-Nubala (Misbah al-Arib 2:297); al-Qasim ibn Asbagh al-Qurtubi (247 – 340) was called “the great hafiz ” and “the muhaddith of Cordoba” by al-‘Asqalani  ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ  and is
saduq (Lisan al-Mizan (6:367-8); Ahmad ibn Zuhayr ibn Harb (d. 299) is thiqah according to al-Daraqutni and Khatib; ‘Ubayd ibn Abi Qurrah is a shaykh of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ    and is thiqah according to Ya‘qub ibn Shaybah and Yahya ibn Ma‘in ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ (Tarikh Baghdad 12:386-9); Yahya ibn al-Durays (d. 203) is a narrator of Muslim, and is thiqah according to Ibn Ma‘in ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ (Tahrir al-Taqrib 4:89).

Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi transmitted the same narration with a different chain leading up to Yahya ibn Ma‘in ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ  after which the chain is the same, and Dr. Bashshar ‘Awwad Ma‘ruf commented on it, “This is a report with a sahih isnad, and its narrators are trustworthy and well-known.” (Tarikh Baghdad 15:504)

Several other narrations with similar wordings from Imam Abu Hanifa ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ about his methodology have been reported in al-Intiqa’ by Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (pp. 266-7). These narrations from Imam Abu Hanifa ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ   regarding his methodology in deriving laws reveal the baselessness of the allegation that in most of his opinions he relied on analogy and parted from the transmitted sources of the Shari’ah. In fact, the Qur’an, well-known sunnah and narrations from the Sahabah were the primary foundations of his madhhab.


One of the essential characteristics of  the religion of Islam  is its insistence that the sovereignty of Allah, the Most  High, requires that the State and all its institutions submit to Allah’s laws. If  Allah, the Most High, is Sovereign, then Parliament, for example, cannot  be sovereign. The Sovereignty of Allah, the Most High, implies the supremacy of the religion of Islam  and, in particular, the sacred law or  Sharî‘ah. That supremacy of Islam over the State, and over public life, was symbolized by the institution of the Khalîfate. Even when the office of the  Khalîfate  had been transformed into dynastic monarchy, the  Khalîfate  still performed that symbolic role of supreme strategic importance.

European civilization, on the other  hand, experienced a conflict between religion and the State which resulted in  the secularization of politics. The final chapter of the conflict, which sealed the fate of religion in Europe, and brought an essentially godless civilization into being, was the French and Bolshevik Revolutions. The sphere of  religion was reduced to individual and group worship, and the Pope and Euro-Christianity were excluded as actors in the conduct of State. Allah, the  Most High, was no longer recognized to be Sovereign (al-Akbar). Instead it was the people who now recognized themselves as sovereign, and they vested that sovereignty in the new secular model of a State. The State was ‘al-Akbar’. Islam,  the religion, recognized such an act to be  shirk, the greatest of all sins, and the one sin which Allah, the Most High, will never forgive!

Godless European civilization embarked upon an unholy crusade to transform the entire world,  and to remold it after the new European model of the secular State and godless society. The rest of the world was colonized or had its essential freedom  taken away. It was then secularized, and is fast being reduced to a godless society. This  included the world of Islam.  In fact the world of Islam  was the special target of godless European civilization. The process of reducing the world of  Islam  to a godless society commenced with the secularization of public life. The Ottoman Islamic Empire was targeted. It had to be destroyed. It  could not be destroyed so long as the Khalîfate  remained a powerful institution of  the sacred model of society which recognized the sovereignty of Allah, the Most High. And so the Khalîfate had to be destroyed.

The destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which was effected in the first world war, resulted in the emergence  of the secular State of Turkey. The government was constituted of secularized westernized Turkish nationalists who worked hand-in-glove with an  under-ground Jewish movement. They first reduced the now powerless  Khalîfate  to an office which resembled that of the Pope, and then they abolished it.  But the secularization process in the world of Islam  was sealed when the  Hijâz, under the rule of ‘Abdul ‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, also joined Mustafa. Kamal (Ataturk) in the rejection of the supremacy of Islam over the State. And so Arabia, the heartland of Islam, also embraced the secular model of a State. The birth of the State of Saudi Arabia coincided with the destruction of the  Dâr al-Islâm  which had been established by Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah, the Most High, be upon him) and from  that point onward the  Haramayn  and Hijâz fell into the control of forces  which would stop at nothing to obstruct the re-emergence of the  Khalîfate  and the restoration of authenticity to the collective life of the Ummah.

So long as the Hijâz remained  Dâr al-Islâm, every Muslim  was guaranteed by the  Sharî‘ah  the right of entry into that territory. He did not need a visa. There was no such thing as Saudi sovereignty. There was no such thing as Saudi citizenship. The right of entry into any part of  Dâr al-Islâm  was one of several rights which Muslims had. They  also had the right to reside in  Dâr al-Islâm; they did not need residence permits; the right to seek their livelihood in any part of  Dâr al-Islam; they did not need work permits; and the right to participate  in the political process (Sh ûrâ); they did not need Saudi citizenship etc. The birth of the Nation State of Saudi Arabia resulted in the denial, and, eventually, the elimination of all these rights of Muslims. The huge oil-wealth of Arabia belonged to the world of Islam.  When the State of Saudi Arabia was born, the Saudis robbed the rest of the Muslims of what belonged to all Muslims and what  was to serve the interests of the Ummah  . Then the Saudis handed over the effective control of the oil to the Americans in exchange for an American  security guarantee. That, also, was treason.

The destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the emergence of  the State of Saudi Arabia were events which changed the  very face of the world of Islam in such a way as to result  in a return to the pre-Hijrah  stage of Islamic civilization. Nowhere in the world today does  Dâr al-Islâm  exist. Islamic civilization now exists in the post-Kh alîfate  era of its history. And, as it was in Makkah fourteen hundred years ago,  so too today, the Muslim  community around the world is subjected to an all-embracing  Jâhiliyyah  which dominates the world. The origin of that  Jâhiliyyah  is, of course, modern post-Christian western secular and materialist western civilization. It was, perhaps, with particular reference to  this age, that the Prophet of Islam   (divinely blessed is he and in eternal peace) is reported to have said :

Whosoever dies without having witnessed  (during his lifetime)  the institution of  bay‘ah  (the oath of allegiance by the people through which an appointment to the position of leadership over the Jamâ‘ah is legitimized)  has certainly died a death of Jâhiliyyah  (This could also imply a death in an age which has witnessed the return to the pre-Hijrah Jâhiliyyah).’ (Muslim)

If this  Ummah  is ever to succeed in restoring the supremacy of Islam over the State in the world of Islam,  it is  imperative that Muslims be taught the history of the collapse of the Khalîfate  and its replacement, in the heartland of Islam,  by the secular Saudi-Wahhâbî  nation-State on its ruins. This was an act of supreme betrayal of Islam.

Allah, the Most High and All-powerful, revealed the  Dîn  of Islam  to the Holy Prophet Muhammad  Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam that it establish its supremacy over all other religions. This required the prior submission by the  Ummah  to the supremacy of Islam in both the private and public life of Muslims.

The office of the  Khalîfate  functioned as the ultimate symbol of Islam  as a dominant force in public life. Without the  Khalîfate  the world of Islam would never have political power. There was, moreover, a permanent link between the  Khalîfate  and control over the  Haramayn, i.e. the sacred territories in Makkah and Madînah. Anyone who could succeed in severing that link, would cripple the institution of the  Khalîfate  and, eventually, render the world of Islam powerless!

Throughout the 1400 years of the history of the Ummah  of Prophet Muhammad Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam, no one has ever been successfully appointed to the  Khalîfate, and has had his appointment legitimized by the  bay‘ah, or oath of allegiance of the Muslims, without such a person  having either actual control, or the capacity to exercise control, over the Hijâz in general and the  Haramayn  in particular. The office of the  Khalîfate, and authority over the  Haramayn, have always been inseparably linked in  the religio-political consciousness of the Ummah. The inseparable link also had a foundation in the  Sharî‘ah  in so far as the Hajj  was an institution binding on the members of the  Ummah, and  Hajj involved physical travel to the Hijâz.  No one, therefore could be recognized to be the supreme leader of the Muslims who did not have the authority, and the means of exercising responsibility for the organization and administration of the  Hajj. And this, of course, included freedom  and security for the pilgrims and, hence, required control over the Hijâz. As a consequence, even  when the seat of the  Khulafâ  (ie.  Khalîfate  was shifted from  the Hijâz to Kûfah (Iraq), Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and even Istanbul, the Kh alîfs) always took the greatest care to maintain their authority and control over the Hijâz. This basically continued uninterruptedly until the demise of the Ottoman Islamic Empire in the First World War. The enemies of Islam  paid very  careful attention to the study and understanding of the link between the  Khalîfate, the preservation of faith (Îmân) among Muslims, the power of Islam  as a world-wide force, and control over the  Haramayn. They then planned their diabolical strategy to render Islam  powerless, and to confine  it to a personal private faith with no authority over public life. In other words they planned their strategy to secularize Islam,  and, in so doing,  to reduce Muslims to the godless European way of life. They achieved considerable success!

The British, realizing the paramount  importance of the Hijâz and the Haramayn  for the legitimacy and even survival of the Ottoman  Khalîfate, concentrated their diplomacy in the  First World War on wresting the Hijâz from  the control of the Ottoman  Khalîf. This was achieved when  Sharîf Husayn, the Ottoman-appointed  Sharîf  of Makkah, and great grandfather of the now deceased King Husayn of Jordan, was successfully induced by the British to rebel against the Ottoman  Khalîf and to establish his own authority over the Hijâz under benign British alliance and protection. The British also successfully concluded a Treaty of Collaboration in 1916 with ‘Abd ul-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd. That Treaty further destablized Ottoman rule over the Hijâz.

