Category Archives: Principles of Fiqh

Clearing a Confusion about Ittifaaq/ijmaa’ (Consensus) of the Majority


I am confused regarding the ittifaaq/ijmaa’ of the majority of Ulama. The Ulama are saying that since the majority is of the view that stunning animals is permissible, this will be the official ruling of the Shariah. There are other similar issues of difference as well. They say that since the majority is of the view that digital pictures are permissible, therefore, this will be the fatwa of the Shariah. They compare their ittifaaq with the Ijmaa’ of the Fuqaha of former times. Please read the Fatwa of Darul Uloom Karachi. Please explain the issue of the ittifaaq (consensus) of the majority which I believe is being misinterpreted by the Ulama of the day.

ANSWER (By Mujlisul Ulama):

1) The consensus (ittifaaq) of the majority of molvis on baatil, is the ittifaaq of the shayaateenul ins. It is absolutely ridiculous to compare the consensus of today’s ulama-e-soo’ with the Ittifaaq of the Jamhoor of the Mutaqaddimeen era.

Ittifaaq of the majority on an issue which is explicitly in conflict with the Nass of the Shariah, is ittifaaq on shaitaaniyat and baatil.

In the absence of a directive of the Shariah – in other words, if there is no Nass of the Mutaqaddimeen on an issue which is a recent development, then the issue will simply be referred to the principles of the Shariah. If it is found to be in conflict with these principles, the fatwa of impermissibility will be issued. If there is no conflict, then obviously it will be permissible.

On a new expediency of this nature, e.g., performing Salaat in a plane, so-called suicide bombing as a tactic of Jihad, printing the Qur’aan Majeed with machinery in which the ink used has alcohol, and no other ink is available, kangaroo meat, etc., etc., there is no Nass from the Fuqaha-e-Mutaqaddimeen. The Ulama will study such issues in the light of similar mansoos juziyaat and the usool of the Shariah, and issue their Fatwa.

In matters of this kind, there is bound to be ikhtilaaf-e-raai’ (difference of opinion). It is not permissible to be bigoted and dogmatic and to claim that only ‘my’ view is the Haqq and the view of the others is baatil. But on issues on which there exists explicit rulings of the Shariah which have been transmitted from the era of Khairul Quroon, the slightest divergence will be intolerable and unacceptable. Opinion and the consensus of the majority of donkey-molvis and sheikhs are the effluvium of the nafs and the stunt of Iblees.

Furthermore, the majority view in cases of this nature, i.e. new expediencies, being consensus of the jamhoor Ulama-e-Haqq of the time, will be acceptable while at the same time, this ittifaaq of the Jamhoor of the current era will not be binding on the dissenting Ulama. However, on issues where there exists Nass of the Shariah, any view which is in conflict, be it the opinion of the so-called jamhoor of the time, will be mardood and mal-oon, and those who follow such baatil ittifaaq will come within the scope of the Qur’aanic castigation: “They take their ahbaar and ruhbaan as gods besides Allah and also (they take as god) Maseeh, the son of Maryam.”

This type of baatil ittifaaq is on an issue such as stunning animals prior to Thabah. Thabah is Mansoos Alayh. The full tareeqah of Thabah, from beginning to end, is Mansoos. Changing any mas’alah in this system without valid Shar’i cause is baatil and haraam. It will be Tahreef-e-Shariah (interpolating and mutilating the Shariah). In terms of the Nass of the Shariah, inflicting injury on an animal prior to Thabah is haraam. The infliction of injury is of genus significance. It covers all forms of injury. Even the act of sharpening the knife in front of the animal which is to be slaughtered is prohibited. When such an indirect act which is not a physical act of injury is also prohibited, then to a far greater degree will the brutality of stunning be prohibited.

Now, since infliction of injury is haraam by the Nass of the Shariah, the ittifaaq of a whole world of moron molvis will be baatil, and it will be haraam for even the awaam (the masses) to submit and follow. They will come within the criticism stated in the aforementioned Qur’aanic aayat.

Ittifaaq of Jamhoor never means validity of an ittifaaq which is in conflict with any Nass of the Shariah or which abrogates a Shar’i hukm. Any ittifaaq of the jamhoor molvis of this era which gives precedence to a method or concept of the kuffaar over and above the method ordained by the Shariah, is kufr. Precisely for this reason has Hadhrat Thanvi (Rahmatullah alayh) said that approval of stunning is tantamount to kufr.

2) We have as yet not read the fatwa of Darul Uloom Karachi. However, we must say that the fatwas issued by this institution are not necessarily reliable. They condone sareeh (explicit) haraam practices, and they are adept in the art of ta’weel baatil. We have criticized Mufti Taqi on several issues.

The episodes which had transpired on the demise of Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) had spawned a sharp difference among the Sahaabah. Some tribes refused to pay Zakaat. The Khalifah, Hadhrat Abu Bakr Siddique (Radhiyallahu anhu) resolved to wage war against them. In fact he declared kaafir those who differentiated between Salaat and Zakaat. Due to the extremely delicate situation and the fact that attacks on Madinah appeared to be imminent, there was Ittifaaq of all the Sahaabah including Hadhrat Umar (Radhiyallahu anhu) and Hadhrat Ali (Radhiyallahu anhu) on accepting the terms of deniers of Zakaat, and that jihad should not be waged against them.

Opposing this solid Ittifaaq of all the Sahaabah, was the solitary dissenting voice of Hadhrat Abu Bakr (Radhiyallahu anhu) who declared with an unseen and an unheard of vehemence and determination that he, alone would wage jihad against the deniers of Zakaat if the Sahaabah did not concur with him. Observing this wonderful state of determination, all the Sahaabah, abandoned their Ittifaaq and wholeheartedly accepted the view of the Khalifah.

The second episode pertains to the army of Hadhrat Usaamah Bin Zaid (Radhiyallahu anhu). During his maradhul maut (last illness), Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) had ordered the army under Hadhrat Usaamah (Radhiyallahu anhu) to wage jihad against the Romans. Whilst the army was on the outskirts of Madinah, the news of Rasulullah’s demise arrived. Thus, the army halted.

Hadhrat Umar (Radhiyallahu anhu) and all the elite Sahaabah of the Ansaar and Muhaajireen unanimously advised against this expedition. They said that with the departure of the army, Madinah surrounded by hostile, rebellious, murtaddeen tribes, would be exposed and defenceless. Again, Hadhrat Abu Bakr (Radhiyallahu anhu) rejected this Ittifaaq of the Sahaabah and ordered the army to march against the Romans. He declared with the greatest of confidence and vigour that under no circumstances whatsoever would he cancel the expedition.

These two episodes confirm that Ittifaaq of the Jamhoor is not in the same category as the Nass of the Qur’aan. When rejection of such a powerful Ittifaaq was valid, what does the intelligence and Imaan of the Mu’min dictate regarding the ittifaaq of a world full of moron mercenary molvis, sheikhs, cranks and quacks who betray Islam, Allah Ta’ala, Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) and the Ummah? The ittifaaq of such a stercoraceous ‘jamhoor’ is baatil effluvium manufactured for scuttling the Shariah. Allah Ta’ala has granted the Ulama-e-Haqq sound and nooraani intelligence, and such baseerat which enable them to understand and differentiate between Haqq and baatil. An ittifaaq of a jamhoor of morons will be rejected. It simply has no validity in the Shariah.




Please comment on the following Fatwa:

After issuing their relevant fatwa they quote a few Ibaarats (texts) which state that the Asl is ibaahah.


Selling T-Shirts with country flags; Advertising products with videos of people

Question 1. 

I want to sell T shirts with different country flags on them for the upcoming Soccer World Cup. Some of these countries are not majority Muslim countries (e.g. Portugal, Spain, France etc.). Will it be permissible to sell these t shirts?

2. What is the ruling on advertising products with videos of people using them? Sometimes products need a video demonstration, or a photo to show how to properly use them. What is a permissible way to do this?

The answers to your queries are as follows:

1. It is permissible to sell t-shirts with flags of the various countries imprinted on them, irrespective of the religious predominance in the respective country. However, one should avoid t-shirts with flags that have animate objects, religious depictions- like the Saudi flags, etc.

2. There are academic differences of opinions amongst contemporary ‘Ulamaa and Muftis regarding digital photography. The Darul Iftaa advises to adopt taqwaa and avoid all forms of digital pictures and videos. You may revert to us with details of the product(s) you wish to advertise and we will try to assist you with suitable alternatives.

Is this fatwa correct according to the Shariah?

ANSWER (Mujlisul Ulama):

The fatwa is seriously flawed with incongruities. It is not valid in terms of the Shariah.

The Mufti did not apply his mind. It is clear that the Muftis of this age are egregiously ignorant of the fact that the objective of Ifta is to bring people closer to Allah Ta’ala. On the contrary, these muftis are entrenching the fisq and fujoor of people by resorting to technicalities. The Aakhirat is the furthest from their minds. Hence, whatever technical loophole they can dig out from the kutub, they will utilize to issue such lamentable fatwas which only give further impetus to the fisq and fujoor of people, thus further stunting their Imaan and increasing the chasm between Allah Ta’ala and His servants.

The flags of kuffaar countries are generally symbols of kufr. It is not permissible for Muslims to sell such flags and T-shirts with such flags even if the flags are without animate objects. Furthermore, such T-shirts are Tashabbuh bil kuffaar. It is haraam for Muslims to wear such garb.

The chap who asked the question clearly mentioned that he desires to sell such T-shirts “for the upcoming Soccer World Cup.” It beggars Imaani credulity that a mufti fails to understand the colossal fisq and fujoor accompanying these haraam kuffaar games. A host of major sins are attached to these shaitaani games. To sell T-shirts associated in any way with these haraam activities is to aid and abet in sin and transgression. It is I’aanat alal ma’siyat. It is haraam by the explicit Nass of the Qur’aan Majeed.

By what stretch of aql did the mufti cite the principle of Al-Asl fil Ashyaa’ Al-Ibaahat (the principle regulating things is permissibility), defies understanding. This principle has absolutely no relevance to the issue of selling flags and T-shirts.
If it be accepted that this Ibaahat principle is valid and applicable today, then too, the principle is conditioned with daleel which negates Ibaahat (permissibility). There are valid arguments which negate the applicability of the principle to the T-shirts and kuffaar flags. The Fuqaha clearly stipulate for the validity of the operation of this principle that the issue in terms of the Shariah is Maskoot anhu, i.e. the Shariah is silent on the matter. 

Furthermore, if the Shariah is silent on a specific issue, however, there is Shar’i daleel for hurmat (prohibition/impermissibility), then obviously the question of Ibaahat recedes into oblivion. In Al-Kaafi Sharh Al-Bazudi, it is mentioned: “We do not say that Ibaahat is a principle established inceptionally by the Shariah and that there is no hurmat inceptionally in all things because human beings since the time of Aadam (Alayhis salaam) to the present time have not been left in vain (to wander about aimlessly like the holy bulls and cows of Hindu India) at any time whatsoever. Allah Ta’ala says (in the Qur’aan): ‘There has not been an Ummah, but there was a Warner (a Nabi) among them. In the imposition (of the Shariah on people) there is prohibition of things and permissibility of things. Should we say that Ibaahat is the Asl in things as an inceptional Shar’i principle, it will lead to the abrogation of Takleef (i.e. the imposition of Shar’i ahkaam), and this is incorrect.”

Ibn Ameer Haaj (Ibn Al-Muwaqqa Al-Hanafi) states in At-Taqreer Wat Tahreer: “Sadrul Islam said: ‘After the incidence of the Shariah, wealth will be (regulated by the principle of) Ibaahat by Ijmaa’ as long as the cause of hurmat (prohibition/impermissibility) has not appeared.”

It should be understood that Ibaahat is not a principle to be employed loosely for just anything for according it permissibility as do the deviates of our age. If there is Shar’i daleel, this principle cannot be invoked, for it will mean abrogation of the Shariah. In Kashful Asraar Sharah Al-Bazdawi, it appears: “In terms of the view of those who say permissibility and impermissibility are known only on the basis of the Shariah, it will be said that the exception from prohibition is Ibaahat. Thus it is as if it is said: These things are haraam in the state of ikhtiyaar (volition, and permissible in the state of idhtiraar (dire straits). Therefore, Ibaahat in the state of dire need is also established by Nass (explicit command of the Shariah).”

Further negating the careless employment of this principle, it is mentioned in Ghamz Uyoonil Basaair: “Therefore, Tahreem (decreeing haraam) is more preferable to us. Verily, it is more preferable to us because in it is the abandonment of mubaah (a permissibility) for the sake of abstention from haraam, and this is better than its contrary.

…..The Asl in things is Ibaahat until there appears the daleel for negation of Ibaahat. This is according to the Math-hab of those Fuqaha who say that the Asl is Ibaahat. Similarly according to those who say that the Asl is Tahreem. It will be Tahreem until such time that there appears the daleel for negation of Tahreem.”