By 1916, and in the very midst of  the first world war, the Ottoman  Khalîf had lost control over Makkah and Jeddah, ie. the lower Hijâz. His control over Madînah was maintained throughout the war and only came to an end in 1919 when certain Ottoman troops within the city of Madînah were induced to betray and rebel  against their commander, Fakh rî Pasha after his heroic defense of the city.

After the Ottoman Khalîf  had lost control over the Hijâz, the  Khalîfate  was so crippled that it lingered on in Istanbul  for just a few more years before it collapsed completely. And this was a truly outstanding success for British diplomacy. The weakening of the  Khalîfate  destabilized the entire structure of the Ottoman Islamic Empire. It  eventually collapsed. In 1919 British troops, under the leadership of General  Allenby, captured Jerusalem.  It is significant that the British General, upon  entering the Holy City, proclaimed that ‘…  the crusades  were  finally over…’ If there was any doubt whatsoever of the extreme danger to Islam posed by British diplomacy in the Arabian peninsula, this statement of  Allenby should have put those doubts to rest.

What Allenby meant was that Islam  was  now a tiger without teeth. Its fate was to remain permanently powerless and, therefore, incapable of responding to the loss of Jerusalem  in the manner in which Sultân Salâhuddîn Ayyûbî Rahimahullah (Saladin) had responded when Jerusalem was lost to the Crusaders.

The Arabs had been deceived to fight with Allenby, in his army, against the Turks, to wrest Jerusalem from the rule of the Ottoman Khalîf. Those Arabs were now waiting to ravage the carcass left by the British victory over Istanbul. They coveted local rule over the Hijâz, but it was still necessary to wait and see whether the Ottoman  Khalîf  would ever be able to regain the strength necessary to seek to re-impose his rule over the Hijâz. When, on March 3, 1924, the Ottoman  Khalîfate  was abolished, it became clear that no such threat existed. And it was precisely on that day that the clients of Britain began their fight over the carcass left by their betrayal of the Ottoman Islamic rule.

On March 7, 1924,  Sharîf  al-Husayn pre-emptively claimed the  Khalîfate for himself. His most important credential  was that he exercised de facto local control over the Hijâz. He  also boasted of being  Hâshimite, i.e. belonging to the same clan –  Banû Hâshim  – of the tribe of the Quraysh , to which the Holy Prophet (Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam)  himself belonged. In fact this weighed so heavily amongst the people that the Chief  Qâdî  of Trans-Jordan promptly accepted the claim and recognized Husayn as  Khalîf.

His other credential, which was of  dubious value amongst the Muslim masses, but which weighed heavily in  the power-politics of the peninsula, was that the  Sharîf  was an ally of Britain, the super-power of the day, and had received considerable financial,  diplomatic and military support from Britain in his successful rebellion against Ottoman authority in the Hijâz. In claiming the  Khalîfate  for himself, however,  Sharîf Husayn committed the monstrous blunder of not first seeking the permission of the British to act as he did. It is the essence of the client-State status that freedom is effectively curtailed.  Sharîf  Husayn had violated the basic rule of conduct for clientStates. How would the British react ??

British diplomacy in Jazîrat ul-‘Arab  (i.e. the Arabian peninsula) was multidimensional and yet integrated. There  was, first of all, the objective of wresting control of the  Haramayn  from  the  Khalîf. This was meant to weaken his legitimacy, and thus his influence and control over the rest of the world of Islam,  and so facilitate the defeat of the Ottomans in the world war.Secondly, Britain wanted a friendly regime  in control of the Hijâz so that it could better be able to manipulate the  politics of the peninsula in pursuit of the long term goal of destroying Islam. Thirdly, British politics in the peninsula, and the defeat of the Ottomans, were strategically linked to Zionism’s efforts to create a Jewish National Home  in Palestine. And this integrated diplomacy was finally  made clear with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

The ‘ super-power ’ (of the day), and  the so-called ‘ chosen people ’ of Allah, the Most High, would hence be  locked in a highly deceptive embrace of truly calamitous consequences for Muslims, Jews, Christians, and for the rest of mankind. The objective of the integrated diplomacy was to dismantle the entire Islamic Public Order so as  to render Islam  powerless to prevent Zionism  from  achieving its goal. So  long as the institution of the  Khalîfate remained it was always possible for the Islamic Public Order to linger on and, eventually, be revived. The attack on the institution of the  Khalîfate was, therefore, vitally necessary.

It was quite clear to the British and the Zionists that a Jewish National Home – the Jewish State of Israel – could not  be established in Muslim  Palestine, and could never hope to survive so  long as the world of Islam had a Khalîf capable of mobilizing its formidable resources and religious fervor and directing it to military ends. And so the control over the Hijâz, which was of paramount importance in the politics of  the peninsula, was a matter to which British diplomacy directed supreme attention.

The claim to the  Khalîfate  by the Hâshimite British client,  Sharîf  al-Husayn, was incompatible with British diplomatic objectives. It was always possible that the claim could have succeeded.  Sharîf  al-Husayn could then have mobilized the world of Islam  to such an  extent as to re-establish the Islamic Public Order and Pax Islamica in the symbolically powerful heartland of Islam,  and so pose a threat to Britain’s  influence and control over large parts of  Dâr al-Islâm. A revitalized world of Islam  would also have made Jewish control over Palestine and Jerusalem quite impossible.

Britain responded to the claim  to the  Khalîfate  by  Sharîf  al-Husayn by giving her blessings to the other British client in the peninsula, ‘Abd al‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, to move against Husayn, and to wrest control of the Hijâz from  him.  This was the perfection of  the art of double-crossing and of hypocrisy. One British client was used to eliminate another (British) client.

In so far as the Muslim  World was concerned the first world war was much more than a mere European war. It  was, rather, a war which brought about upheavals and changes in the Muslim  World which were unprecedented in its thirteen hundred years of existence.

Firstly, the greatest Muslim  power  and seat of the contemporary  Khalîfate, the Ottoman Islamic Empire, entered the war on the side  of the Central Powers. While this decision is still clouded in some  controversy since, up to the very last moment, the Ottoman leadership had not decided whether to enter the war or not, and if so, which  side to support, there were grounds for speculating a British-Zionist role in the affair.

The Jewish-Zionist leaders had made  a number of unsuccessful efforts at striking a deal with the  Khalîf  for Jewish control over Jerusalem.  They even offered to buy the holy city. Britain  had supported these Jewish-Zionist efforts zealously.

Among Britain’s  major political and military goals in the war were the subjugation of Islam as a power in the  world, the conquest of Jerusalem,  and the creation in Palestine of a Jewish home-land which would constantly disrupt and police the Muslim  Middle East on behalf of the West.

The Ottoman leadership predictably  attempted to mobilize support for its war effort from  the entire Muslim  world. In this connection, on November 23, 1914 the  Shaykh  al-Islâm  of the Ottoman Islamic Empire issued a  fatwâ (Islamic legal ruling) and a proclamation declaring  jihâd  (ie.  war conducted in accordance with Allah’s law) and commanding all Muslims to fight against the Allied Powers. British  diplomacy, however, succeeded in promoting and exploiting Arab nationalism  in the Arabian peninsula as an effective means of attacking and undermining the formidable strength of the universal Islamic fraternity. As a consequence the Arabs rebelled against Ottoman rule on the basis of a British offer of assistance to achieve national independence.

In less than two years after  the commencement of the war  Sharîf  al-Husayn, self-styled ‘ King of the Arabs ’,  firm  ally of the British, and great-grandfather of Jordan’s now deceased King Husayn, had successfully rebelled against the Ottoman authority  and was installed as King of the Hijâz,  the heart-land of Islam.  And as a consequence of the loss of the cities of Makkah and, eventually, Madînah, the pan-Islamic appeal of the Ottoman Khalîf suffered irreparable damage.

The British followed up their success in the Hijâz  by installing the sons of Husayn as Kings in Iraq and Trans-Jordan as well. And by 1919 the British General, Allenby, with Arab troops  fighting loyally with him,  marched triumphantly into Jerusalem  and declared  that the crusades had finally come to an end. Palestine remained a British Mandate territory (mandated by the League of Nations) until the British withdrew in 1948 and the Zionist Jews declared the establishment  of the State of Israel. Muslim  Nationalists had in effect fought against the central  Khalîfate  to unwittingly effectuate the establishment of the Zionist State. 

The Ottoman Islamic Empire was badly defeated in the war. The Allied Powers combined their military prowess with a psychological weapon which had far-reaching effects for Islam.  The British and French succeeded in winning Muslim  military support (by means more foul than fair) from  India, the Maghrib and other areas and so both Arab and non-Arab Muslims fought against their brother Muslim  Turks. The result was that the Ottoman Islamic Empire was not only defeated but its  universal Islamic foundations were destroyed.

In the wake of the loss of the cities of Makkah and Madînah and the Arabian peninsula , and after brother-Muslims  had fought against them  in the war, the Turkish nationalist forces, who had  been in constant conflict with the Khalîf, now felt themselves free from any  impelling attachment to the world of Islam.  Out of the ashes of Ottoman defeat in the first world war the secular Turkish nationalist forces, led by Mustafa Kamal (Ataturk) moved swiftly to transform  their political order from  the old model of  Dâr al-Islâm, or the Islamic Public Order, to the western model of a modem  secular nation-State, the Republic of Turkey. 