Furthermore, this extremely contentious principle is weak of nature. It is not a holy writ. In Sharhul Manaar is mentioned: “Verily, Ibaahat being the Asl is not a Shar’i hukm……….  There are two objections against the principle: ‘Al-asl fil ashyaa’ Al-Ibaahat’. (1) The apparent impression conveyed is that this is a unanimous principle. We have mentioned earlier that it is the view of some Hanafiyyah. (2) Verily, Al-Ibaahatul Asliyyah is not a Shar’i hukm……..

This principle is according to some Hanafiyyah among whom is Al-Karkhi. Some of the Ashaabul Hadith said that the Asl is prohibition, and some of our Ashaab said that the Asl is Tawaqquf (non-committal).”

It is also stated in Ghamzul Uyoon: “Know that verily, that in which there is harm for a person or for others is beyond the pale of difference (i.e. there is unanimity in its prohibition).” Thus, it may not be argued that tobacco, for example, is halaal on the basis of the principle of Ibaahat because there is extreme dharar (harm) for human beings in this substance. This principle cannot be invoked to legalize dagga, claiming that it is only a plant, hence on the basis of this principle it is halaal. There is Shar’i daleel to negate the Ibaahat. 

Another interpretation of this principle is: “Exemption from punishment on the basis of commission or omission.” However, in negation of this view, Fakhrul Islam said: “This applies only to the era of Fatrah which was between Nabi Isaa (Alayhis salaam) and Muhammad (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam). …………”

In Raddul Muhtaar it is mentioned: “According to Ibnul Humaam, Al-Ibaahat is (the view) of the Jamhoor Hanafiyyah and Shaafi’iyyah. It is stated in Sharh Usoolil Bazdawiy: ‘The majority of our Ashaab and the Ashaab of Shaafi’said: ‘That things are on the (principle of Ibaahat) prior to the applicability of the Shariah’s ruling of permissibility and prohibition. That is the Asl in such things, hence it is permissible for a person to whom the Shariah has not reached to consume whatever he desires………….. Consumption of carrion and drinking of wine are prohibited only by (Shar’i) proscription, hence Ibaahat (permissibility) has been decreed the Asl and Hurmat (prohibition) is the Aaridh (an external regulating factor).”

Al-Baidhaawi said: “The intention of those who say that the Asl in things is Ibaahat, is in such things in which there is benefit. However, regarding harmful things, the Asl is Tahreem (prohibition).”

There is copious discussion and interpretation of this principle which the Mufti Sahib has used, not only loosely, but baselessly. It has absolutely no relevance to T-shirts. It is moronic to say that on the basis of the Ibaahat principle it is permissible for women to unveil themselves in public since inceptionally, the face of woman is not aurah. Only a maajin mufti who is fit to be whipped and stopped from issuing fatwa will proffer such a corrupt and stupid ‘fatwa’. There is valid Shar’i daleel for the Wujoob of veiling the face. Similarly, there is Shar’i daleel for the kuffaar T-shirts being impermissible, and this impermissibility has greater emphasis regarding such T-shirts which are associated with kuffaar sport which are accompanied by a host of Kabeerah sins.

Tashabbuh bil kuffaar, I’aanat alal ma’siyat and kufr symbols are factors which prohibit trading with such T-shirts and flags. The kuffaar sport connotation by itself is adequate for prohibition. But, in reality, this principle has no relevance with T-shirts and flags.

The Ibaahat principle will operate in issues on which the Shariah is silent and for which there are no apparent elements of prohibition. For example, kangaroo meat or any other animal for which there is no mention/ruling in the Shariah. Is it halaal or haraam? As long as there is no daleel to prove prohibition, it will be said that the meat is halaal.

If one visits a Muttaqi Muslim who exercises considerable caution regarding his food, one will not doubt the food he serves. The principle will be applicable here. But, in our age, when it is confirmed that 99% of the populace and 99% of even the molvis and sheikhs devour carrion, and that 99.9% of Muslim butcheries trade in haraam meat and chicken, then the principle of Ibaahat will not apply. Only a moron and a maajin mufti will   apply this principle in a scenario where the vast majority of people devour excreta, and advise that as long as the najaasat is served in a Muslim’s home, it will be halaal on the basis of Al-Asl fil Ashyaa’ Al-Ibaahat.

The universally prevailing condition of the people – their wholesale devouring of haraam and their wholesale indulgence in fisq and fujoor, and their flagrant disregard for the Shariah in all spheres of life, negate the principle of Ibaahat in our time. Today the principle of Hurmat applies. All things will be regarded haraam unless proven to be halaal. The kuffaar manufacturers are fully aware of the halaal requisite, hence they will not reveal the true ingredients of their products. Compounding the evil is the mass halaaization of carrion by the cartel of ‘halaal’ certificate vendors such as SANHA, MJC, NIHT and the myriad of other agents of Iblees. Thus, there is no scope for the operation of the Ibaahat principle in today’s scenario. Hadhrat Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi (Rahmatullah alayh) has also confirmed this fact, namely, that the Asl today is Hurmat.

Furthermore the mufti has cited this principle as if it is the final world. It is mentioned in Al Ashbaah Wan Nazaair that according to ‘some Hanafiyyah’ the principle is Ibaahat. According to some Muhadditheen, the principle is Al-Hazr (Prohibition). Other of our Fuqaha say that the principle is Tawaqquf (neither permissibility nor prohibition). A Shar’i daleel is essential for a ruling.

Technically, there are three views: Ibaahat, Tahreem and Tawaqquf. However, in reality, the consequences of all three are the same. For example: An unknown wild fruit is found growing in the bush/jungle. Is this fruit halaal or haraam? In terms of the Ibaahat view it is halaal. In terms of the second view, it is Haraam, and in terms of the third view the issue is indeterminate. However, if it is confirmed that the fruit is poisonous, then unanimously it will be haraam. In the same way, if it is confirmed that the fruit is not poisonous nor harmful, it will be unanimously halaal.

All three views are conditioned by daleel. If there is daleel to indicate prohibition, e.g. the fruit is poisonous, then both the Ibaahat and Tawaqquf fall away, and hurmat is confirmed. Similarly, if Shar’i daleel confirms that something is halaal, then the Tahreem and Tawaqquf view fall away.

Is giraffe halaal or haraam? According to the Ibaahat view it is halaal because there is no Shar’i daleel to negate its permissibility. On the other hand, rhino is haraam despite the fact that both the rhino and giraffe are herbivorous animals. Despite Ibaahat being the principle according to the Jamhoor Ahnaaf, our Math-hab rules that rhino and elephant are haraam. The Shar’i daleel of khubth (vile/evil/noxious) mentioned as a factor of prohibition in the Qur’aan, constitutes the condition for the cancellation of Ibaahat of rhino and elephant meat.

The principle may not be applied loosely and stupidly without taking into account the prevailing circumstances and the elements of Hurmat. It may not be argued that since apples are halaal, liquor made with apples will also be halaal in view of the Shariah being silent on the issue of apple liquor or strawberry liquor or pineapple liquor. The principle of Ibaahat cannot be utilized to halaalize such liquors. There is a Shar’i daleel to override this principle in this regard, and that is the prohibition of all intoxicants.

Similarly, when it is known that carrion is consumed by the vast majority of Muslims, it will be stupidity and perfidy to claim that on the basis of the principle of Ibaahat it is permissible to devour the food of all Muslims. Only a moron will conclude permissibility when there exists a Shar’i daleel to negate it. In this case, ghalbah zann (overwhelming probability bordering on certitude), overrides the principle of Ibaahat.

It is indeed moronic and totally unexpected of a mufti to apply the principle of Ibaahat to something such as a T-shirt with a logo of kufr or shirk or which is a garb of the kuffaar or which is worn to celebrate haraam kuffaar sport such as the World Soccer Cup with its accompaniment of a plethora of major sins. In the same way, it is stupid and haraam to claim that gold for males is halaal on the basis of the Ibaahat principle because there exists Shar’i daleel negating the principle on this issue. 

In view of the universal preponderance of haraam and mushtabah in this age, and the concealment of ingredients by manufacturers with E-numbers and chemical designations, and the mass halaalization of carrion and haraam for monetary purposes, the only option for practical implementation is the principle of Tahreem. In other words, all things will be regarded as haraam unless confirmed as halaal by valid Shar’i daleel.

The claim by the mufti that “there are academic differences of opinion amongst contemporary Ulama and Muftis regarding digital photography”, is not worthy of intelligent consideration. In the more than fourteen century history of Islam there has always been Ijmaa’ (Consensus) of the Ummah on the hurmat of pictures of animate objects regardless of the method of production. All authorities of all Math-habs have ruled that such pictures are haraam.

Contemporary ‘ulama’ who claim that the production by the digital process of haraam pictures renders such pictures halaal, are like the carrion halaalizers. Their view is putrid and so silly that even children will mock and jeer at the ghutha they stupidly blabber. A haraam picture – a picture of an animate object – remains haraam regardless of the method of production. The method is not haraam. The picture produced is haraam. It is ludicrous for a genuine mufti to cite the views of such moron molvis and sheikhs in a subtle attempt to minimize the 14th century prohibition substantiated by Nusoos of the highest calibre of authenticity. In a nutshell, there is no difference whatsoever regarding the prohibition of pictures of animate objects. The utterly baseless ta’weel (interpretation) expectorated to halaalize haraam pictures render these molvis zanaadaqah.

The contention of digital images not being haraam pictures is absolutely stupid and it is ridiculous to aver that such a silly view is within the confines of ‘academic’ difference of opinion. Moron, zindeeq sheiks and molvis of our age hold the view that it is permissible to shave the beard, khamr (grape liquor) is halaal as long as one does not become drunk, that it is permissible for women to appear without Niqaab in front of ghair mahaareem, that it is permissible for women to undertake journeys without their mahrams, etc., etc. Such haraam differences may not be elevated to the category of academic difference of opinion simply because such rot and rijs are excreted by molvis and sheikhs who are actually agents of Iblees. Similarly, those molvis and sheikhs who claim that digital pictography of animate objects is halaal, are agents of Iblees. The devil manipulates them to undermine and demolish the Shariah.

Observing the prohibition is not a matter of Taqwa as the mufti seeks to convey. It is Fardh to abstain from pictures of animate objects.

The averment that a picture made with a camera or the digital process is not a picture, is ineffably preposterous. It is an insult to intelligence. Regardless of the method of producing a picture, the end product is a picture which is haraam if it is of an animate object. It is compound jahaalat to say that this stupid view is within the confines of academic difference of opinion. The ludicrousness of this weird view comes within the purview of the Qur’aanic Aayat:

“Thus does Allah casts rijs (filth) on those who are bereft of aql (intelligence).”

The brains of these molvis who have fabricated this satanic idea have been disfigured as mentioned in this Qur’aanic Aayat. That is why they are capable of expectorating shamelessly such trash which leaves even children gaping aghast. A picture is not a picture simply because a modern method has been selected for making it!!!!! The degree of stupidity underlying this convolution boggles the minds of even intelligent kuffaar who react with scornful mirth on hearing such absolute trash and rubbish.

There is absolutely no academic difference of opinion on the hurmat of pictures of animate objects regardless of the method of producing such images. The contemporary so-called ulama who have hallucinated and disgorged this effluvium of the permissibility of digital pictures, are morons who have exchanged the Deen for the miserable gains of this dunya. They search for just any type of ghutha for legalizing the prohibitions of the Shariah. Then they utilize their molvi status and inapplicable Fiqhi technicalities to bamboozle and mislead the ignorant masses. Every haraam fatwa is passed off as an effect of ‘academic difference of opinion’ whilst in reality it is the inspiration of Iblees.

The fatwa of the mufti on the issues of T-shirts, flags and pictures is baseless. It is devoid of Shar’i substance.


In the Shariah there is a principle which states: “Al-Asl fil ashyaa al-Ibaahah.”, which means permissibility of things unless proven to be haraam. Things are initially permissible. However, a Shar’i daleel (proof of the Shariah) will render it unlawful. If there is no such proof, the original rule of permissibility will remain.

Although there is a contrary view, the aforementioned principle is the popular version. However, in view of the changed circumstances which have resulted in total disregard for the Shariah, and flagrant indulgence in fisq, fujoor and haraam, the opposite principle will apply to our times.

According to the contrary principle, all things will be haraam unless proven to be halaal. Commenting on the current situation, Hakimul Ummat Maulana Ashraf Ali Thaanvi (rahmatullah alayh) said: “For permissibility the earlier fatwa was that things are initially permissible until hurmat (prohibition) has not been proved. However, today the situation warrants saying: ‘The Asl (principle) regarding things is hurmat (prohibition) until permissibility has not been prove. Only if this fatwa is issued, will people be saved from indulgence in haraam. Tremendous chaos prevails nowadays.”

In this era, we observe the materialization of the Hadith which predicted that a time will dawn when people will be totally unconcerned from whence they obtain wealth. As long as they can lay their hands on wealth they are not concerned whether it is halaal or haraam. The insane craving is only for the acquisition of material items of ‘pleasure’ regardless of the manner in which the wealth is obtained.