It was no surprise, therefore, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted, on March 3, 1924, law  abolishing the  Kh Law stated :

The  Khalîfate. The office of the  Khalîfate  is abolished, since the  Khalîfate  is essentially comprised in the meaning and signification of the words Government (Hukûmah) and Republic (Jumhuriyyah).’

The passage of this law marked a decisive moment in the history of the Ummah.  After a period of thirteen hundred years during which the institution of the  Khalîfate  was almost universally recognized by Muslims as essential to their religion, even when the seat of the  Khalîfate  was filled in ways which were contrary to the principles of Islam,  the world of Islam found itself in the fourteenth century of its existence without a  Khalîf. Indeed so definite and permanent was the change that one could, perhaps, be forgiven for concluding that the world Islam  had now passed into the post-Khalîfate  period of its existence. This, of course, is an incorrect conclusion, since the Holy Prophet Muhammad Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam  has himself prophesied the emergence of a true  Khalîf  from  amongst his descendents,  Imâm al-Mahdî ,  who will lead a Muslim  army  which will destroy the stranglehold of  Shirk  and  Kufr  over the world (contemporary manifestations being both the Saudi State, and the State of Israel).

Britain had cultivated Ibn Sa‘ûd’s friendship and alliance during the war against the Khalîfate and, as usual, had employed financial diplomacy (i.e. bribery). Ibn Sa‘ûd received a monthly sum  of 5000 pounds sterling from  the British Treasury in return for his benevolent neutrality in Husayn’s rebellion against the Khalîf, the imposition of  Hâshimite  rule over the Hijâz, and Britain’s  diplomatic and military efforts  in the peninsula directed against the Ottomans. He diabolically rationalized  this manifest violation of the command of Allah, the Most High, and His Prophet    not to take Jews and Christians as protecting friends by explaining it away as  Jizyah  ( tax imposed on free non-Muslims under Muslim rule). 

But British diplomacy in respect of Ibn  Sa‘ûd was directed to ends of far greater strategic importance than mere  benevolent neutrality  in the war and the disposal of the injudicious  Sharîf  Husayn. Ibn Sa‘ûd had a far greater potential which Britain now moved to exploit, consequent on  Sharif Husayn’s claim to the  Khalîfate. The Saudi power in the Najd, which had reemerged with the capture of Riyadh  in 1902, was the product of an old alliance between a tribal chief and the religious leader of the  Wahhâbî religious sect. That alliance ensured that  while the descendants of the tribal chief would wield political power over territory ruled by the alliance, religious affairs would be subject to the authority of the descendants of the religious chief. As a consequence it  was inevitable that the Najdî Saudis would be under pressure from  the  Wahhâbîs  to seek to force the submission of the heart-land of Islam  (the Hijâz) to the  Wahhâbî  perception of the true faith.

Britain was only too pleased to give the  green light to Ibn Sa‘ûd to move his forces against Husayn four days after the Hâshimite had claimed the Khalîfate  for himself. Ibn Sa‘ûd was impatient to move against Husayn since, as strange as it may appear, both Jewish control over Jerusalem,  and Wahhâbî  control over Hijâz, faced a similar threat. Neither could be achieved, and neither could hope to survive, if the world of Islam  had a Khalîf. (Indeed, the destruction of the Saudi State may very well take place when the  Khalîfate is restored at the time of Imâm al-Mahdî).

By supporting Ibn Sa‘ûd the British were  now ensuring that so long as the Saudi-Wahhâbîs ruled over the Hijâz, the  Khalîfate  could never be revived. The British further calculated that without the  Khalîfate  the Islamic Public Order could not survive and the world of  Islam would then be so weakened that it could never be mobilized to prevent the creation of the Jewish State of Israel. Britain also knew that the  Wahhâbîs, themselves, could never claim the  Khalîfate, firstly because they knew that if  they did so they would meet the same  fate as  Sharîf  al-Husayn, and secondly  because they had the good sense to know that a  Wahhâbî  Khalîf  would always be totally unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of  Muslims the world over. And so, by withdrawing support from  Husayn and supporting Ibn Sa‘ûd, Britain was in fact pursuing her relentless attack on the institution of the  Khalifate theo-centric Islamic Public Order.

Khalîfate  and the Within a few months Ibn Sa‘ûd was able to conquer Makkah and Husayn fled to Jeddah. The British eventually  intervened to remove him  physically from  the peninsula by offering him  a comfortable exile in Cyprus. And soon Madînah and Jiddah were also under Saudi-Wahhâbî rule.

More than a century earlier, however, the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance had succeeded in overcoming the defenses of  Taif and Makkah and there ensued a blood-bath of truly astonishing proportions. The  Wahhâbîs, in their fanatical zeal, considered the Muslims resident in the Hijâz to be engaged in shirk and, as a consequence, held that it was permissible to kill them. The Khalîf  in Istanbul got the Mamluke Khedive  of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to send an army  to the Hijâz under the leadership of his son Ismail. The SaudiWahhâbî  warriors were unceremoniously driven out of Hijâz and into the desert. A century later, however, there was no  Khalîf  and all the powerful Muslim communities were under western colonial rule. In addition, Ibn Sa‘ûd enjoyed the protecting friendship of Great Britain which was the super-power of the day. There was, therefore, no immediate possibility whatsoever of dislodging the Saudi-Wahhâbî forces from the Haramayn and Hijâz.

Although Ibn Sa‘ûd was safely  in control of Hijâz at the commencement of his rule in 1924 he was still confronted with a truly formidable problem. Namely, he had to devise some  strategy which could avert the long-term possibility of a repetition of the disaster which visited the previous SaudiWahhâbî  rule over the Hijâz . It would appear that he first thought of a policy of conciliation with non-Wahhâbî  Muslims and of using his control over the Hijâz to further the cause of the unity of the  Ummah. Thus shortly after gaining control over Makkah and  receiving from its inhabitants their recognition of him  as Sultan of the Hijâz, he issued a proclamation to the entire world of Islam  to the effect that the Hijâz, with its  Haramayn, belonged to the entire world of Islam  and that he, Ibn Sa‘ûd, held control over the Hijâz as a trust only, and on behalf of the entire world of Islam.  He then went on to invite the entire world  of Islam  to send its representatives to Makkah so that, on the basis of  Shûrâ  and  Ijmâ’, a just, efficient and representative administration could be established over the Hijâz.

This important announcement was entirely consistent with the provisions of the Islamic Public Order. The Hijâz was still the  Dâr al-Islâm  which had been established by the Holy Prophet  . As yet there was no hint of any Saudi State which would claim  territorial sovereignty over the Hijâz. The rights of the Muslims in the territory of  Dâr al-Islâm  were being publicly recognized and respected. But, unfortunately, this concern for the unity of the world of Islam  and this fervent declaration concerning the status of the Hijâz did not represent the actual Saudi-Wahhâbî  designs over the Hijâz. It was simply a case of politics of expediency and was designed to protect the Saudi-Wahhâbîs in the wake of a significant initiative undertaken by the formiddable Indian  Khilâfah  Movement & Al-Azhar University in Cairo shortly after the abolition of the Ottoman  Kh alîfate. Indeed the Azhar initiative had perilous implications for Ibn Sa‘ûd and the Saudi-Wahhâbî rule over the Hijâz. It also constituted a troublesome ‘fly in the ointment’ for the victorious Zionists and British.  Al-Azhar University proposed to convene an International Islamic  Khalîfate  Congress (Mu‘tamar al-Kh ilâfah) in Cairo which would, among other things, attempt to appoint a new  Khalif over the world of Islam.

Had the  Wahhâbîs been genuinely devoted to  Islam  they would have welcomed these efforts to  achieve conformity with  an essential requirement of the  Sharî‘ah, i.e. the establishment of a genuine  Khalîfate. The  Wahhâbîs had long argued that the post-Râshidûn Khalîfate  was invalid because, among other things, the  Khalîfate  was not constituted  in a manner which conformed with the requirements of the  Shari’ah. Now that the ‘invalid Khalîfate’  had been abolished and the leading center of Islamic learning of the day was convening an international Islamic congress to discuss the question of the  Khalîfate, and to effect the appointment of a new  Khalîf, the Wahhâbîs should have welcomed this initiative. In addition, they should also have extended every possible cooperation,  and should have participated in a serious way in the Congress in order to ensure that the genuine  Khalîfate was restored.

But the  Wahhâbîs had no such sincere devotion to Islam.  Their attitude was essentially one of selective religiosity, expediency, opportunism  and parochialism. 
The  Wahhâbîs knew that the world of  Islam  would never have accepted a  Wahhâbî  Khalîf  and, as a consequence, they found it expedient to repudiate an essential requirement of  the Islamic Public Order. They marshaled all their energies to sabotage the Cairo  Khalîfate  Congress. Their strategy was to organize a rival congress  in Makkah at the time of the Hajj of 1926. That meant that the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ would take place within a month of ‘ Cairo Congress ’, making it  difficult for delegates to attend both conferences. Since the ‘ Makkah Conference ’ was timed to coincide with the  Hajj, and since it had the active support of the British, it had a clear advantage over the Cairo Conference.

Secondly they specifically excluded  from  the agenda of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ the question of the  Khalîfate. This transparent attempt to sabotage the ‘ Cairo Conference ’ and to bury the  Khalîfate  was more than ample evidence to expose the  hollow credentials of the  Wahhâbîs as socalled champions of the  Sh arî‘ah and of Islam.

The response of the world of Islam  to this rivalry, ie. the ‘ Cairo  Khalîfate Congress ’ of May/June 1926, and  the rival Makkah ‘ World Muslim Congress ’ of July 1926, is a subject which deserves serious research, as well as how much British machination was  involved in ensuring, for example, that the important Muslim  community  of India which had supported the Ottoman  Khalîfate  to such an extent that they had established the formidable Khilâfah  Movement, would stay away from  the  Khalîfate  Congress of Cairo and, instead, attend the rival ‘ Makkah  Congress ’ from  the agenda of which the question of the  Khalîfate was specifically excluded.

  It was clear, however, that in this rivalry the ‘ Makkah Congress ’ achieved a tactical victory over Cairo – a victory which had enormous implications for the very survival of the institution of the  Khalîfate  and the orthodox Islamic Public Order (i.e.  Dâr al-Islâm). Those who organized the ‘ Cairo Congress’ wished to ensure conformity with  the orthodox Islamic system  of political organization. But they were intellectually incapable of articulating a conception of the Islamic Public Order (Dâr al-Islâm) and the Islamic Conception of an International Order which could convince a skeptical world of Islam.  And they could not  respond to the new and unique situation in which Muslims had found themselves  by articulating the alternative of the establishment of the authentic  Jamâ‘ah  and  Amîr  wherever in the world it could be established.

Those who organized the ‘ Makkah Congress ’, on the other hand, were unwilling, because of vested interests,  to remain faithful to the orthodox Islamic Public Order with its  Khalîfate,  Dâr al-Islâm, etc. Instead they chose to accept the rival system of political  organization which had emerged in modem  western civilization and which had  just penetrated the very seat of the Ottoman  Khalîfate, namely the secular nation-State system. And they did so because it was only in the nation-State system that the Saudi-Wahhâbîs could realistically pursue an effort  to win recognition and legitimacy for their rule over the Hijâz and thus ensure  the survival of the Saudi State. They camouflaged their true designs and made  an elaborate attempt to dupe the world of Islam. And their success in  this game of deception was amply demonstrated in the representative character of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’.

The tactical victory of the ‘ Makkah Congress ’
in its rivalry with the ‘ Cairo Congress ’ played a significant role in  paving the way for the rest of the world of Islam,  including the very heart-land of Islam,  to eventually follow the example of Mustafa Kamal and his model of the secular State of Turkey. The history of the world of Islam  since 1924 records, on the one hand, the evils which were continuously injected into the body of the Ummah through this alien system  of political organization and, on the other, the naive, confused and superficial attempts  of modern Islamic scholarship to reconstruct a new Islamic Public Order on the secular foundations of the nation-State system.

What emerged from those efforts was  the goal of ‘ Islamization ’ and of establishing the ‘Islamic State within the system  of nation-States’. But both of these were futile goals for it was,  and still is, impossible for them  to be achieved without first dismantling some  of the essential apparatus of the Khalîfate system.

Eminent Islamic scholars such as Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Abul Ala Maududi, Dr. Ismail Faruqi etc. ventured into  Ijtihâd  (i.e. independent reasoning) to reconstruct an Islamic Public Order in post-Khalîfate  Islam.  Their efforts resulted in the concepts of the ‘ Islamic State ’ and ‘ Islamization ’. Despite being great thinkers of the time they  appeared not to have adequately understood the true nature and consequences of the change which was taking place. Dr Iqbal, for example, has stated that ‘… according to  Sh ar‘î  law  the appointment of an  Imâm  or  Khalîf  is absolutely indispensable. Turkeys ijtihâd  is that according to the spirit of Islam the  Kh alîfate  or Imâmate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected assembly  (e.g. the Turkish Grand National Assembly or Parliament).  Personally I believe the Turkish view  is perfectly sound…’ Unfortunately, however, the efforts for Islamization and for establishing the  Islamic State resulted in the orthodox Islamic system  of the political organization of the Ummah or the Islamic Public Order (i.e. Pax Islamica and  Dâr al-Islâm) being relegated to total obscurity. As a consequence political thought in the world of Islam was gravely misdirected, and the immense confusion so created persists to the present day. 

The World Muslim Congress which convened in June 1926 as a result of the efforts of King ‘Abdul ‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd  was hailed as the first such meeting in the History of Islam.  And indeed  it was, for all the wrong reasons. The Congress received two messages from  the King. In the first, the opening address of the Congress, the King made  reference to the sorry history of the Hijâz ending with the despotism  of  Husayn who, among his other sins, placed the Hijâz under foreign non-Muslim  influence. This being prohibited by the Prophet  , a justification was therefore presented for the Najdî conquest of the Hijâz. As a result of  that conquest, the King was pleased to point out there was now security in the Hijâz. The Congress was invited to hold its sessions in that atmosphere of  security and of total liberty. The only constraints on the conference were the restraints of the Islamic Law and of not meddling in international politics nor  in the differences which separate certain Muslim  peoples from  their governments. And yet Ibn Sa‘ûd was less than honest in his opening statement since he was just as guilty as was Husayn in aiding and abetting the penetration of British influence in the peninsula.

  Two things stand out in the  King’s address. Firstly the  Wahhâbî  leadership was showing its best possible face in  order to court the support of the Congress, – thus the security and total liberty promised. But secondly, and more important, the ban on international politics in the discussions of the Congress clearly implied that  the security of the Saudi-Wahhâbî  State and the maintenance of its relations with  its allies (Britain in particular) took precedence over the considered opinions of the  Ummah  even when expressed through  Sh ûrâ  in an Islamic Conference ‘ unprecedented ’ in the history of Islam.

The King gave to the Congress the safe  task of examining the necessary ways and means for making the holy places the best centers of Islamic culture and education, the most perfect  region in terms of prosperity and hygiene, and the Muslim  country which is most conspicuous for its recognition of Islam  . It was very clear  from  this address that the King was attempting to foist on the Congress an  artificial division between religion and politics, and a new theory to the effect that the proper subject matter for the consideration of Islamic Congresses was the subject matter of religion and religious affairs. And this was a  bid‘ah  (ie. blameworthy innovation) of a truly reprehensible nature since it was in such manifest conflict with the Qur’ânic  guidance, the  Sunnah  of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam and the very foundations of the Islamic legacy. The King was, in fact, making an attempt to transform alIslam,  which was  al-Dîn, into religion in the narrow and distorted sense in which the term was used in secular western civilization.

On July 2nd  , 1926, on the occasion of the 15th   plenary session, the King addressed a second message to the Congress, through which he sought to achieve one of the main objectives of the  Wahhâbî  initiative, to wit, the international Islamic recognition and acceptance of Saudi-Wahhâbî  control over the Hijâz. 

The King expounded his politique for the Hijâz as follows :

1) We do not admit any foreign intervention in this sacred country, whatever may be its nature.

2) We do not admit any privileges  open to some  and denied to others; whatever takes place in this  country must conform  with the Sh arî‘ah.

3) The Hijâz must have a special neutral regime. It must neither make war nor be attacked, and this  neutrality must  be  guaranteed  by all the independent Muslim States.

What the King was attempting to do in  this address was nothing less than propounding a new Islamic political theory. It was as though the SaudiWahhâbîs were convinced that they were  the only Muslims, and hence Hijâz and Najd, which were under their control, was the real  Dâr al-Islam. Thus all territories outside of Hijâz and  Najd (or modem  Saudi Arabia) were foreign. And when the King spoke about  the need to prevent any foreign intervention in the Hijâz, he was  referring specifically to the kind of intervention which had ousted the  Wahhâbîs from the Hijâz more than a century earlier. 

The second point made was, of course, quite admirable i.e. a nondiscriminatory application of the injunctions of the  Sh arî‘ah. But the second point was incompatible with the first. The world of Islam  was being accorded the status of foreigners who,  naturally, would not be eligible to all the privileges open to the Saudi-Wahhâbîs. Foreigners, for example, would need a visa in order to enter  the Hijâz even for performing the  Hajj. The Saudi-Wahhâbîs would not require a visa since they were citizens of the new-born State of Saudi Arabia and  so the Hijâz belonged to them. NonSaudi Muslims could now be  imprisoned if they extended their stay in Hijâz after the expiry of their visas for they  were now foreigners and the Hijâz, which was no longer Dâr al-Islâm, did not belong to them.

The King had, in fact, dismantled the  Dâr al-Islâm  which had been established by the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam himself, and by his companions , in the Hijâz, had dispossessed the world of Islam  of its very heartland, had insulted the Muslims, and was destined to get away with that audacious behavior for more than seven decades.

The third point made in the King’s  address was quite remarkable. There could be no doubt at all that it  was a manifest statement of  bid‘ah. Neither in the  Qur’ân, nor in the  Sunnah  of the Prophet  , nor in the entire Islamic legacy is there any concept of the  neutrality of the Hijâz. Indeed the statement that the Hijâz must not make war amounted to taking the very heartland of Islam  out of  jihâd, and was thus in manifest conflict with explicit commands of the  Qur’ân. Here again the King was walking the path of kufr. In respect of the request of the King  that all independent Islamic States should recognize the neutrality of his regime, it was clear that this was a scarcely disguised attempt to win recognition from  the world of Islam  of Saudi-Wahhâbî rule over the Hijâz.

As such the  Khalîfate  question was never discussed. This was a major triumph for the new secular approach  to Muslim ‘ unity ’. The conference did, however, enter into politics in  approving a resolution demanding the return of Ma‘ân and ‘Aqabah to Hijâzî control since the British annexation of these territories to Trans-jordan  (over which Britain was the mandate power) violated the command of the Prophet  Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam that the Arabian peninsular must remain free of all non-Islamic influence.