This situation prevails in all spheres of life. Muslims have become so accustomed to consuming, buying and selling haraam food, etc. that it is no longer possible to eat the food of relatives and friends without circumspection and fear. Like animals Muslims are devouring haraam and mushtabah without the slightest tinge of conscience.

The preponderance of haraam in earnings, food, living conditions and in almost every aspect of life has smothered whatever vestige of inhibition to haraam the Muslim’s heart should naturally have. Haraam earnings and haraam food corrupt and stunt the intellect. All celestial Noor is extinguished, hence the hearts of Muslims have become impervious and unreceptive to the Haqq (Truth) in the same way as the disfigured and spiritually deadened hearts of the kuffaar.


The following is an extract from our book, Haraam Bank Riba-Loans and The Haraam View of a Sciolist Jaahil ‘Shaykh’.

In his attempt to legalize riba, the deviate resorts to ludicrous mental gymnastics, juggling with the concept of Wikaalat (Agency) and other principles which have no bearing whatsoever on the issue of bank loans. Thus, he says:

“The initial status of all kinds of transactions is that they are permissible. One of the well-known principles of the Hanafi School is that everything beside these three is permissible by default: 1. Bloodshed 2. Sexual acts 3. Rituals of worship……….Based on this, we say, everything is permissible unless it is proven to not permissible.”

Regarding the bank loan issue, the introduction of the aforementioned principle is indeed moronic.

(1) There is no relationship between a bank loan encumbered with interest and this principle. The fundamental constituents of borrowing, lending and paying interest, determine the Shariah’s ruling. A clear-cut ruling of prohibition of interest cannot be submitted to the contentious principle formulated by opinion.

The introduction of this principle, totally unrelated to the issue of bank interest loans, is a silly exercise in futility with which the deviate modernist attempts to obfuscate the conspicuous clarity of the prohibition of bank interest.

The introduction of this principle, totally unrelated to the issue of bank interest loans, is a silly exercise in futility with which the deviate modernist attempts to obfuscate the conspicuous clarity of the prohibition of bank interest.

However, since he has moronically touched on this principle, it will be appropriate to discuss and refute its applicability to the issue under discussion.

Atabek has abortively attempted to convey the idea that the principle: “The initial (hukm) regarding things is ibaahah (permissibility).”, is the standard and accepted rule of the Hanafi Math-hab. This postulation is incorrect.

This is the principle of the Jamhur Shaafi’ Fuqaha, not of the Hanafi Fuqaha. The following elucidation is presented in Al-Ashbaah wan Nathaair ala Mathhabi Abi Hanifah:

“Is the Asl (the initial hukm) regarding things Ibaahah  (permissibility) until such time that there is a daleel (evidence) to indicate the negation of ibaahah – and this is the Math-hab of Ash-Shaafi’ (rahmatullah alayh) – or is it (i.e. the Asl) Tahreem (Prohibition) until there is daleel for Ibaahah? The Shaafi’iyyah attribute this (i.e. the Asl is Tahreem) to Abu Hanifah (Rahmatullah alayh).

In Sharhul Minaar it appears: Things are initially on Ibaahah according to some Hanafiyyah. Among them is Al-Karkhi. Some of the As-haab of Hadith say: The Asl in this is Al-Hazr (prohibition).

Our As-haab (the Hanafi Fuqaha) say: The Asl in it is Tawaqquf (Non-Committal), meaning that a hukm (of the Shariah) is necessary for it, but we are not aware of it by means of intelligence.

In Hidaayah appears: The Asl is Ibaahah.”

In Al-Ash-Baah wan Nathaair (Shaafi’), the Shaafi’ position is stated as follows:

“The Asl in things is Ibaahah until there is daleel to indicate Tahreem (Prohibition). This is our (i.e. Shaafi) Math-hab. According to Abu Hanifah the Asl is Tahreem (Prohibition) until there is a daleel to establish Ibaahah (Permissibility).”

In this sphere there are three principles: Ibaahah (Permissibility), Tahreem (Prohibition) and Tawaqquf (Non-Committal). Regarding these principles formulated on the basis of opinion, there is considerable difference of opinion. These principles are not cast in rock. They are not Mansoos on the basis of Wahi nor in terms of the Hadith.

Fuqaha of the same Math-hab subscribe to differing opinions. Among the Hanafis are those who hold the opinion of Ibaahah while others of the Hanafi Math-hab subscribe to the Tahreem view, and similar is the difference in the other Math-habs.

Furthermore, these principles are overridden by Shar’i Daleel. They will operate only in rare cases of absolute absence of Shar’i daleel. There is also no strict adherence to these principles among the Fuqaha. Consider an animal such as the giraffe (zaraafah). The Qur’aan and Ahaadith are silent regarding the permissibility or prohibition of giraffe. Those who subscribe to the Ibaahah principle opine that its meat is halaal while those holding the view of Tahreem say that it is haraam. Since there is no Shar’i basis for proclaiming giraffe haraam, the holders of the Ibaahah view say that it is halaal. On the other hand, Imaam Nawawi and Shiraazi who are Shaafi’ authorities, proclaim giraffe haraam despite the Shaafi’ principle of Ibaahah.

The Hanafis again, despite their principle of Tahreem, proclaim giraffe to be halaal since there is no Shar’i daleel for saying that it is haraam. From this, it is clear that the actual determinant is Shar’i daleel. If there is daleel for Ibaahah, the ruling will be permissibility. On the contrary, if there is daleel for Tahreem, the fatwa will be on hurmat. Also according to Imaam Ahmad Bin Hambal (Rahmatullah alayh), giraffe is haraam despite the Asl of Ibaahah.

Although the principle of the Shaafi’ Math-hab is Ibaahah, the majority of the Shaafi’ Fuqaha have refrained from issuing a ruling regarding the giraffe. Neither do they say that it is halaal nor haraam despite their Ibaahah principle. (Al-Ashbaah wan Nathaair – Shaafi’). In Al-Ashbaah wan Nathaair of Imaam Jalaaluddin Suyuti, it is mentioned:

“The majority of the As-haab (Shaafi’ Fuqaha) have not entertained this issue (of the giraffe) at all whatsoever, neither permissibility nor prohibition. Fataawa Qaadhi Husain and Imaam Ghazaali have explicitly said that it is halaal……………

Taqiyuddin As-Subki (Shaafi’) mentions in his Kitaab, Qadhaail Arab fi As-ilati Halab: “Shaikh Abu Is-haaq has categorically stated in At- Tanbeeh that the giraffe is haraam……..In Sharhul Muhazzab, Nawawi has narrated Ittifaaq (Consensus) on the giraffe’s prohibition.”

In the Kitaab, Asnal Mataalib fi Sharhi Raudhit Taalib it appears as follows:

“He says in Al-Majmoo’ that verily, the giraffe is haraam without any difference of opinion.” This is despite the Ibaahah principle on the basis of which other Shaafi’ Fuqaha proclaim it to be halaal.

There exists considerable difference and argument and conflicting dalaa-il in the Shaafi’ Math-hab regarding the permissibility or prohibition of the giraffe despite the Jamhur’s principle of Ibaahah. On the other hand, despite the Tahreem principle of the Ahnaaf, the Hanafi Fuqaha say that giraffe is halaal. It should be quite evident that the determinant is Shar’i daleel.

Consider the example of the whale. In terms of the Shaafi’ principle, Ibaahah applies, and not only to the whale, but to all sea animals. However, according to the Ahnaaf, whale and all sea animals are haraam despite a semblance of Shar’i daleel. Although a Hadith leads to the possible conclusion of the sea animal being a whale, the Hanafi Fuqaha do not accept that the sea animal described in the Hadith was a whale, hence they maintain its prohibition.

They have their own Shar’i dalaa-il for the hurmat of the whale and all sea animals. Thus, the emphasis is on Tahreem by the Ahnaaf. What is clear from the considerable difference, conflict and ambiguity in these principles is that the determinant is Shar’i Daleel which restricts and overrides the principles.

(2) The claim that this principle applies to trade transactions is erroneous. It applies to existing aspects of creation on which the Shariah is silent, e.g. animals, plants, a water channel whose ownership is unknown, i.e. whether it is private property or not, and any existent for which there is no ruling provided by the Qur’aan or Hadith.

It is stupid and baatil to apply the principle of Ibaahah to a transaction or even a tangible substance merely because their names cannot be found in the Nusoos. It may not be said that vodka and whisky are halaal on the basis of the principle of Ibaahah. It may not be said that pudding is halaal on the basis of this principle of permissibility simply because the name, ‘pudding’ does not exist in the Qur’aan or Hadith. The imperative need will be to examine and establish what exactly are the ingredients and constituents of these substances. If the ingredients are haraam or the effect of the halaal ingredients is haraam such as intoxication, then the Shar’i daleel for Tahreem is confirmed.

Similarly, mortgages cannot be said to be halaal on the basis of the Ibaahah principle simply because this term is new and cannot be located in the Nusoos. The incumbent need is to examine and establish what mortgages are all about. The introduction of the Ibaahah principle in this regard demonstrates the jahaalat of Atabek. The simple issue in this regard is that a bank loan is encumbered with interest/riba, hence it is Haraam. There is absolutely no need for the invocation of any one of the three principles to determine the Shariah’s verdict on bank-interest. It is glaringly Riba. Only brains welded by stupidity and aggravated by western liberalism and a bootlicking attitude, understand otherwise.

The mudhaarabah transaction of the so-called Islamic banks cannot be proclaimed halaal on the basis of the Ibaahah principle, and simply because it has an Islamic designation. The need is to examine the constituents of the contract to establish the Shar’i ruling. A plant, the properties of which are unknown – whether beneficial or poisonous – shall not be proclaimed halaal or haraam simply on the basis of the principles of Ibaahah and Tahreem. The demand is for establishing the ruling on the basis of Shar’i daleel. If examination confirms that the plant is poisonous, then obviously the verdict will be Tahreem. If it is not harmful or poisonous, the ruling will be Ibaahah.

It will indeed be a rarity for the total absence of Shar’I daleel to act as the determinant. In such rare cases, Tawaqquf will apply, thus rendering the issue to the Mushtabah realm. As far as bank loans are concerned, there is absolutely no ambiguity in their nature. A bank loan is pronounced haraam by the categorical Nusoos of the Qur’aan and Hadith. Only a stupid deviate having no affinity with the Shariah will muster the stupid audacity to invoke the principle of Ibaahah for the determination of a ruling for a bank loan which is encumbered with riba. The principle may not be used in conflict with a mansoos alayh law. The unnecessary and stupid introduction of the Ibaahah principle which is totally unrelated to bank interest/riba, has constrained this digression.


By Molvi Muhammad Huzaifah Ibn Aadam

An unfortunate state of affairs today is that most of those carrying around the title of `Ulamaa are in fact either Juhalaa (ignoramuses) or Shayaateen prowling about in human form. They fall into two categories:

(1) Those who spread baatil because they are too stupid to know what is the Haqq. This is the type of Molvi who slept during classes and graduated from whatever Darul Uloom despite not being able to correctly read and understand even a single paragraph of Arabic. As a result, they spread baatil beliefs without even realising their folly. 

(2) Those who have in fact acquired some “book knowledge”. They know very well what the Haqq is, but because they are in fact Shayaateen (be it Shayaateen-ul-Ins or Shayaateen-ul-Jinn), they intentionally conceal the Haqq from people and propagate baatil to mislead them from the Path of Allaah Ta`aalaa.

Stating this fact will cause many people to become upset and offended, but the truth remains the truth regardless of who likes or dislikes it.

This brief article deals with an issue regarding which the Ulamaa-e-Soo (or Juhalaa-e-Soo) are blatantly dishonest. It is the issue of Makrooh Tahreemi (Prohibited Abomination) and its meaning in the Hanafi Madh-hab.

In order to certify khinzeer, khamr, ribaa and a host of other Haraam acts and substances, the Morons of Soo’ employ a number of different “Fiqhi Terms” and Arabic terminology to dupe the ignorant masses. Terms such as “Umoom-e-Balwaa”, “Mudhaarabah”, “Mushaarakah”, etc., are bandied about to impress the masses who have no idea of the meanings of these terms. They are impressed by Arabic-sounding terms and assume that whatever the Molvi is saying has to be true.

When asked for the ruling on things that are not permissible in Islaam, they deceptively employ the term “Makrooh” in their defective fatwas, translating it as “disliked” without giving the questioner any explanation of the Shar`i meaning of Makrooh Tahreemi. In fact, they do not specify even if the Makrooh is Tahreemi or Tanzeehi. The term is presented as if there is scope for permissibility.

What the layman understands from the word “disliked”, is that the Makrooh action is permissible, and it is fine to act accordingly although it is better if one abstains, but there is no sin incurred. With this idea these molvis corrupt the juhala, open the door of fitnah for the addiction of sin.