This however was not entirely the case.  One of the effects of the war of 1914-18 was to eliminate the Turks from  Arabia and to extend the British sphere of influence over the whole peninsula. But it is very important to note that in this unique and momentous achievement of the British in which the command of the Prophet  Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam was compromised for the first time in thirteen hundred years, the British were aided and abetted by both Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ûd. Indeed both commanded a price  for their services to Britain. The Arab forces of Husayn actually fought alongside the British against the Turks. Ibn Sa‘ûd’s benevolent neutrality in this struggle enhanced the chances of Britain’s  success. Up to  1920 when his monthly payments from the British were stopped, Husayn had received about six million pounds sterling. Ibn Sa‘ûd, who received from  the same British Government a more modest 350,000 pounds at the rate of  5000 pounds a month, diabolically explained it away as  jizyah  (a tax paid by a subject non-Muslim  people resident in the territory of Dâr al-Islâm).

It was Britain (the mandate power  in Trans-jordan) which had annexed Ma‘ân and ‘Aqabah to Trans-jordan in 1925. Although ex-King Husayn protested the annexation from  his exile  in Cyprus and Ibn Sa‘ûd moved the World Muslim  Congress to adopt a resolution protesting the annexation, the British action was clearly a fait accomplishment.

It is interesting to note that  if the command of the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam  had not been compromised by Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ûd in  their misguided assistance to the British, and in their attempt to rid the peninsular of Ottoman influence, it would not have been possible for the Balfour Declaration to be fulfilled and for the Zionist State to be established in Muslim  Palestine. It is also interesting to note that if ‘Aqabah had remained under Hijâzî control, Saudi Arabia would have been a front-line State in the present Middle East conflict. History may one day reveal that one of the reasons for the British annexation of Ma‘ân and  ‘Aqabah was to create a  buffer zone between the volatile heartland of Islam and the Jewish national home in Palestine which the Balfour Declaration envisaged. It should be clear that a direct confrontation between the Hijâz (now part of Saudi Arabia) and the Jewish National Home in Palestine (now the State of Israel) would arouse uncontrollable Islamic passions, a factor which still constitutes the only serious threat to the survival of the Zionist State. 

And so became manifest the contemporaneous destruction of the institution of Khalîfate and the symbiotic character of the emergence and future existence of the Saudi-Wahhâbî State and the State of Israel.

Why was the  Khalîfate  not restored somewhere else after it collapsed in Istanbul ? Why have we had no  Khalîfate  for more than seventy years now? The reason for this is the nature of the  age in which we now  live. This is the age when the greatest force of evil ever created by  Allah has been released (eventually to appear as a human  being). This is the age of  al-Masîh adDajjâl (ie. anti-Christ) and of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj (ie. Gog and Magog).

When viewed from an essentially  Qur’ânic  perspective, the abolition of the Ottoman  Khilâfah  appears to have occurred at the same time that other events of supreme  Qur’ânic  importance were unfolding. For example, the Ottoman empire would not have been defeated and destroyed had fundamental change not come  to Europe, transforming European civilization into a major actor on the stage of  the world. The French and Bolshevik revolutions marked the turning points  in the transformation of Western and Eastern European civilizations from  civilizations based on faith (in Christianity) to essentially godless civilizations. The scientific and industrial revolutions and the emergence of the capitalist economy resulted in those godless civilizations becoming predatory and having the power with which to prey upon all mankind. Those godless European civilizations then embarked upon an effort to transform  all the rest of the world to godlessness! The Ottoman Empire stood  in the way of Europe since it was established on foundations which were essentially sacred. The institution of the  Kh alîfate  established and legitimized Islam’s sacred model of a public order and a world order.  That public order, or  Jamâ‘ah, was absolutely essential for the preservation of the integrity and faith of the World of Islam. And so, the  Khalîfate  had to be targeted and  destroyed in order for the penetration and destruction of faith in the world of Islam to be ever realized.

With the destruction of the  Khalîfate  in 1924, the last major hurdle in the way of those who were determined to  reduce all of mankind to godlessness was now removed. The stage was thus set for the fulfillment of the words of the  Hadîth  al-Qudsî  in  Sahîh Bukh ârî  narrated by Abû Sa‘îd Khudrî Radiyallahu Anhu, in which Allah, the Supreme, informed Âdam Alaihissalaam that 999 out of every 1000 persons (of this age) would enter into Hell. In other words, the destruction of the  Khalîfate  by the modern godless European  world provided evidence that the age of  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj  had commenced. (See  Qur’ân,   al-Kahf,  18:98-99)

Indeed, for one of the greatest Islamic scholars of the age, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, the age of  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj  had commenced even earlier. He declared in 1917, perhaps after the Bolshevik revolution, that ‘… all the armed forces of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj  have now been released …

Khul gayah Yajûj awr Majûj kay lash kar tamâm Chasmay Muslim daykhlay tafsîr harf e yansilûn

Iqbal advised that the attention of Muslims should now be directed to the verse of the  Qur’ân  (Al-Anbiyâ’:  21: 96) which ended with the word ‘ yansilûn ’, and which spoke of the re-emergence of the Jewish State of Israel. And that is the subject to which we now turn.

At the same time that the objective of the destruction of the  Khalîfate  was being pursued by modern, godless, European civilization, another more sinister revolution was taking place in  the Jewish world. A godless, Zionist Movement emerged amongst Eastern European Jews. It declared that the Holy Land of Palestine belonged to the Jews because God gave it to them. The Zionist movement misled the Jews into believing that it was their inalienable right and divinely ordained  destiny to restore the Jewish State of Israel 2000 years after it was destroyed  by Allah, the Most High. It totally ignored the fact that Jews had both corrupted and betrayed the religion of ‘Abraham  ’ and, as a consequence, no  longer had any right to the Holy Land ! Jews swallowed the bait of the Zionist Movement. The supreme goal of Jews now became the goal of establishing the State of Israel regardless of the means which were to be employed  to achieve this goal. Zionism  was created by a truly evil force. A force about which Allah had warned – the release of  al-Masîh ad-Dajjâl  and of the Gog and Magog (Ya’jûj  and Ma’jûj).

And so we witnessed the amazing  phenomenon – amazing for those who ponder over the  Qur’ân  – of the destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the restoration of the State of Israel as  contemporaneous events. The same evil forces were at work in both  cases. This was confirmed in  Sûrah al-Anbiyâ’ of the  Qur’ân  in verses 95 and 96 where Allah spoke of a  qaryah  (town) (i.e. the city of Jerusalem,  symbolizing the State of Israel) which He destroyed and then pronounced the restoration of that  qaryah  (ie. the restoration of the State of Israel) to be  harâm  (prohibited) until the (commencement of the) release of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj.

And it is prohibited for a town  (ie.  Jerusalem is referred to here  )  whose people We have punished  (with expulsion from that territory, ie. the Holy Land),  that they may not return  (ie. to restore the State of Israel),  until  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj  are released and they descend from every direction. (ie. they take control of the world). ’ (Qur’ân, al-Anbiyâ’,  21:96)

Since the Jews were now deceived and put on a path which led, progressively, to the greatest oppression and wickedness in their conduct with mankind, in general,  and with Muslims, in particular, a third event now took place at just this same  time. It  was a sign from  Allah which was spoken of in the  Qur’ân, a sign which was meant to warn both modern western civilization and the Jews: ‘…If you live like Pharaoh  (ie. rejecting the Truth, demonizing Islam, and oppressing the Muslims),  you will die the way he died…’ (See  Qur’ân,  Yûnus  :10:92). That event was the discovery of the body of Pharaoh by Loret in 1898 at Thebes in the King’s Valley of Lower Egypt. The discovery of Pharoah’s body  confirmed what Allah had declared at the moment of his death ( ie. the death of Pharoah) :

This day We  (have decided to)  preserve your body  (from destruction)  so that you  (ie. your body)  may be come a sign to (a people)  who will come after you,  for most people are heedless of Our signs.’         _(Qur’ân, Yûnus, 10:92-93)

And the specific warning to the Jews, at  the moment of their last and greatest act of wickedness and oppression, was that not a single one of them  would escape the fate of Pharoah. Just as Pharoah had declared his faith in Allah at the moment of his death, and that did not save him  from  the hell-fire, so too would the Jews have to declare their faith in ‘Îsâ (Jesus) as the Messiah at the moment of their death, but that  would not save them  from  the hell-fire. (Qur’ân, an-Nisâ’: 4:159) 

Complicit in this final onslaught against Islam  are the Saudi-Wahhâbîs. It should be known that the Holy Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallamsaid : 

The violent and torturous people are in the East, and Shaytân  will arouse dissension from there.’ pointing towards the Najd.  (Mish kât

Another title used in reference to the  Wahhâbîs is ‘ Najdî ’. They hail from Dar’iyyah in the Najd. The disunion predicted in the above  hadîth   emerged twelve centuries later. The  Wahhâbîs spewed forth from  the Najd into the Hijâz, plundering the possessions of  Muslims, killing the men and enslaving the women and children. They committed  the basest evils, evils reminiscent of the Mongol sack of the Islamic empire centuries before.