The idea which they are conveying and with which the people are deceived, is not the meaning of Makrooh Tahreemi. On account of the grave misconception spawned by the corrupt definition of Makrooh, people, even so-called ‘aalims’ say: “It is only Makrooh, not Haraam.” This idea peddled by the juhala molvis is tantamount to kufr. It is Istikhfaaf (regarding something to be insignificant) with the laws of the Shariah.

In reality, there is no difference between Haraam and Makrooh Tahreemi. For all practical purposes both are the same. Both mean that the action is prohibited, and that the one who perpetrates it is sinful. The punishment for committing Haraam or Makrooh Tahreemi is the Fire of Jahannam. It is essential to resort to Tawbah.

Many molvis, muftis and shaykhs who are in fact Jaahils lauded with titles, read the explanation of Makrooh Tahreemi given in the Kutub, but fail to understand its meaning. The Kutub of Fiqh mention that something prohibited by a daleel qat`iyy (evidence of absolute certitude) is termed Haraam, and something prohibited by a daleel zanni is termed Makrooh.

These molvis fail to understand what is meant by the difference between the two categories of prohibition. The literal meaning of the word “zanni” is “speculative”. Thus, in their jahaalat (ignorance), they adopt the literal meaning thereby believing that Makrooh is something that has no solid evidence to prohibit it. This notion is corrupt, baseless. It is simply based on conjecture.

Despite having studied the Kutub of the Madh-hab, their failure to understand the terminology of the Madh-hab is mind-boggling.

When the Hanafi Madh-hab uses the term “zanni”, guesswork and opinion are not implied. The proof for the rule/teaching is of a category slightly less than the daleel qat`iyy category of evidences. The category known as daleel qat’iyy consist of Aayaat of the Qur’aan and Ahaadith-e-Mutawaatarah. This is the highest and most authentic class of Ahaadith. On this type of Hadith is based the fardhiyat (compulsion) of the Fardh raka’ts of the daily Salaat, for example.

The term daleel zanni applies to such Ahaadeeth which are not of the qat’iyy category. But never does it mean that laws based on daleel zanni are products of opinion for which there is no reliable Qur’aanic or Hadith evidence. Such a notion is absolutely corrupt. 

Thus, if something is prohibited, and its prohibition is based on daleel qat’iyy, then the Hanafi Fuqahaa classify it as Haraam. If the prohibition is the effect of daleel zanni it is described as Makrooh Tahreemi. But for practical purposes, both mean strictly prohibited, and both are punishable offences. The difference is only academic, not practical. 

Thus, when the Ahnaaf use the term Zanni, they do not refer to guesswork and speculation. They refer to Ahaadeeth. Something prohibited by Rasoolullaah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) is described by the Ahnaaf with the term “Makrooh Tahreemi”. Imaam Ibn Aabideen (Rahmatullah alayh) writes in Raddul Muhtaar alad-Durril Mukhtaar:

“According to Imaam Muhammad, every Makrooh is Haraam.”

In Al-Kawaashiful Jaliyyah an Mustalahaatil Hanafiyyah, a Kitaab written on the explanation of the terminologies of the Hanafi Madh-hab, it is mentioned:

“Both (the perpetrator of haraam and makrooh tahreemi) are equal in deserving punishment and criticism.”

The Shaykh-ul-Hadeeth of Darul Uloom Deoband, Mufti Saeed Ahmad Palanpuri wrote in his refutation of Maulana Taha Karaan in “Tresses of Jannat: The Female Hair Issue”:

“There are many Usool (Principles) for (competency in) Fatwa. It is obligatory on a Mufti to take into consideration such principles (of Ifta). Awareness of such principles is the first obligation of a Mufti. For example in his writings he differentiates between Haraam and Makrooh whereas these terms are technical terminology. If the prohibition of things is substantiated on the basis of the Qur’aan, the Ulama describe it with the term, Haraam, and if the prohibition is substantiated on the basis of Ahaadith, the term Karaahat (being Makrooh) is used. But in Urf this differentiation is not made. The word Haraam is used for Makrooh Tahrimi as well.”

Thus, the meaning of Makrooh Tahreemi according to the Hanafi Madh-hab is as clear as daylight. As far as the practical adoption of the Rulings of the Shariah goes, there is absolutely no difference between Makrooh Tahreemi and Haraam. If a person commits a Haraam act, he has committed a sin, and if he perpetrates a Makrooh Tahreemi act, he has committed a sin. In both cases, he has to make Tawbah or he may be subjected to punishment in the Aakhirah if Allaah Ta`aalaa has not forgiven him.

However, the Ulamaa-e-Soo do not explain this reality to the people when issuing a fatwaa. The questioner gains the understanding that Makrooh Tahreemi refers to something that is permissible but that it’s just better to abstain.

A very simple, straight-forward question: “If a person commits a Haraam act, he is sinful and may suffer Athaab, and if a person commits a ‘Makrooh Tahreemi’ act, he is sinful and may undergo Athaab, so what is the difference?” Both must be equally avoided.

Allah Ta’aalaa knows best


Allaamah Abdul Wahhaab Sha’raani, the renowned Shaafi authority of the Shariah, proferring advice to the Ulama, says in his Kitaab, Tambeehul Mughtarreen:

“O my friend! Examine yourself in the light of the demand of Amr Bil Ma’roof, Nahy Anil Munkar to ascertain whether you do regard evil to be evil or not, and to ascertain whether you are among  those people who are beloved to Allah Ta’ala.

Examine yourself to ascertain if you have aided the Shariat of Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) or are you among those who have abandoned the Shariat. However, you labour under the notion that you are the Representative of Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) because you are calling people towards the Deen.

Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) has appointed the Ulama of the Ummah to be the Trustees of his Shariat after him. However, nowadays (i.e. during the 10th Islamic century) the majority has abandoned the Shariat, leaving it without helpers by means of their words and deeds and by means of silence in the face of evil.

Wa La houla wala quwwata illaa billaahil azeem.” 

The Ulama-e-Soo’ in this age and in all ages have always abstained from fulfilling the obligation of Amr Bil Ma’roof Nahy Anil Munkar. A vile tendency acquired by them is the notion of an act of the Shariah being “only Sunnah’ or “only Makrooh”. This ‘only’ attitude is termed Istikhfaaf in the Shariah. Istikhfaaf means to regard something insignificant or unimportant. Adopting the attitude of Istikhfaaf for any act of the Shariah even if it is a Mustahab, is kufr.

There is nothing in the Deen which is unimportant or insignificant regardless of the category of its classification. These miscreant molvis and sheikhs have instilled in the ignoramuses the idea of the legitimacy of perpetrating a Makrooh act. With this attitude they have rendered a huge disservice to the Ummah. They invite the Wrath of Allah Ta’ala upon themselves and on those who follow in their satanic footsteps.

There are two kinds of Makrooh: Tanzihi and Tahreemi. While Tanzihi refers to such actions which although not sinful if committed occasionally, they are transformed into Makrooh Tahreemi and sins by means of Israar, i.e. constant commission.

The miscreant molvis due to their extremely defective knowledge and even greater deficiency of understanding the smattering of their defective knowledge are equating Makrooh Tahreemi with Makrooh Tanzihi. Therefore, they believe and teach the permissibility of the wholesale    commission of haraam actions.

For example, all sea animals besides fish, are haraam for followers of the Hanafi Math-hab. This haraam is technically described as Makrooh Tahreemi. In order to gratify their lust for consuming crayfish, shrimps and the like, they stupidly and dangerously claim that it is ‘only makrooh’. Yet, they fail to understand that there is Consensus (Ijmaa’) of the Ahnaaf on the consequences of both Haraam and Makrooh Tahreemi being the Fire of Jahannam.

An act being technically designated Makrooh is not a licence for commission or to feel snug in its perpetration and to believe that it is not sinful.

The kutub of the Ahnaaf are replete with thousands of masaa-il referring to Makrooh acts with the term ‘Haraam’. Only moron molvis are ignorant of this fact. In Shaami is mentioned:

“Every Makrooh Tahreemi is Haraam, i.e. like haraam in the consequence being the Fire according to Imaam Muhammad (Rahmatullah alayh).”

“Imaam Muhammad has explicitly said that every Makrooh is Haraam.”

There are innumerable masaa-il which are described by the Fuqaha as haraam despite the fact that the proofs on which they are based are not of the Qat’i class of dalaa-il. For example, in Bahrur Raa-iq is mentioned that for a woman in haidh the recitation of even less than one Aayat is haraam despite there being no Qat’i daleel for this. While the kutub describe Qur’aanic recitation by such a woman to be Makrooh, numerous kutub say that it is haraam. This is merely one example out of the thousands of masaa-il in which Makrooh is the same as haraam.

Discussing the practice of mesmerism in Imdaadul Fataawa, Hadhrat Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi (Rahmatullah alayh) says:

“Regardless of its (initial) permissibility it is in the category of Qabeeh li ghairihi (evil due to other factors), hence prohibited and haraam. This principle is not hidden from the expert of Usool-e-Fiqh.” (Imdaadul Fataawa, Vol.4, page 74)

It is quite understandable that these Usool are hidden and incomprehensible to moron molvis and maajin muftis.

An act may be initially permissible, hence not prohibited by either the Qur’aan or Hadith. Thus it is Mubah (permissible). Despite its permissibility, the accretion of evil elements renders the permissible act prohibited, and this prohibition is described as haraam by the Fuqaha. Only maajin muftis are ignorant of this principle and the methodology of the Fuqaha.

The disease of assigning insignificance to sin was predicted by Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam): “Soon will you obey Shaitaan in the sins which you regard as insignificant.” Today this predicted act is materializing in the corrupt fatwas by the molvis who make tahqeer (regard as insignificant) of sins with their convoluted conception of Makrooh.

It is also said in the Hadith: “Beware of trivializing sin.” The tool for justifying this satanic attitude of tahqeer-e-zunoob (regarding sins being insignificant) is the misconception pertaining to the meaning of Makrooh. 

On the basis of this misconception sins are justified and regarded to be insignificant. This is Istikhfaaf which is kufr.

The profession of Ifta’ is not secular. The Mufti should not operate like a lawyer whose objective is this dunya. The Mufti is supposed to guide the servants of Allah and to show them the way to Jannat. He has to strive to close the avenues of sin and strengthen the bond of the Muslim with Allah Ta’ala. But the methods of the muftis of the current age only increases the chasm between people and their Khaaliq.

It is of imperative importance that the Mufti imbues in his fatwa the spirit of Islam to encourage practical implementation of the Sunnah. It is a moron ‘mufti’, who issues fatwas on the basis of dry technicalities when these open the door of fitnah. The purpose of Fiqhi technicalities is not to distance the questioner from Allah Ta’ala. It is not to encourage in him laxitude and disdain for the Sunnah methods of A’maal.

Nowadays, the muftis appear to be propagating the permissibility of cultivating a lackadaisical attitude towards the Deen whereas the fatwa of the Mufti should serve to bring the questioner closer to the Deen. The Fiqhi technicalities of latitude should be resorted to only after the commission of the deed. It should never be promoted to open avenues for weakening Imaan by diverting the questioner from taqwa.

The attitude of the muftis of today is to embed in the minds and hearts of Muslims indulgence in technical permissibilities regardless of the long term harms to both Imaan and physical health.

Consider for example, the fatwa of alcohol. The muftis who have a loose association with the Deen, their gaze being deflected from the Path of Taqwa and the spirit which pervades the Qur’aan and the Ahaadith, go to great   uncalled for lengths to promote the ‘fadhaa-il’ of ethanol, and the motive for this type of obduracy and convoluted thinking is plain nafsaaniyat. It is calculated to counter those who issue the fatwa of prohibition based on the view of the Jamhoor of our Math-hab and the Ijma’ of the other three Math-habs. The nafsaani idea is to show us a point, hence they intransigently peddle the idea of their being ‘nothing wrong’ with ethanol. They wade through the kutub with the intention of discovering some weird view or an error of a Faqeeh for justifying their convolution.

While the Ummah is grovelling in deluges of fisq and fujoor, and while the Ummah is ablaze with bid’ah and kufr, these muftis with their fossilized brains are lost in technicalities which only adds fuel to the conflagration of fisq, fujoor, bid’ah and kufr in which the Ummah is perishing.

Despite the proven destruction to the health by tobacco, the maajin muftis go out of their way to find, by hook or crook, some justification for legalizing this stinking poison as if it is a staple food contaminated by najaasat, hence the ‘imperative’ need to halaalize the smoking practice of the devil. They will, for example, present as daleel the hookah practice of some Buzrug or doggedly cling to a text of a Faqeeh despite the conspicuous and decisive evidences debunking that view which was centuries ago based on lack of information of the harms of tobacco. 

Cancer, as a confirmed consequence of tobacco, is tolerable and acceptable for the Ummah to these muftis, but the Shariah’s principle of dharar (substances causing harm) as an element of prohibition is unknown to them, yet they proclaim themselves ‘muftis’! In fact, they are like the moron ‘mufti’ who is described as ‘haatibul lail’  – a moron who searches for firewood in the bush on an intensely dark night not knowing on what his hands fall, whether on a snake or on faeces.