Three other related events took place and,  indeed, are still taking place, all of which are directly related to the release of those evil forces created by Allah. They all flowed from the emergence of  materialism  and secularism  as the philosophical foundation of the modern western civilization. These were the events :

i) The emergence of  ribâ  (interest) at the very foundation of the European economy, and the subsequent deadly embrace of the entire world economy by  ribâ. The Ottoman Empire was the special target, however, and the decline of this great Islamic State began when it was penetrated by Jewish bankers with  ribâ  during the rule of Mahmûd II (1808-39). By 1896 the stranglehold of  ribâ  on the Ottoman economy had put the  Sultân  in such dire straits that the Zionist leader, Herzl, could finally visit Sultan ‘Abdul Hamîd II  and play the card of financial diplomacy which  ribâ  made possible, i.e. black mail. In return for Palestine he offered ‘…to regulate  the entire finances of the Ottoman State…’. ‘Abdul Hamîd refused.  He was overthrown by the complicit Nationalist forces, the  Khalîfate  was abolished – and  the Jewish bankers rubbed their hands and declared ‘ mission accomplished ’!

ii) The emergence of  shirk  at the very foundation of the new European political philosophy. Allah is no longer sovereign. The modern secular State is now sovereign. That modern  European model  of a State then embraced all of mankind in its deadly embrace, but the seat of the Khalîfate was the special target. After the  Khalîfate  was abolished the new, modern, secular State of  Turkey emerged with that  sh irk  at its very foundation. From  Turkey it went to  ‘Abd ul-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd who then transformed the heartland of Islam  into  the modern State of Saudi Arabia based on the same  shirk. Pakistan followed in  tame  imitation and the great effort of Iqbal became an exercise in futility.

iii) The emergence of a new philosophy of  feminism  at the very heart of the new, European, secular society.  It brought in its wake a sexual revolution which dismantled the edifice of sexual morality. Sexual freedom  resulted in an unprecedented explosion of sexual promiscuity and sexual perversions. This was the  kath r al-khabath  (excessive immorality and  sexual perversion) which the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam had declared to be the sign of the great  Fitnah  of   the  Dajjâl  and the  Ya’jûj  and  Ma’jûj. This destructive sexuality now targeted all of mankind, but the special target was again the World of Islam.

As these events were taking place,  the world of Islam witnessed the emergence many lesser  Dajjâls  (false Prophets); Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the false Prophet of Qadian and founder  of the Ahmadiyyah Movement, Elijah Muhammad, the founder of the Nation  of Islâm  in the U.S.A. et al. The primary role of these and their like  was one of corrupting Muslim  thought and belief, especially as it related to the accurate perception of the transcendental reality which was now unfolding in the Age of  fitan. These were and are tools of the forces which  were at work planning the destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the universal Ummah, and their primary role was one of diverting Islamic thought from  that  supreme attack which was being launched on the Ummah, and  reducing the Islamic intelligentsia to a state of intellectual confusion. They have been eminently successful.

We embarked on this cursory analysis  in respect of the transcendental dimension of the historical reality  which witnessed the abolition of the Khalîfate, in order to demonstrate that the restoration of the  Khalîfate  was not possible during these last eight decades. After all, some of those who are hesitant about giving the  bay‘ah  (oath of allegiance) to an  Amîr  of a Jamâ‘ah  have asked the question : ‘  Why was the Khalîfate not restored somewhere else after it collapsed in Istanbul ? Why have we had no Khalîfate for more than seventy years now ? ’ The reason for this is the nature of the age in which we now live. This is the age when the greatest force of evil ever created by Allah has been released (eventually to appear as a human being – Dajjâl). This is the age of al-Masîh ad-Dajjâl and of Ya’jûj and Ma’jûj. That authentic Jamâ‘ah which is struggling for the restoration of the Khalîfate cannot possibly succeed in its efforts unless it first has an accurate perception of today’s objective reality and recognizes this age as the Age of the Dajjâl. That authentic Jamâ‘ah did not exist in 1924. How, then, was it possible to wage a successful struggle for the restoration of the Khalîfate?

We turn now to explain the ‘political reality’ of the age which witnessed the collapse of the  Khalîfate, and of the period of time which has elapsed since 1924. Sharîf  al-Husayn, great-grandfather of  the now deceased King Husayn of Jordan, claimed the  Khalîfate on March 7, 1924, four days after the announcement from  the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolishing the Khalîfate. He had been appointed by the Ottoman  Khalîf  as the  Sharîf  of Makkah, but had rebelled against Istanbul and, as a client of the British, had fully co-operated in the British effort  to defeat the Ottoman Empire. His reward was a princely seven million  Sterling pounds pay-off from  the British Treasury. In claiming the  Khalîfate, however, he was in conflict with the basic British and Zionist objective in  the war against the Ottoman Empire. The war was not just a war against Turks. It was a war against Islam. The objective was the destruction of the  Khalîfate  and the emasculation of the Muslim world so that the Jewish State  of Israel could be restored, and the faith of Muslims destroyed.

Sharîf al-Husayn’s claim to the  Khalîfate  threatened the entire scheme  of the British and the Zionists. And so they had  to get rid of him.  They did it with diabolical cunning. They gave the green  light to another British client, ‘Abd al-‘Azîz Ibn Sa‘ûd, head of the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance which had briefly captured Makkah about a hundred years previously, to attack Husayn. ‘Abd
al-‘Azîz cooperated with the British in  the destruction of the Ottoman Empire through concluding a treaty of ‘ Benevolent Neutrality ’ with the British in 1916. His pay-off from  the British Treasury for his treachery against Islam  was a less princely sum  of five thousand Sterling pounds a month. He explained to his gullible so-called  Salafî Ikh wân  (an armed forced of  Wahhâbî  zealots used by the Saudi King) that this was  jizyah  (a punitive tax imposed by  Dâr al-Islâm  on Christian and Jewish residents). They accepted his explanation, and so, perhaps, do well-paid Saudi clients around the world !

The British-Zionist political strategy succeeded in replacing Husayn with a Saudî-Wahhâbî  monarchy which effectively prevented the restoration of the Khalîfate. The plan was simple, yet brilliant. No one could possibly be recognized as  Khalîf, and win legitimacy for his  Khalîfate, unless he controlled the  Haramayn  (i.e. Makkah and Madînah) and the  Hajj. No one could succeed in controlling the  Haramayn  and the  Hajj  so long as the Saudi regime, supported militarily by the West,  remained in control of Arabia. And the Saudi-Wahhâbîs would never be so stupid as to claim  the  Khalifate for themselves. After all, what happened to khalîfate of Sharif  al-Husayn was supposed to function as a warning. It did! And the so-called  Salafî Wahhâbîs  and the Saudi kingdom  abandoned the  Khalîfate! In doing so they committed an unprecedented act of treachery against Islam. The reality is that the  Khalîfate  could not, and still cannot, be restored until Arabia is liberated and  Dâr al-Islâm  is restored.

And while the struggle to restore the  Khalîfate  must never cease, we also recognize the possibility that the liberation of Arabia may, in all  likelihood, not take place until the advent of  Imâm al-Mahdî. When the  Imâm al-Mahdî  does emerge, however, he will need the  Jamâ‘ah  of Muslims to support him  and to struggle with him.  This, then, is the imperative for the creation  of the authentic Islamic revolutionary movement or Jamâ‘ah.


The destruction of the  Khalîfate  of Islam  was the result of a diabolical conspiracy hatched by the British and  the Zionist Jews.

The Saudis and the so-called Salafî-Wahhâbîs acted as willing accomplices  in that crime against Islam. The  Khalîfate  symbolized a system  of political organization (ie.  Dâr alIslâm) which recognized the supremacy of  Islam  in public life, and in the international relations of the Muslim  world. The emergence of the secular nation-states of Turkey and Saudi  Arabia, at the seat of the  Khalîfate  and in the very heart-land of Islam,  paved  the way for the secularization of the system  of political organization of  the Muslim  world. And since it was governments of secular nation-States within the Muslim  world which would now represent the World of Islam,  the implication was that Islam  would no longer rule supreme over public life or over the international relations of the Muslim world. Rather the secular  State now claimed sovereignty. Recognition of that sovereignty amounted to an act of  shirk. And so, the whole world of Islam  now found itself, in  so far as its collective existence was concerned, within the embrace of  shirk,

A more blunt way of saying the same  thing would be to say that in so far as public life in the Muslim  world was concerned, Allah, the Most High, would no longer be  Akbar  ! No Muslim  can read these  lines without feeling great anger against those who betrayed Allah, the Most High, and the Prophet Sallallaahu Alaihi Wasallam! The quality of faith (Îmân) of a Muslim  can, in fact, be gauged through the manner in which he responds to this pathetic situation. The World of Islam  is today without  power. The conclusion is that the institution of the  Khalîfate, which forms part of  Dâr al-Islâm, is indispensable for the restoration of  power. Without power there will be many more Bosnias, Kashmirs, Algerias, Chechnyas, Palestines etc. The only way this deplorable state of affairs can be changed is through the restoration of the supremacy of Islam  in  the public life of Muslims and in the international relations of the Muslim  world. That requires the restoration of Dâr al-Islâm  and the  Khalîfate. We need, therefore,  to articulate anew the provisions of the Islamic Public Order (Dâr al-Islâm) and Islam’s Conception of an International Order, and to demonstrate their clear superiority over the secular rival which has emerged from  western civilization. We also need to recognize,  as this series has made clear, that it is impossible, and will remain  impossible, to restore the  Khalîfate  so long as the Hijâz remains under the control of the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance. Power cannot be restored without the liberation of the  Haramayn  and the  Hajj  from the control of those who participated in the destruction of the  Khalîfate. The goal of destroying the  Hajj  is now within the grasp of the enemies of Islam. 