Rarities and technicalities are not to be promoted for mass consumption. A fatwa based on a technicality is to be restricted to the peculiar circumstances of only the questioner. It may not be peddled for public consumption, for in so doing, wide avenues are opened for fitnah and fasaad. 

Consider the example of I’aanat alal Ma’siyat (Aiding sin). The Qur’aan categorically forbids aiding in sin and transgression. But, muftis lacking in vision and wisdom, suffering from fossilization of the Aql, not only issue the fatwa of the permissibility of building a church/temple, but even promote it by presenting the Arabic texts from the kutub to convince the moron questioner who understands neither head nor tail of the quoted ibaaraat (texts from the kutub of Fiqh).

They cite, for example from Fataawa Hindiyyah, where it is mentioned that aiding in building a church is ‘permissible’. On the basis of this statement, they go crazy with delight to promote all the haraam contracts which Muslim builders enter into with the kuffaar. On this basis they will justify the building of Hindu temples of shirk in Dubai and elsewhere wherein even the ruler of the state and his wife worshipped in accordance of  Hindu rituals of shirk.

Whilst they stupidly cling to the aforementioned text like a dog   clinging to a bone, they are either stupidly unaware or conveniently overlook that in the very same kitaab it is mentioned that if a non-Muslim asks the way to the church/temple, then to show him the direction is kufr. Just view the great disparity between ‘permissibility’ of building a church / temple, and the mere act of pointing in the direction of the church / temple being kufr.

The objective of this brief discussion is not to explain the application of the conflicting masaa-il. This is not the occasion for it. We are merely drawing attention to the jahaalat and incompetence of the muftis who are either real juhala, or mudhilleen (those who misguide). They follow in the footsteps of the Ulama of Bani Israaeel whose trademark was rendering haraam into halaal, and vice versa as it served the interests of the donors or the nafs. 

The former class consists of morons who have been issued with Ifta certificates despite grossly lacking in even the rudiments of Ifta. The second class of mudhilleen are those who have chosen the dunya despite having academic expertise. They are the likes of Mufti Taqi who has fallen into the trap of western liberalism, hence his association with the rulers, capitalist bankers and the like. Such association has rendered him persona non grata from the Shar’i perspective. Rasulullah (Sallallahu alayhi wasallam) said:

“The Ulama are the Trustees of the Rusul (the Messengers of Allah) as long as they do not mingle with the sultan (the rulers), and as long as they do not plunge into the dunya.”

The Mas’alah of the Determination of Tashabbuh bil Kuffar (emulating the Kuffaar)


Is there any encompassing rule to determine whether something is Tashabbuh bil Kuffaar (emulating the kuffaar wal fussaaq) or not, especially with regards to clothes, eating, etc.?

Answer (by Mujlisul Ulama):

There is no comprehensive principle regarding Tashabbuh Bil Kuffaar. The times and norms play a prominent role. Also, the wijdaan and baseerat of the Aalim of Haqq is important for determining this issue.

To correctly understand the mas’alah of Tashabbuh, there are three essentials: Ilm, Ikhlaas and Baseerat. Baseerat is the effect of Taqwa. Minus Taqwa, one’s ikhlaas will be contaminated. This contamination will eliminate Baseerat. The importance of Baseerat could be understood from Imaam Abu Hanifah’s fatwa on the impurity of Maa-e-Musta’mal (used water). With his Baseerat he observed the spiritual filth in maa-e-musta’mal, hence his view is the strongest on this issue.

Without Ikhlaas and Baseerat, the view on an issue will be the emotion of the mufti maajin (a moron ‘mufti’ whose ‘fatwas’ are the products of his bestial nafs). Consider the example of western clothes. To which extent does Tashabbuh apply? The mufti maajin who himself may be wearing western fashionable dress styles will argue that the dress has become universal (aam) and there is no longer any religious connotation attached to it, e.g. the tie, hence it is permissible to wear shirt, pants, jeans, skippers, ties and all the miserable artefacts of shaitaan and his western progeny. Just imagine the level of jahaalat and mental convolution of even Ulama who argue that the satanic bermuda pants monstrosity is permissible simply because it is below the knees.

The baatini corrosion has blighted the intellectual perception so thoroughly that the mufti maajin fails to realize that a dress such as the bermuda pants is a pure western kuffaar fashionable dress item just recently introduced. Even prior to it assuming the decrepit and apodalic attribute of being aam, the maajin character proclaims it permissible simply on just one count, namely, the covering of the knees. Well, your wife’s ijaar and her burqah offer greater concealment of satr than the bermuda pants, and at the same time it is Tashabbuh bil Muslimah (emulation of a Muslim female), which rationally is better than Tashabbuh bil Kuffaar. Notwithstanding this fact, Tashabbuh bil Muslimah is also mal-oon (accursed). Thus, to a greater degree will a male who adopts kuffaar dress be mal-oon because of Tashabbuh bil Kuffaar.

However, the Mufti who focuses on the Aakhirat and who understands the maqsood (objective) of life on earth, ruminates with his Baatini (Spiritual) Heart and asks: Why does a Muslim want to wear shirt, pants, jacket, jeans, T-shirts and ties and strut about with a bared head, when Islamic dress is available, and when millions of Muslims are wearing such dress by which one can recognize from a mile away that the person is a Muslim? Careful reflection will convince one that there is the thief, shaitaan lurking in his nafs or it is the deception of his nafs which constrains him to proffer the ‘aam’ argument.

Since his nafs craves to don kuffaar garments because it is stylish and appealing to the desire, and it blends suitably with the kuffaar environment in which we live, he presents spurious arguments to justify such kuffaar dress. Little does he realize that in so doing he is according preference to kuffaar dress over and above Islamic dress which is easily available to him. This attitude thus confirms the element of Tashabbuh in kuffaar dress.

Someone may raise the argument that items such as jerseys, socks, shoes, raincoats and other necessary items of dress which all of us wear, are also of western origin. Does Tashabbuh apply here too? The response to this ishkaal (conundrum) is as follows:

Yes and no! At times it will be Tashabbuh and at times it will not be. In our environment and the circumstances in which Muslims work and live, these items are necessary. There is no suitable Islamic substitute for these items of dress. The idea of Tashabbuh is furthest from the mind. In this scenario the argument of the dress being universal is valid. Nevertheless, this still precludes such of these items which have entered society as the latest fashions. It also precludes footwear on which appears logos and the like.

But, in a different setting such as India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, they are perfectly at home with a chaadar (shawl) thrown around the shoulders. They are comfortable in it and it does not interfere with their activities. Thus, for Muslims in those lands the element of Tashabbuh will be even in jerseys, and to a degree even in the type of shoes which we wear in the western world. The type of jooties worn in India and Pakistan suit them well although it is unsuitable for us here due to the flimsiness of the shoes and due to the feminine appearance.

A daleel for us is the amal of Imaam Abu Yusuf (rahmatullah alayh). After he became the Qaadhi and he had to do considerable walking, he changed his style of shoes and adopted the style of the Ajam. When someone objected, he explained that because of the toughness of these shoes he has adopted them.

In conclusion: In our environment, shirts, suits, ties, jeans, T-shirts and the like are Tashabbuh bil Kuffaar without the least doubt, and furthermore it borders on kufr because it is preferred over Islamic dress which is readily available. Preferring a kuffaar style over an Islamic style is a major sin of kufr proportions.

Regarding the practice of eating from tables and eating with knives and forks, the element of Tashabbuh is too glaring for the need to cudgel brains for the determination of the Shar’i Hukm. The argument of its ‘permissibility’ on the basis of this practice having become universal is contemptuously baatil. Abandonment of the Sunnah is haraam whether it is abandoned by a few or by the entire population. After fourteen centuries of the Ummah eating on the floor, suddenly the table and chair practice becomes ‘halaal’ on the decrepit and deceptive basis of ‘universality’. If this has to be accepted as a standard ‘principle’ for abrogation of Shar’i and Sunnah practices, the same fate which has destroyed the Shariats of Nabi Musaa (alayhis salaam) and Nabi Isaa (alayhis salaam) will mangle and mutilate the Sunnah which this Ummah of Muhammad (sallallahu alayhi wasallam) has followed since the inception of Islam.

Those who have adopted tables and chairs for eating, after abandoning their original Sunnah practice, are hovering on the brink of kufr for having preferred a kuffaar practice over and above the Sunnah practice. Those who have been eating in western style since birth, whilst not perpetrating haraam as the former group, nevertheless, are under Waajib obligation to abandon the kuffaar style and to adopt the Sunnah style. If, after having been made aware of this essentiality, they refuse, then they will be guilty of the haraam practice of Tashabbuh bil Kuffaar. And, Allah knows best.  

اصول محدثین ضعیف حدیث “تلقی بلقبول” کے سبب صحیح کا حکم رکھتی ہے

اصول_محدثین : ضعیف حدیث “تلقی بلقبول” کے سبب صحیح کا حکم رکھتی ہے:
مسائل کا ایک اہم مآخد “(علماء کا) اجماع” اور اس بات پر محدثین کی تائید:

قرآن-و-سنّت کے احکام میں “نسخ” کا احتمال ہوتا ہے کہ وہ منسوخ ہے یا نہیں ہے.
[کما قال امام الغزالی رح – المستصفى مع مسلم الثبوت:٣/٣٩٢؛ و کما قال امام ابن_تیمیہ رح – مجموع الفتاویٰ:٢٨/١١٢]

جیسے قرآن میں ارشاد ہے:

مَا نَنۡسَخۡ مِنۡ اٰیَۃٍ اَوۡ نُنۡسِہَا نَاۡتِ بِخَیۡرٍ مِّنۡہَاۤ اَوۡ مِثۡلِہَا ؕ اَلَمۡتَعۡلَمۡ اَنَّ اللّٰہَ عَلٰی کُلِّ شَیۡءٍ قَدِیۡرٌ (٢/البقرہ:١٠٦)

“جو بھی کوئی آیت ہم منسوخ کرتے ہیں، یا اسے (ذہنوں سے) بھلا دیتے ہیں، تو ہم لے آتے ہیں اس سے کوئی بہتر آیت، یا اسی جیسی، بیشک اللہ ہرچیز پر پوری قدرت رکھتا ہے”.(اس آیت کی تفسیر ضرور پڑھیے)

مگر “اجماع” میں نسخ کا احتمال نہیں ہوتا اور وہ معصوم ہوتا ہے. [تفسیر_ابن_کثیر، سورہ نساء، آیت : ١١٥؛صحيح البخاري » كِتَاب الِاعْتِصَامِ بِالْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّةِ » بَاب قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى وَكَذَلِكَ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ أُمَّةً وَسَطًا (البقرہ :١٤٣) وَمَا أَمَرَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ بِلُزُومِ الْجَمَاعَةِ وَهُمْ أَهْلُ الْعِلْمِ =

ترجمہ: صحیح بخاری:جلد سوم: کتاب اور سنت کو مضبوطی سے پکڑنے کا بیان : اللہ تعالیٰ کا قول کہ ہم نے اسی طرح تم کو بیچ کی امت بنایا۔ (البقرہ:١٤٣) اور اس کے متعلق کہ رسول الله صلے الله علیہ وسلم نے جماعت کو لازم پکڑنے کا حکم فرمایا اور آپکی مراد جماعت سے اہل_علم کی جماعت تھی.
؛فاتح الباری، لامام ابن_حجر: ١٣/٣١٢]

اور (اسی طرح) امام نووی رح اپنے شیخ حافظ ابو عمرو سے مروی ہیں:

“الأمة في إجماعها معصومة من الخطاء” يعني امت اجماع میں خطا سے معصوم ہوا کرتی ہے [مقدمہ صحیح مسلم: صفحه# ١٤]

اور مشھور ائمہ_محدثین رح جیسے شافعی، بخاری، ترمذی، سیوطی، سخاوی، شوکانی وغیرہ (رحمہ الله علیھم اجمعین) نے اس اصول کا تعین کیا ہے کہ عملی طریقوں کا انحصار (دارومدار) تعامل_امت (اتفاق-و-اجماع سے امت کے جاری عمل پر) ہے. جب امت کا عمل کسی حدیث پر جاری ہو، اگرچہ وہ ضعیف ہو، تو اس کی سند پر بحث کی ضرورت نہیں. یعنی جس ضعیف حدیث پر بھی تعامل_امت (اتفاق-و-اجماع سے امت کا جاری عمل) ہو، تو اس حدیث کو مانا جائیگا، اگرچہ ضعیف ہو.[المعجم الصغیر لطبرانی: باب التحفة المرضية في حل مشكلات الحديثية، ٢/١٧٧-١٩٩]

قال ابن عبد البر في الاستذكار لما حكي عن الترمذي ان البخاري صحح حديث البحر “هو الطهور ماؤه” و أهل الحديث لا يصححون مثل اسناده لكن الحديث عندي صحيح لان العلماء تلقوه بالقبول.[تدريب الراوي : ٢٩]

ترجمة: علامة ابن عبد البر “الاستذكار” میں یہ بات امام ترمذی رح سے نقل کرتے ہوۓ فرماتے ہیں کہ امام بخاری رح (اس) حدیث_بحر “ھو الطھور ماوه” کو صحیح کہتے ہیں، حالانکہ محدثین اس جیسی سند (والی حدیث) کو صحیح نہیں کہتے لیکن حدیث میرے (ابن عبدالبر کے) نزدیک صحیح ہے 
حافظ ابن حجر عسقلانی (شافعی) رح نے فرمایا:

ومن جملة صفات القبول التي لم يعترض شيخنا الحفيظ يعنى زين الدين العراقي أين يتفق العلماء على العمل بمدلول حديث فانما يقبل حتى يعمل به وقد صرح بذلك جماعة من أئمة الأصول.

ترجمة:…منجملہ (صحت حدیث کی) صفات_قبولیت میں سے ایک وہ بھی جس کی طرف ہمارے شیخ یعنی زین الدین العراقی نے تعرض کیا ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ علماء مدلول_حدیث پر عمل کرنے میں متفق ہوجائیں، پس اس حدیث کو قبول کرلیا جائیگا، یہاں تک کہ اس پر عمل واجب ہوگا، اس بات کی تصریح کی ہے علماء_اصول کی ایک جماعت نے. (المصاح على نكت أبن الصلاح)

دو سو کے قریب کتب کے مصنف محدث، فقیہ، اصولی، مؤرخ علامہ سخاوی رح لکھتے ہیں:

“وكذا إذا تلقت الأمة الضيف بالقبول يعمل به الصحيح حتى أنه ينزل منزلة المتواتر”

ترجمة: اسی طرح جب امت ضعیف حدیث کو قبول کرلے تو اس کے ساتھ صحیح والا معاملہ کیا جائیگا.حتیٰ کہ وہ متواتر کے درجہ میں ہوجائیگی.
آگے لکھتے ہیں:

“ولهذا قال الشافعي رحمة الله في حديث “لا وصية الوارث” أنه لا يثبت أهل الحديث ولكن العامة تلقته بالقبول وعملو به حتى جعلوه ناسخا لاية الوصية”

ترجمہ: اسی وجہ سے امام شافعی رح (اس) حدیث “لا وصية لوارث” کے مطلق فرماتے ہیں کہ محدثین اسے صحیح نہیں قرار دیتے لیکن جمہور علماء نے اس کو قبول کیا ہے اور اس پر عمل کیا ہے حتیٰ کہ اس کو آیت_وصیت کے لئے ناسخ بنادیا.[فتح المغيث بشعره ألفية الحديث: ص # ١٢٠]

٦٠٠ کے قریب کتب کے مصنف علامہ جلال الدین السیوطی (الشافعی) رح لکھتے ہیں:

“قال بعضھم يحكم للحديث بالصحة إذا تلقاه الناس بالقبول وإن لم يكن له أسناد صحيح.[تدريب الراوي: صفحة # ٢٩

ترجمہ: بعض محدثین فرماتے ہیں کہ حدیث پر صحت (صحیح ہونے) کا حکم لگا دیا جاۓ گا جب امت نے اسے قبول کرلیا ہو اگرچہ اس کی سند صحیح نہ بھی ہو.

المقبول ما تلقاه العلماء بالقبول وإن لم يكن له أسناد صحيح،[شرح نظم الدرر المسمى بالبحر الذي ذخر

ترجمہ: مقبول وہ حدیث ہے جسے علماء قبول کرلیں اگرچہ اس کی سند صحیح نہ بھی ہو.

قال ابن السمعاني وقم يدل لتضمنه تلقيهم له بالقبول. [تدريب الراوي : ١٧٢]

ترجمة: ابن سمعاني اور ایک جماعت یہ کہتی ہے کہ حدیث کے موافق اجماع کا ہونا یہ حدیث کی صحت پر دلالت کرتا ہے اس حدیث کے اس بات کو متضمن ہونے کی وجہ سے کہ اس کو تلقی بلقبول حاصل ہے.

وصحح الآمدي وغيره من الاصوليين إنه حكم بذلك.[تدريب الراوي: ١٧١]

ترجمہ: (علم کا کسی حدیث پر عمل یا دلیل لیتے فتویٰ دینے کی وجہ سے) آمدی اور ان کے علاوہ دیگر اصولیین نے اس بات کو صحیح قرار دیا ہے کہ اس حدیث پر صحت کا حکم لگایا جاۓ گا.

قال (ابن عبدالبر) في التمهيد روي جابر عن النبي صلي الله عليه وسلم الدينار أربعة و عشرون قيراطا، قال وفي قول جماعة العلماء و إجماع الناس على معناه غني عن الاسناد فيه.[تدريب الراوي: ٢٩]

ترجمہ: ابن عبدالبر “التمہید” میں فرماتے ہیں کہ حضرت جابر (رضی الله عنہ) نے نبی (صلی الله علیہ وسلم) سے روایت کی “دینار چوبیس قیراط کا ہے” فرمایا: جماعت_علماء کا قول اور لوگوں کا اس کے معنا پر اجماع اس کی سند سے مستغنی کردیتا ہے.

علامة ابن مرعي ألشبرخيتي المالكي رح

“ومحل كونه لايعمل بالضعيف في الأحكام ما لم يكن تلقته الناس بالقبول فان كان كذلك تعين وصار حجة يعمل به في الاحكام وغيرها.[شرح الأربعين النووي]

ترجمة: اس بات کا محل کہ ضعیف حدیث پر احکام میں عمل نہیں کیا جاتا یہ ہے کہ اس کو تلقی بلقبول حاصل نہ ہو، اگر اسے تلقی بلقبول حاصل ہوجاۓ تو وہ حدیث متعین ہوجاۓ گی اور حجت ہوجاۓ گی اور احکام وغیرہ میں اس پر عمل کیا جاۓگا.

اہل_ظواہر (غیر مقلد) کے پیشوا قاضی شوکانی (زیدی شیعہ) لکھتے ہیں:

ثم حكم أبن عبدالبر مع ذلك بصحته لتقي بالعلماء له بالقبول فرده من حيث الأسناد وقبله من حيث المعنى وقد حكم بصحته جملة من الحديث لاتبلغ درجة هذا ولا تقاربه.[نيل الأوطار: ١/١٨]

ترجمہ: پھر ابن عبدالبر رح نے باوجود (ضعف سند کے) اس کی صحت (صحیح ہونے) کا حکم لگایا ہے، علماء کے اس کو قبول کرلینے کی وجہ سے، پس رد کیا ہے اس کو سند کے اعتبار سے اور قبول کیا ہے اس کو معنا(مضمون) کے اعتبار سے، اور حکم لگایا ہے ایسی بعض احادیث پر جو اس درجہ تک نہیں پہنچتی بلکہ اس کے قریب بھی نہیں پہنچتیں.

اتفق أهل الحديث على ضعف هذه الزيادة لكن قد وقع الإجماع على مضمونها.[الدراري المضية شرح الدرر البهية؛ الروضة الندية شرح الدرر البهية في صفحة ٥، مطبوعه دار الجليل بيروت لبنان]

ترجمہ: محدثین اس زیادتی (اضافہ) کہ ضعف (کمزوری) پر متفق ہیں لیکن اس کے مضمون (معنا) پر اجماع منعقد ہے. (فتاویٰ علماۓ حدیث : ٧/٧٣ ; فتاویٰ غزنویہ :١/٢٠٦)

امام ابن_تیمیہ (الحنبلی) رح(المتوفي ٧٤٨ھ:
هذا حديث صحيح متفق على صحته تلقته الامة بالقبول والتصديق مع انه من غرائب الصحيح.[فتاوى إبن تيمية:١٨/٢٤٨]

ترجمہ: یہ حدیث (صحیح بخاری کی “انما الاعمال بالنیات”) صحیح ہے (کیونکہ) اس کی صحت پر اتفاق ہے، امت نے اسے قبول کیا ہے اور تصدیق کی ہے، باوجود اس کے کہ وہ صحیح (بخاری) کی غریب حدیث میں سے ہے.


علامہ ابن القیم الجوزی (الحنبلی) رح لکھتے ہیں:
على ان أهل العلم قد نقلوه واحتجوا به فوقفنا بذلك على صحته كما وفقنا على صحة قول رسول الله (صلي الله عليه وسلم) “لاوصية لوارث” وقوله في البحر “هو الطهور ماؤه و حل الميتة” وقوله “إذا إختلف المتبايعان في الثمن والسلعة قائمة فحالفا وتر ادا البيع” وقوله “الدية على العاقلة” وان كانت هذا الأحاديث لا ثبتت من جهة الإسناد ولكن لما تلقته الكافة عن الكافة غنوا بصحتها عندهم عن طلب الأسناد لها فكذلك حديث معاذ (رضي الله عنه) لما احتجوا جميعا غنوا عن طلب الإسناد له.[أعلام الموقعين:١/١٥٥، مطبوعه مكة المكرمة]

ترجمہ: مزید یہ کہ اہل_علم نے اسے نقل کیا ہے اور اس سے استدلال کیا ہے. پس علم ہوگیا ہمیں اس بات کا کہ یہ حدیث ان کے نزدیک صحیح ہے. جیسا کہ ہمیں معلوم ہوا رسول الله صلی الله علیہ وسلم کے قول “لاوصية لوارث”، اور آپ (صلی الله علیہ وسلم) کے فرمان سمندر کے بارے میں “هو الطهور ماؤه و الحل الميتة”، اور آپ (صلی الله علیہ وسلم) کے فرمان “إذا إختلف المتبايعان في الثمن والسلعة قائمة فحالفا وتر ادا البيع” اور آپ (صلی الله علیہ وسلم) کے فرمان “الدية على العاقلة” کی صحت کا. اگرچہ یہ احادیث (صحیح) سند کے ساتھ ثابت نہیں ہے لیکن اس کو (ہر دور میں علماء_امت کی) جماعت نے جماعت سے قبول کیا تو مستغنی کردیا ہے اس کی صحت کو اس کی سند طلب کرنے سے، اسی طرح حدیث معاذ(رضی الله عنہ) ہے، جب دلیل پکڑی ہے تمام نے اس سے تو اس کی سند کو طلب کرنے سے مستغنی(بے-پرواہ/غیر-لازم) کردیا ہے.

علامہ جمال الدین الملطی(الحنفی) رح لکھتے ہیں:

وخبر الواحد اذا تلقتھ ألأمة بالقبول عملا به و تصديقا له يفيد العلم (اليقيني) عند جماهير الأمة وهو أحد قسمتي المتواتر ولم يكن بين سلف الأمة في ذلك نزاع.[شرح عقيدة الطحاوية: ٣٥٥]
ترجمہ: اور خبر واحد کو جب امت قبول کرلے اس کی تصدق اور اس پر عمل کرتے ہوۓ تو جمہور علماء_امت کے نزدیک علم یقینی کا فائدہ دیتی ہے اور یہ بھی متواتر کی ایک قسم ہے. اسلاف_امت میں اس بارے میں کوئی نزاع نہیں.

فقہ حنفی کے عظیم محدث محقق، فقیہ، اصولی شیخ زاہد بن الحسن الکوثری رح لکھتے ہیں:

واحتجاج الأئمة بحديث تصحيح له منهم بل جمهور أهل العلم من جميع الطوائف على ان خبر الواحد إذا تلقته الأمة تصديقا له أو عملا به يوجب العلم.[مقالات الكوثري:٧٠]

ترجمہ: ائمہ کا بطور_دلیل کسی حدیث کو لےلینا یہ ان کی طرف سے اس حدیث کو صحیح قرار دینا ہوگا، بلکہ تمام جماعتوں کے جمہور اہل_علم اس اصول پر ہیں کہ خبر_واحد کو امت جب اس کی تصدق کرتے ہوۓ قبول کرلے تو یہ علم_یقینی کا فائدہ دیتی ہے.


(١) جس حدیث کو امت قبول کرلے یا اس پر کسی مسئلہ یا عقیدہ کی بنیاد رکھ لے، وہ حدیث صحیح کے درجہ سے متواتر کے درجہ میں ہوتی ہے اس کی سند پر بحث کرنا اصول_محدثین کے خلاف ہے.

(٢) اگر کئیاخبار آحاد (واحد کی جمع) ہوں، ان سے ایک معنی “مشترک” طور پر سمجھ میں آتا ہو، تو اس بات کو تواتر_معنوی حاصل ہوگا.

(٣) تواتر کی تمام اقسام یقین کا فائدہ دیتی ہیں.

(٤) اگر اخبار آحاد پر فردا فردا اعتراضات ہوں لیکن ان سے ثابت ہونے والے مفہوم پر وہ اعتراض وارد نہیں ہوگا، جیسے حضرت عیسیٰ علیہ السلام کی حیات تواتر_معنوی سے ثابت ہے، ان کی بعض روایات پر جرح اس اصل مسئلہ کے ثبوت میں کوئی نقصان نہیں پہنچاۓ گی، بلکہ ایسی روایات پر جرح کرنا ہی بے-فائدہ اور بے-کار ہوگا اور ایک اتفاقی مسئلہ کو مشکوک بنانے کی سعی لاحاصل ہوگی.