All that is required for that goal to be fully realised is that  Masjid alAqsâ  be destroyed. The Jewish State of Israel can do that at any time. It is just a matter of choosing the opportune moment. The present Saudi regime has, from  its inception, adopted a non-reversible position of acceptance of, and accommodation with, the Jewish State of Israel. The destruction of Masjid al-Aqsâ  will, as a result, create greater opposition against Saudi rule over Arabia. The Saudi regime  will not  be able to control the rage which Muslims will openly express at the time of the  Hajj. And yet if the Saudi regime  is seen to be unable to control the  Hajj, then the internal opposition within Saudi Arabia will put the  Hajj  to effective use in destabilizing the regime. This is the scenario which  will most likely lead the Saudis to suspend the  Hajj  in order to preserve their rule. Any suspension of the  Hajj by the Saudis, as a consequence of security considerations, will be exploited by the West to ensure that the  Hajj  cannot be resumed. They have the resources to ensure this. 

The liberation of the  Haramayn  and the  Hajj  will be possible when the Saudi-Wahhâbî  alliance breaks down. There are  indications that the alliance is already under great pressure and  can fall apart. There are many Saudi ‘Ulamâ’  who are now imprisoned or under  house arrest. The issues which are most likely to tear the alliance apart would be Saudi ‘ recognition ’ of the Jewish State of Israel (something which has already taken place de facto, and cannot be indefinitely concealed),  and the immanent likelihood of the destruction of Masjid al-Aqsâ by the Jews. 

As events unfold they will confirm  the basic points argued in this treatise.

Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ criticizes Imam Abu Hanifa ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ: An Analysis

The claim is a matter of much bravery and courage because no such saying of Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ can be presented which can back up this claim. This claim is but a result of jealousy, malice and enmity where whatever the heart desires is said. What can one call this if not a result of malice?

Hafidh Ibn ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Ibn Abi Rawaad ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ spoke the truth with sagacity which was noted down by Ibn Hajar Makki ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ in Khayraatul Hisaan pg.35:
“Hafidh Ibn ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Ibn Abi Rawaad said that whosoever loves Imam Abu Hanifah is a Sunni and whoever has malice in his heart for him does Bid’ah. It is stated in a narration that Imam Abu Hanifah is between us and the people of the past. Thus whosoever loves him is from the People of Sunnah and whosoever has malice against him is from the People of Innovation.”

Some Ghair Muqallideen lead astray the common layman by saying that Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has written in his book Kitab al-Dhu’afaa:
“(Imam Abu Hanifah) was Murjee and people adopted silence from narrating from him.”

In reply to this I say that firstly the book al-Dhu’afaa by Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , published in Agra Allahabad, does not contain any such sentence. The same is not found in Adab al-Mufrad, Juzul Qira’ah and Khalqul ‘Ibad either. Even if it is taken to be true, the reply is that Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ had enmity of mathhab towards Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ which is apparent in the writings of Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ . Thus this jarh cannot be accepted on the basis of enmity of mathhab. That is why Thahabi, Ibn Hajar, Wasiuddin Khizaji and others ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﮭﻢ did not give any importance to this Jarh and did not even mention it by considering it “ ﻻ ﯾﻌﺒﺎ ﺑﻪ”.

Secondly, regarding the saying that Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ was a Murjee, the meaning has to be established. If by Murjee those were referred on whom be Allah’s Curse, then this is absolutely wrong because it is stated in Fiqh al-Akbar:
“We do not say like the Murjeeah that it is for certain that our good deeds are accepted and sins are forgiven. We say that whosoever does good deeds with all the right conditions, provided he does not make them void and dies in the state of Iman, then Allah will not let go his good deeds to waste and will reward him accordingly by accepting his deeds.”

It is stated in Khayrat al-Hisaan, pg 73, it is stated:
“The Commentator of al-Muwaqif mentions that Ghisaan Murjee used to say things so that it would seem that Imam Abu Hanifah was a Murjee and he used to include Imam Abu Hanifah in the Murjeeah sect. Ghisaan deliberately accused Imam Abu Hanifah to legitimize his mathhab.
Shehristani, in al-Mlal wal Nihal, has said that it is astonishing how Ghisaan used to attribute the teachings of his Murjeeah sect to Imam Abu Hanifah and would call him a Murjeeah. He has lied.”
And if by Murjeeah it is meant Murjeeah Marhoomah then all of Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama’ah is included in it. It is mentioned in al-Tamheed of Abu Shakoor Salimi:
“There are two types of Murjeeah. One is Murjeeah Marhoomah and it is the Companions of Rasulullah ﷺ . The second is Murjeeah Mal’oonah and these are those who say that sins do not matter and there is no punishment for them. ‘Uthman bin Abi Laila once wrote a letter to Imam Abu Hanifah asking if he is from the Murjeeah. Imam Abu Hanifah replied that there are two types of Murjeeah. One is Murjeeah Mal’oonah and I am not from them. The other is Murjeeah Marhoomah and I am from them. In fact, the Anbiya ﻋﻠﯿﮭﻢ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ were also the same. Do you not know the saying of ‘Isa ﻋﻠﯿﻪ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ , ‘If You (Allah) punish them, they are Your slaves after all, but if You forgive them, You are the Mighty, the Wise.’

Thus it is learnt that Imam Bukhari’s ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ saying regarding people not accepting the Hadith and opinion of Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ is absolutely false and baseless.

Thirdly, in ‘Uqud al-Jawahir al-Manifa, the book of Hafidh Mosuli, al-Du’afah is quoted to state:
“Yahya bin Mu’een has said, ‘I have not found anyone superior to Waqi’ and he used to give fatwa on the qawl of Abu Hanifah and would memorize all his Ahadith. He heard a lot of Ahadith from Abu Hanifah.’”

And it is stated in Manaqib Kurdi, pg 100:
“Sa’eed bin Yahya bin Humayri Wasti was an Imam and Hafidh of Hadith from Wasta. He has narrated from Imam Abu Hanifah and has acquired knowledge from him. He used to say that Imam Abu Hanifah is an ocean of knowledge.”

And in the same Manaqib on pg 19 it is stated:
“’Abdullah bin Yazeed al-Muqri Makki heard 900 Hadith from Imam Abu Hanifah.”
In Khayrat al-Hisaan, pg 23, it is stated:

“Ibn al-Mubarak said, ‘He (Abu Hanifah) used to be the one with most knowledge in Fiqh, and I have not seen anyone more knowledgeable than him in Fiqh. .

.And he is the most knowledgeable amongst them (Imam Malik and Sufyan) and better Muhaqqiq and Mudaqqiq.’”

“Abu Yusuf al-Thawri says, ‘I follow Imam Abu Hanifah in majority of issues.’”

“Yahya bin Sa’eed Qattan says, ‘We have not heard an opinion better than that of Imam Abu Hanifah and thus we give fatwa on his qawl.’”

“Ibn al-Mubarak says, ‘I have seen Mus’ir ask questions and benefit from the study circles of Imam Abu Hanifah.’”

In Khayrat al-Hisaan, pg 26, it is stated by Ibn Jarir ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ :
“The second chapter is regarding those who acquired Hadith and Fiqh from Abu Hanifah and to assess their number is impossible.”

“This is the reason why some ‘Ulema state that amongst the A’immah of Islam, no one has as many students as Imam Abu Hanifah.”

Look at this with justice and without any bias. Waqi’, Ibn Yahya al-Wasti, Ibn al-Mubarak, Sufyan al-Thawri, Mus’ir bin Kudam, Yahya bin Sa’eed al-Qattan and others have spoken so highly about the Fiqh and Opinion of Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ . Thousands have acquired Hadith and Fiqh from Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ and have become famous by his blessing in the world.
As is seen in Manaqib al-Kurdari and Manqib Mawafiq of Ibn Ahmad al-Makki.

Despite of this, Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ says,

“ ﺳﮑﺘﻮﺍ ﻋﻦ ﺭﺃﻳﻪ ﻭ ﺣﺪﯾﺜﺎ ”

If this is not out of malice due to Mathhab then what is it?

Fourthly, If, according to Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , a narrator should be left and nothing should be taken from him if he is a Murjee, then due to what reason did Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ include in his Sahih Bukhari Ahadith from the deviant sects like Murjeeah, Nasibiyah, Kharijiyah, Shi’a, Jahmiyah, Qadariyah and others. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, in Muqaddamah Fath al-Bari, has written this in detail name by name. Over here we will mention the total number of people from four of these deviant sects. Murjeeah 31; Shi’a 2; Qadariyah 28; Nasibiyah 5.

Then according to the standards of Ghair Muqallideen, does Sahih Bukhari not become the weakest of all books?

Now that the topic of the narrators of Bukhari has been touched, it is only appropriate to talk about some of these narrators. The world knows that Sahih Bukhari has been accepted as ‘Asahhul Kutub’ unanimously (which means that as a collection it has collectively more sahih ahadith; this does not mean that each and every hadith of Bukhari is most authentic when compared to other ahadith found in different collections). It is without any doubt that Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has put in a lot of effort in it which is worthy of much praise. May Allah (swt) accept his effort.

However, it has many narrators on whom different types of Jarh have been done. Examples are given below:

(a) Kathhab: Extreme liar
(b) Yakthibul Hadith: Lies in matters of Hadith
(c) Yasriqul Hadith: Steals Hadith
(d) Yadha’ul Hadith: Invents Hadith
It is seen that the highest form of Jarh is also included. Fathul Bari and Meezanul I’tidaal can be referred for more details. They list more than 100 such narrators.
Despite these Jarh, Imam Bukhari did not consider these narrators among those from whom Hadith should not be taken. Instead, he accepted Ahadith from them. And despite this, other Muhadditheen did not deny Sahih Bukhari to be Asahhul Kutub.

Then what is the reason apart from Mathhabi malice that Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ did not take from Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ although no Jarh can be done on him according to the principles of this science?