(٥) اجماع اسناد سے قوی ہے یعنی جس بات پر اجماع ہوجاۓ اس کی روایات کی جانچ پرکھ کی ضرورت نہیں.

موجودہ زمانہ میں اکثر حضرات ان اصولوں سے ناواقف ہیں، اس لئے وہ ہر حدیث کو سند کے اعتبار سے پرکھنا شروع کردیتے ہیں اور (مسلموں کی جماعت سے دور) گمراہی کے گڑھے میں جاگرتے ہیں. منکرین_حیات انبیاء (علیہ السلام) نے مسئلہ_حیات کا انکار اسی وجہ سے کیا ہے، حالانکہ احادیث_حیات تواتر تک پہنچی ہوئی ہیں.

إن من جملة ما تواتر عن النبي صلي الله عليه وسلم حياة الانبياء في قبورهم”. [نظم المتناثر من أحاديث المتواتر]

ترجمہ: جو روایات نبی (صلی الله علیہ وسلم) سے متواتر ہیں ان میں انبیاء (علیھم السلام) کا قبروں میں زندہ ہونا بھی ہے.

٦٠٠ کے قریب کتب کے مصنف علامہ جلال الدین السیوطی (الشافعی) رح لکھتے ہیں:

حياة النبي (صل الله عليه وسلم) في قبره هو وسائر الانبياء معلومة عندنا علما قطعيا لما قام عندنا من الأدلة في ذلك وتواترت له الأخبار الدالة على ذلك.[الحاوي للفتاوى: ٢/١٣٩]

ترجمہ: نبی اقدس (صلی الله علیہ وسلم) کی اور دوسرے انبیاء (علیھم السلام) کی قبر میں حیات ہونا ہمیں یقینی طور پر معلوم ہے، اس لئے کہ ہمارے نزدیک اس پر دلائل قائم ہیں اور اس مسئلہ پر دلالت کرنے والی روایات ہمارے نزدیک متواتر ہیں.

اور علامہ ابن القیم رہ نے “کتاب الروح” میں ابو عبدالله قرطبی سے بھی اسی طرح کی بات نقل کی ہے کہ ان کے نزدیک اس پر دلائل قائم ہیں اور اس مسئلہ پر دلالت کرنے والی روایات ہمارے نزدیک متواتر ہیں.

چونکہ احادیث حیات الانبیاء (علیھم السلام) کو تواتر حاصل ہے، اس لئے اس کا انکار کرنے والا اہل_سنّت والجماعت سے خارج (بدعتی) ہے، اور اس کے پیچھے نماز پڑھنا مکروہ_تحریمی ہے.

The Difference between Bid`ah-e-Hasanah & Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah

[By Maulana Sarfaraz Khan Safdar (rahimahullah)]

It is imperative that we differentiate and explain Bid`ah-e-Hasanah and Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah so as to clarify the issue with those who are unaware of the difference and so that they are not left in trepidation regarding the two.

There are two types of Bid`ah – lexicographic Bid`ah and Shar`i Bid`ah. Lexicographic Bid`ah is the term given to all things which are newly invented, which came into being after the demise of Nabi ﷺ. This includes Ibaadat and Aadat (habitual things). These are divided into five categories: Waajib, Mandoob, Haraam, Makrooh and Mubaah.

Shar`i Bid`ah includes all those innovations which came into being after the three best eras and upon which there is no consent from Nabi ﷺ by way of word, action, clearly or by indication. This is that Bid`ah which is classified under Bid`ah-e-Dhalaalah, Bid`ah-e-Qabeehah and Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah. The Ulama have dilated upon this.

“Bid`ah is of two types: one is a lexicographic Bid`ah and the other is a Shar`i Bid`ah. Lexicographically, Bid`ah is every new invention which includes Ibaadaat and Aadaat. This Bid`ah is further divided into five categories. The second type is that Bid`ah which increases (or decreases) in any revealed Deeni matter after the passing of the three best  era. This increase is devoid of consent from Nabi ﷺ. There  is no consent from Nabi ﷺ on these actions, neither by way of word, action, explicit or by indication. This is the meaning of Bid`ah-e-Dhalaalat” [Tarweejul  Jinaan/Junna page 161]

For a more detailed explanation on Bid`ah-e-Hasanah and Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah refer to Irshaadus Saari, vol.3, page 344, Umdatul Qaari, page 356, vol.5, Nawawi Sharah Muslim, page 285, vol.1 and  Mudkhal, page 257, vol.2.

Haafidh Ibn Hajar (rahmatullahi alaihi) writes:

“The crux of the matter is this that if Bid`ah has an acceptable proof in the Shariah, then it would be classified as a Bid`ah-e-Hasanah. If the Bid`ah has an unacceptable proof then it would be classified as Bid`ah-e-Qabeehah. Otherwise it would be Mubaah. Bid`ah is divided into five categories.” [Fathul Baari, page 219, vol.4]

A similar explanation is given in Allamah Aini’s Umdatul Qaari. Refer to page 356, vol.5.

Now this much remains to be explained, that what is acceptable in the Shariah and what is unacceptable in the Shariah. Hadhrat Imaam Shaafi (rahmatullahi alaihi) states:

“Bid`ah is of two types. That Bid`ah which contradicts the Kitaab (Qur`aan Majeed), Sunnah, Ijma or Athar of a Sahaabi. This is Bid`ah-e-Dhalaalah. That Bid`ah which does not contradict anything of these, this is a Hasan Bid`ah, in accordance to the words of Hadhrat Umar (radhiyallahu anhu):‘This is a good Bid`ah’” [Minhaajus Sunnah, page 128, vol.2]

That action which Nabi ﷺ left out notwithstanding the conditions and ability being in existence during his era and that the Sahaabah-e-Kiraam (radhiyallahu anhum) and Taabieen also left out is undoubtedly a Bid`ah and deviation. This is so because it is in contradiction to the Kitaab, Sunnat, Ijma of the best of eras and Qiyaas. If there exists a little proof for it, then sometimes it may be a good action, whereupon reward is due and sometimes it is merely a permissible action which warrants neither reward nor sin.

The summary of the discussion of Qiyaas in Majaalis-e-Abrar and the above-mentioned texts, results in the definition of Bid`ah-e-Hasanah and Bid`ah-e-Sayyiah is as follows:

Bid`ah-e-Hasanah is that action whose prevention was removed after the demise of Nabi ﷺ. Or its conditions and ability  of execution came into existence after Nabi ﷺ. Some proof for its execution can be found in Kitaabullaah, Sunnat, Ijma or Qiyaas. This is known as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah or in other words it is also regarded as lexicographic Bid`ah, which is not rejected or accursed. The texts of Allaamah Ibn Rajab etc. has already been quoted which adds more light on the subject.

As for that action, which could have been executed during the era of Nabi ﷺ but he did not carry it out and the Sahaabah-e-Kiraam, Taabieen and Tabe Taabieen, notwithstanding their extreme love and affection for Nabi ﷺ also did not carry out this action, then such actions are called Bid`ah-e-Qabeeha, Bid`ah-e-Sayyia and Bid`ah-e-Shar`iah.   Besides this, the Ijtihaad of a non-Mujtahid, especially in our times, is definitely not classified as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah. In this regard the Fuqahaa-e-Kiraam (rahmatullahi alaihim) have stated:

“It is stated in Nisaabul Fiqh that Bid`ah-e-Hasanah are those actions which the Aimmah-e-Mujtahiddeen have classified as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah. If any person in our era classifies anything as Bid`ah-e-Hasanah then this is contrary to the Haqq, because it is stated in Musaffa that all Bid`ah in our era are deviation.” [Fatawaa Jaamiur Riwaayat and Junna, page 60]

From this text we clearly see that Bid`ah-e-Hasanah is only that which the Aimmah-e-Mujtahiddeen have classified as such. Ijtihaad and Qiyaas are only permissible in those issues and Masaa`il regarding which no Qur`aanic or Ahaadith texts exist, and the conditions and possibility of their execution did not exist during the time of Nabi ﷺ and the best of eras, in fact, it (conditions and possibilities of execution) came into existence only after these eras. If any person in this present age classifies any new action as a Bid`ah-e-Hasanah, then his claim would be totally rejected and discounted.

This is that Bid`ah regarding which Mujaddid Alfe Thaani (rahmatullahi alaihi) stated:

“How can those things which are rejected ever be regarded as Hasan and good?”


[Based on Al-I‘tisam by Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi  (d. 790 H)
Translated by Mawlana Zameelur Rahman]

The  notion  of  “bid‘ah”  in  Islam  is  one  that  is  confusing  to  many.  There  are  a  number  of reasons  for  this  which  are  not  the  concern  of  this  paper,  but  suffice  it  to  say,  there  is  very  little  clarity  presented  on  the  more  nuanced  aspects  of  this  concept,  and  unfortunately  there  are  few  works  in  English,  if  any,  that  attempt  to  tackle  the  concept  of  bid‘ah  accurately  and  with  serious  depth.  Fortunately,  however,  we  have  an  excellent  and  well-researched  work  on  the  subject  in  Arabic  by  the  eminent  pre-modern  scholar,  Imam  Abu  Ishaq  Ibrahim  ibn  Musa  ibn Muhammad  al-Lakhmi  al-Shatibi  (d.  790 H),  called  al-I‘tisam. 

Abu  Ishaq  al-Shatibi  was  a Maliki  Ash‘ari  jurist  and  scholar,  particularly  known  for  his  contributions  in  the  fields  of  usul  al-fiqh  (principles  of  jurisprudence)  and  fiqh  (jurisprudence).  He  is  the  author  of  al-Muwafaqat,  an  authoritative  work  on  the  subject  of  usul  al-fiqh.  

This  paper  is  primarily  based  on  Imam  al-Shatibi’s  definitive  study  of  bid‘ah  in  his  seminal  work,  al-I‘tisam,  but  will  also  draw  on  other  sources  to  support  some  of  his conclusions.  The  aim  is  to  present  a  coherent  and  satisfactory  examination  of  the  concept  of  bid‘ah,  with  a  treatment  of  all  its  important  aspects,  while  keeping  it  as  short  and  digestible  as  possible. 

A  note  about  methodology:  In  most  cases  when  bid‘ah  is  discussed,  a  taqlidi  (imitative)  approach  is  taken,  in  which  scholars  are  haphazardly  quoted  with  no  real  effort  to  reconcile  apparent  inconsistencies  or  base  the  statements  on  scriptural  proofs.  Al-Shatibi’s  approach  is  tahqiqi  (critical)  in  which  a  serious  effort  is  made  to  appreciate  the  reality  of  the  concept  with  integrity  and  care,  and  to  understand  the  issue  in  light  of  the  available  evidence  and  the  statements  of  the  authorities  with  full  academic  rigour.

There  are  two  aspects  to  the  study  of  bid‘ah:  its  usul  (principles)  and  its  furu‘ (peripherals).  Study  of  its  usul  deals  with  the  formulation  of  a theoretical  framework  or  criteria by  which  to  determine  what  constitutes  bid‘ah  and  what  does  not.  Study  of  its  furu‘  deals  with  examples  of  bid‘ah,  determined  by  the  principles  from  its  usul.

Imam  al-Shatibi’s  book  stands  out  as  the  only  work  that  takes  a  serious  and  in-depth look  at  the  subject  of  usul  al-bid‘ah,  of  which  he  was  acutely  aware.  He  mentions  towards the  beginning  of  al-I‘tisam:

“Rarely  has  a  work  been  compiled  on  it  [i.e.  bid‘ah],  and  whatever  has  been  compiled  on  it  is  inadequate  in  these  areas  [i.e.  of  usul  al-bid‘ah].” [al-I’tisam 1:29]

Towards  the  end  of  his  lengthy  work,  he  mentions  two  such  books,  one  by  Muhammad  ibn  Waddah  (d.  287  H)  called  al-Bida‘  wa l-Nahy  ‘anha  and  another  by  Abu  Bakr  al-Turtushi  (d.  520  H),  called  Kitab  al-Hawadith  wa l-Bida‘.  