Thus when this malice is established by clear evidence then what weight can the Jarh of Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ have in regards to Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ .
Fifthly, if the Hadith of narrators, on whom Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has done Jarh, is to be rejected then there are many such narrators taken by Imams Muslim, Nasai, Tirmidhi, Abu Dawood and others ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﮭﻢ who should be rejected according to this rule. But Muhadditheen did not consider such narrators as rejected.
Then why should Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ be rejected due to the Jarh of Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ ?

In ‘Kitab al-Dhu’afa’, Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has said that Ovais Qarni’s sanad is doubtful ( ﻓﯽ ﺍﺳﻨﺎﺩﮦ ﻧﻈﺮ ) and this Jarh, according to the rules of Bukhari, is a serious one. However, Ovais Qarni cannot be considered to be Majruh.

Sixthly, if Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ relied on his own Jarh, then he would not have narrated from narrators on whom he has done Jarh. There are many such narrators in Bukhari whom Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has declared Majruh. Such narrators are listed below:

1. Usayd bin Zayd al-Jalal – Imam Dhahabi ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has mentioned in al-Meezan, “It is strange that Imam Bukhari has taken narrations from this narrator in his Sahih and has also mentioned him in al-Dhu’afa.”

2. ‘Ayub bin ‘Aa’id – Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has mentioned in his book al-Dhu’afa, “He used to prefer the beliefs of Murjeeah despite being truthful.

3. Thabit bin Muhammad – Imam Dhahabi ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has stated, “Although Imam Bukhari has narrated from this narrator, he has included him in his al-Dhu’afa.”
4. Zuhayr bin Muhammad – Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has said in his al-Dhu’afa, “People of Shaam have narrated Munkaraat from him.”
5. Ziyad bin Rasigh – Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ said his sanad is doubtful as is also found in al-Meezan.

6. ‘Ataa Ibn Maimoona – Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ mentioned in his al-Dhu’afa, “He used to like the beliefs of Qadariyyah.” And it is mentioned in the Muqaddama of Fathul Bari that many narrators were inclined towards Qadariyyah e.g. Hams bin Minhala. Imam Dhahabi ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has said that he has been accused of being a Qadariyyah and he has Munkar Hadith and that is why Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has included him in al-Dhu’afa.

Look at this from an unbiased perspective. If Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ trusted his own Jarh, then why did he narrate from these people? When Imam Bukhari himself does not trust his own Jarh, then it is strange that the Muqallideen of Bukhari trust his Jarh and call Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ weak in Hadith.
Seventhly, if near those who object, the Jarh of Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , despite being inaccurate and against ‘usuls, is valid in the case of Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , then why would Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ not be Majruh and rejected? Is Jarh on Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ not established by A’imma of Hadith? Of course they are. Some of them are listed below:

1. Imam Thehli ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , the teacher of Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , has done serious Jarh on him. In Tabqat al-Shafi’iyyah, Vol.12, pg 12, it is stated, “Imam Thehli said, ‘He who visits the study circle of Imam Bukhari should not come to us as people of Baghdad have written to us that Imam Bukhari does kalam in the case of the words of the Qur’an (being created or uncreated) and we told him not to do so. However, he did not listen. Thus do not go to him.’”

Note that not only did Imam Thehli ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ tell people not to visit Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ but also said that he is an innovator who thinks that the words of the Qur’an, coming out of his mouth are words of the creation. Neither should anyone sit with him nor talk to him.

This warning of Imam Thehli ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ had such a huge impact on people that many stopped meeting Imam Bukhari.

In Tarikh Ibn Khalkaan, Vol.2 pg 123, it is stated, “When a difference arose between Imam Bukhari and Muhammad bin Yahya regarding the words of the Qur’an, he stopped people from going to Bukhari. So much so that Imam Bukhari was compelled to migrate from Nishapur and, apart from Imam Muslim, many people boycotted him.”

2. Imam Muslim ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , despite his closeness to Imam Bukhari, has not narrated a single Hadith from him in his Sahih Muslim. In fact, in the discussion of “’an’ana” Hadith, he has referred to Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ with the word “’asawna” (which means he opposes him in this matter) and has severely criticized him. For reference see Muslim Vol. 1, pg 21.

3. Abu Thur’ah and Abu Hatim ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﮭﻤﺎ have not taken from Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ either. In Tabqaat al-Shafi’iyyah, Vol.1 pg 190, it is mentioned, “Abu Thur’ah and Abu Hatim have left Imam Bukhari because of the difference in the case of the Words of the Qur’an.”

In Meezanul I’tidaal it is stated, “. . . .Abu Thur’ah and Abu Hatim did not narrate from the Imam Bukhari, the student of ‘Ali Ibn al-Madini, because of the dispute regarding the Words of the Qur’an.”
And Abdur Rahman Ibn Abi Hatim ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ says, “Abu Thur’ah left Imam Bukhari due to this reason.”
4. Ibn Mundah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has categorized Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ amongst the Mudalliseen (such a narrator who conceals the name of his Shaykh or the Shaykh of his Shaykh) in Shurutul A’immah. Thus he stated, “Bukhari has narrated in his books in these ways: ‘I said to fulan (an unnamed person)’ which is permitted, and ‘Fulan has said this,’ and this is Tadlees.”

It is obvious that Tadlees is a greater defect when compared to weak memory as it is a voluntary act and there is fraud and deception in it. That is why Shamsi has said, “Tadlees is Haram near the A’immah.” (Muqaddama Usul al-Shaykh al-Muhaddith al-Dehalawi ‘alal Mishkat, pg 2)

Please note, Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has narrated about 30 Ahadith from Imam Thehli ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ but has not mentioned the name with which he was famous because was strict aggression between Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ and Imam Thehli ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ . In Tareekh Ibn Khalqan vol.2 pg 134, it is stated, “Imam Bukhari narrated from Imam Thehli in 30 places and has not mentioned his name anywhere. He should have said, ‘Muhammad bin Yahya Thehli narrated to me’ but instead said ‘Muhammad narrated to me.’ And in some places he has mentioned him as Muhammad bin ‘Abdullah’ (‘Abdullah was the name of his grandfather) and in some places he attributed it to his great grandfather.”
5. Darqutni and Hakim ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﮭﻤﺎ have said that Imam Bukhari’s ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ narrating Hadith from Ishaq bin Muhammad bin Ismail has been considered to be something with defect. In Muqaddama Fathul Bari pg 451 it is stated, “Darqutni and Hakim said that there is an allegation on Bukhari in narration of Hadith.”

Darqutni and Hakim ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﮭﻤﺎ mean that Ishaq bin Muhammad has been considered trustworthy by Bukhari whereas he is weak. He could not differentiate between Thiqah and Da’eef. And Isma’il ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has shown astonishment that Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ considers the Munqata’ narration of Abu Salih Juhani as Sahih but considers Mutassil as Da’eef.
It is written in Muqaddama Fathul Bari pg 483, “Ismail accused Bukhari and was surprised that why does Bukhari consider the Ahadith of Abu Salih Juhani as evidence when it is not Mutassil.”
He added, “It is more astonishing that Bukhari considers Munqata’ Hadith as authority and Mutassil as Da’eef.”

6. Thahabi ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ has also shown bewilderment on some of his works. He writes in the biography of Usayd bin Zayd al-Jamal, “It is astonishing that Bukhari considers him to be Da’eef yet narrates from him.”
What can one say about the memory of a person who considers a narrator as weak and yet narrates from him in Asahhul Kutub!

Those who object should do some justice. If Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ is weak due to the Jarh of Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ then why would Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ not be Majruh on the basis of the Jarh of Ibn Mundah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ and Thehli ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ ?

7. By the yardstick used by those who object (on Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ ), Imam Bukhari himself is proven to be Majruh. Thus what effect can the Jarh of a Majruh have on Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ ?

It is sad that Ghair Muqallideen attack Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ due to mere jealousy and do not realize that they live in glass houses.

If Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ will be called Da’eef, then all the Muhaditheen of the world will become Da’eef and rejected in matters of Hadith.

Note: It should be clear that these Jarh have been noted down just to answer the opponents. This is just how Mawlana Shah ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Muhaddith Dehlawi ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ , in his book “Tohfa” has adopted an offensive position (as opposed to defensive) against Shi’a. Otherwise, in truth, our Aqeedah is that Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ and Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ are trustworthy, truthful, just, with strong memory and devout worshippers (of Allah). None of them is Majruh. And Hadith narrated by them is accepted. The reasons due to which we do not accept the Jarh on Imam Bukhari ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ are the same due to which we do not accept the Jarh on Imam Abu Hanifah ﺭﺣﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﮧ ﻋﻠﯿﻪ .

ﺭَﺑَّﻨَﺎ ﺍﻏْﻔِﺮْ ﻟَﻨَﺎ ﻭَﻟِﺈِﺧْﻮَﺍﻧِﻨَﺎ ﺍﻟَّﺬِﻳﻦَ ﺳَﺒَﻘُﻮﻧَﺎ ﺑِﺎﻟْﺄِﻳﻤَﺎﻥِ ﻭَﻻ ﺗَﺠْﻌَﻞْ ﻓِﻲ ﻗُﻠُﻮﺑِﻨَﺎ ﻏِﻼًّ ﻟِﻠَّﺬِﻳﻦَ ﺁﻣَﻨُﻮﺍ ﺭَﺑَّﻨَﺎ ﺇِﻧَّﻚَ ﺭَﺅُﻭﻑٌ ﺭَﺣِﻴﻢٌ

The above material is an excerpt from the book, ‘Imam Abu Hanifah par Ai’terazaat kay Jawabaat’ (Responding to the Objections against Imam Abu Hanifah) pg 41-54