He  writes:  “I  saw  that  the  topic  of  bid‘ah  was  greatly  neglected  in  the  speech  of  the ‘ulama’,  except  for  brief  transmissions  as  done  by  Ibn  Waddah,  or  side  issues  are produced  that  will  not  satisfy  the  thirsty.  Rather,  complete  understanding  of  it  as  is required,  I did  not  find,  despite  my  intense  search  for  it,  besides  what  Abu  Bakr  al-Turtushi  wrote  about  it,  but  it  is  meagre  in  proportion  to  what  is  required  with  respect  to  it;  and  besides  what  the  people  [i.e.  scholars]  wrote  with  respect  to  the  seventy  two  sects  which  is  [only]  one  section  from  the  sections  of  the  topic  and  a  part  of  its  parts.  Thus,  I  took  up  the  task  myself  to  pay  the  attention  to  it  [that  it  deserves],  that  perhaps  Allah  will  bring  benefit  thereby  to  its  writer,  its  reader,  its  distributer,  its  copyist,  the  one  seeking  benefit  from  it  and  all  Muslims.”  [Ibid 3:17]

It  is  hoped  the  following  study  of  bid‘ah,  which  aims  to  tackle  the  concept  primarily  from  a theoretical  perspective,  will  serve  as  a  useful  and  comprehensive  treatment  of  this  important  subject,  and  will  help  to  bring  clarity  to  readers  struggling  to  understand  it.  I have  attempted  to  simplify  technical  discussions  as  far  as  possible.

Lexical  and  Shar‘i  Meanings  of  Bid‘ah
There  are  many  words  commonly  used  by  Muslims  which  were  originally  designated  by  the  Arabs  for  a  certain  meaning  and  were  then,  with  the  advent  of  Islam  and  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him),  appropriated  by  the  Shari‘ah  for  other  meanings,  which  then  became  the  popular  meanings  of  those  words  amongst  the  Muslim  scholars and  masses.  Examples  include  commonly  used  words  like  salah,  zakah,  sawm,  jihad  and hajj.  For  instance,  “sawm”  in  the  Arabic  language  means  “restraint”  (imsak),  but  was appropriated  by  Islam  to  mean:  “avoiding  food,  drink  and  conjugal  relations  from  dawn to  dusk  with  the  intention  of  fasting,”  and  this  eventually  became  its  popular  and  well-known  meaning  amongst Muslims. 

It  is  important  to  appreciate  this  distinction  in  our  discussion  on  bid‘ah,  as  bid‘ah  too,  like  many  other  words  employed  in  the  Shari‘ah,  has  both  a  lexical  meaning  –  assigned  by  the  Arabs  –  and  a  Shar‘i  definition  –  coined  by  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  popularised  by  the  early  Muslims.  Without  understanding  this  distinction,  it  would  be  difficult  to  make  sense  of  the  term  in  its  early  usage,  as  will  be  explained  later.

For  further  clarity  on  this  dual  nature  of  many  words  used  in  the  Shari‘ah,  consider  the following  illustration:  

The  word  kufr  as  co-opted  and  popularised  by  the  Shari‘ah  means:  “Denial  of  what  the Messenger  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him peace)  brought,”  [Imdad al-Fatawa (6:83)], 

and  this  is  borne  out  by  many  texts  of  the  Shari‘ah.  For  example,  in  a  hadith  recorded  in  Sahih  Muslim,  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon him)  asks  Umm  Ma‘bad:  “Who  planted  this  tree,  a  Muslim  or  a  Kafir?”  She  said:  “A  Muslim.”  He  said:  “No  Muslim  plants  a  tree,  which  a  human  being  or  an  animal  or  a  bird  then  eats  from,  except  that  it  will  be  charity  for  him  till  the  Day  of  Resurrection.”  [Sahih  Muslim,    2:15] 

This  hadith  shows  a  person  is  identified  as  either  a  Muslim  or  a  Kafir,  the  latter  being  one who  does  not  affirm  the  message  of  Islam,  and   is  how most  learned  and  lay  Muslims understand  the  word  kufr.  Literally,  however,  kufr  can  have  a  number  of  other meanings,  including  rejection,  ungratefulness  and  concealment.  Thus,  in  one  place  of  the  Qur’an,  a  derivative  of  the  word  kufr  is  in  fact  used  positively,  where  Allah  says: 

“Whoever  rejects  (yakfur)  false  deities  and  believes  in  Allah,  he  has  indeed  grasped  the firmest  hand.”  [Qur’an  2:256]

Hence,  although  “kufr”  is  never  used  positively  in  its  Shar‘i  meaning,  when  used  in  its literal  sense  as  in  this  verse,  it  can  have  both  positive  and  negative  connotations.  It  will be  shown  that  the  same  is  the  case  with  bid‘ah.

The Linguistic Meaning of Bid‘ah
Linguistically,  bid‘ah  means:  “an  invention  without  a  past precedent”  [Al-I‘tisam, 1:41]

For example, in the following verse of the Qur’an it is used in its linguistic meaning:

“Say:  I  am  not  something  unprecedented  (bid‘)  amongst the  messengers.”   [Qur’an 46:11]

Imam  Ibn  Jarir  al-Tabari  (d.  310 H)  explains  this  as  follows: “Meaning,  I  am  not  the  first  of  the  messengers  of  Allah  which  He  sent  to  His  creation.  Before  me  there  were  many messengers  from  Him  sent  to  nations  before  you.”  [Tafsir al-Tabari, 21:119]

Thus,  according  to  this  linguistic  definition,  anything  that  came  into  existence  without  precedence  in  the  time  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  is  bid‘ah  in  relation  to  him.  Hence,  cars,  computers,  calculators,  microphones,  spectacles,  and  so  on,  are  all  bid‘ah  in  the  linguistic  sense.  It  is  already  clear  that  according  to  the  linguistic meaning,  bid‘ah  is  not  necessarily  unfavourable  and  blameworthy.

The Shar‘i Meaning of Bid‘ah According  to  the  Shari‘ah  –  which  is  determined  by  its  usage  in  the  recorded  sayings  of the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  the  early  Muslims  –  bid‘ah  is  best defined  as:  

“Adopting  as  religion  (deen)  that  which  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  his  companions  did  not  adopt  as  religion.”
A  similar  definition  given  by  some  scholars  is:

“Adding  or  subtracting  from  the  religion  (deen)  after  the  time  of  the  Sahabah.” [Shaykh Muhammad ibn Pir ‘Ali al-Birgivi, al-Tariqat al-Muhammadiyyah, p. 9] 

The  most  important  aspect  of  this  definition  is  that  it  is  restricted  to  innovations  in religion.  With  this  definition,  which  is  its  dominant  meaning  in  the  usage  of  the  Prophet (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  the  early  Muslims,  bid‘ah  is,  in  its  entirety, reprehensible,  blameworthy  and  sinful,  and  cannot  be  described  as  good  under  any circumstance.  Moreover,  as  al-Shatibi  explains,  bid‘ah  in  its  Shar‘i  usage  includes religious  innovations  in  four  different  areas:  actions  (af‘al),  omissions  (turuk),  statements  (aqwal)  and  beliefs  (‘aqa’id).  [Al-I‘tisam, 1:55]

Before  supplying  proof  for  this  meaning  of  bid‘ah,  and  demonstrating  that  the  distinction  between  the  lexical  and  Shar‘i  meanings  of  the  term  is  a  necessary  distinction,  I  will  first elaborate  somewhat  on  the  Shar‘i  definition.

Two  Types  of  Proscriptions  in  the  Shari‘ah
Imam  al-Shatibi  explains  that  those  things  that  are  prohibited  or  discouraged  in  the  Shari‘ah  are  of  two  types:

1.  Direct  violations  (mukhalafah  khassah):  these  are  actions,  beliefs,  omissions  or  statements  that  violate  clear  injunctions  of  the  Shari‘ah.  These  can  be  either  haraam  (unlawful)  or  makruh  (undesirable).  Examples  of  haraam  are  murder  and injustice,  and  an  example  of  makruh  is  overspending  (israf)  in  decorating  masjids.  Even  if  these  actions  are  done  in  inventive  ways,  though  they  may  be  regarded  as  “bid‘ah”  linguistically,  according  to  the  Shari‘ah  they  will  fall  under  the  general  prohibition  of  those  acts,  and  will  not  necessarily  be  classed  as  “bid‘ah.”

2.  Opposition  to  the  Shari‘ah  by  introducing  something  new  into  the  religion  which  is  not  from  it.  This  is  what  is  known  customarily  and  legally  as  bid‘ah.  [Ibid. 1:42]

It  is  clear  from  this  distinction  that  bid‘ah  is  different  from  direct  violations.  Thus  it  may happen  that  there  is  no  opposition  to  a  clear  injunction  of  the  Shari‘ah  in  a  certain  matter,  but  merely  because  it  is  something  new  that  is  introduced  into  the  religion,  it  is  classed  as  bid‘ah.  Proscriptions  of  the  first  category  are  not  necessarily  bid‘ah  because,  as  al-Shatibi,  says:  “Violations  –  in  their  capacity  as  violations  –  are  not  instituted  by  anyone  as  paths  which  are  permanently  adopted  in  a  manner  resembling  legislation” (Ibid. 1:76)  which  is  the  nature  of  bid‘ah  in  the  Shari‘ah

However,  these  two  categories  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Thus,  it  may  be  that  something  is  a  direct  violation  and  is  also  categorised  as  bid‘ah  because  it  is  adopted  as religion.  An  example  given  by  al-Shatibi  is  the  use  of  chandeliers  (thurayya)  in  masjids,  which  is  regarded  as  overspending  (israf)  and  thus,  makruh.  If  someone  was  to  purchase  a  chandelier  specifically  for  the  purpose  of  it  being  installed  in  a  masjid,  believing  it  to  be  spending  in  Allah’s  path  (infaq  fi  sabil   Allah),  this  will  constitute  bid‘ah  (as  it  is  akin  to believing  that  spending  on  a  cause  detested  by  Islam  is  spending  in  Allah’s  path). However,  importantly,  this  is  not  because  of  the  initial  undesirability  of  this  practice,  but  because  of  the  belief  attached  to  it. [Ibid. 2:418] 

Another  example  is  the  bid‘ah  of  the  Qadariyyah  who  rejected  Allah’s  foreordainment  (qadr),  as,  although  this  opposes  the  clear  injunctions  in  the  Qur’an  and  Sunnah  which  obligate  belief  in  Allah’s  foreordainment, since  it  is  adopted  as  religion,  not  only  is  it  a  direct  violation,  but  also  a  bid‘ah.

Ritualistic (ta‘abbudi) and Non-Ritualistic (‘adi) Matters
The  most  important  element  in  the  Shar‘i  definition  of  bid‘ah  is  that  it  is  an  innovation  “in religion.”  In  order  to  understand  the  definition,  therefore,  Imam  al-Shaibi  explores  this aspect  a  little  further.  His  discussion  can  be  summarised  in  the  following  points:  

☆  There  are  two  types  of  matters  related  to  the  Shari‘ah:  umur  ta‘abbudiyyah  (ritualistic  matters)  and  umur  ‘adiyyah  (non-ritualistic  matters). 

☆  In  ta‘abbudi  (ritualistic)  matters,  the  reason  and  purpose  behind  them  is  not understood  (ghayr  ma‘qul  al-ma‘na)  i.e.  they  are  carried  out  ritualistically;  while  in  ‘adi  (non-ritualistic/explicable)  matters,  the  opposite  is  the  case:  the  purpose  and  reason  are  understood  (ma‘qul al-ma‘na).

☆  Ta‘abbudi  laws  dominate  in  a  category  of  affairs  known  as  ‘ibadiyyat  or  “religious  matters,”  that  is  those  things  which  are  essentially  part  of  religion;  they  generally  comprise  of  ritual  acts  of  worship  like  prayer,  fasting,  hajj,  etc.  and  articles  of  faith,  like  belief  in  Allah,  the  afterlife,  and  so  on. 

☆  ‘Adi  laws  dominate  in  a  category  of  affairs  known  as  ‘adiyyat  or  “mundane  matters”  which  are  not  intrinsically  part  of  religion,  but  originally  part  of  the  world,  like  marriage,  buying  and  selling,  eating  and  drinking  etc. [Al-I‘tisam, 2:401]

The  primary  distinction  between  ‘ibadiyyat  or  “religious  matters”  and  ‘adiyyat  or  “mundane matters”  is  that  in  the  latter,  even  if  they  are  performed  in  total  compliance  with  the  Shari‘ah,  unless  there  is  an  intention  of  “complying  with  the  command  of  Allah”  (imtithal  li  amr  Allah),  they bring  no  reward  (thawab);  whereas,  ‘ibadiyyat  are  intrinsically  rewarding.  [al-I‘tisam, 2:218]

Although  this  is  a  general  observation,  it  is  not  a  hard-and-fast  rule.  Thus,  at  times  non-ritualistic  rules  are  found  in  religious  matters  and  ritualistic  rules  are  found  in  mundane  matters.  For  example,  the  number  of  rak‘at  of  salah,  the  period  of  fasting,  the  number  of  rounds  of  tawaf,  the  value  of  Zakat  and  so  on  are  all  ta‘abbudi  laws  within  ‘ibadiyyat;  the  laws  of  inheritance  where  specific  shares  are  stipulated  for  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  are  examples  of  ta‘abbudi  laws within  ‘adiyyat.  The  command  to  spread  Islam,  preserve  its  texts  and  laws,  teach  and  learn,  and  so  on  are  examples  of  ‘adi  (non-ritualistic/explicable)  laws  within  ‘ibadiyyat;  and  the  condition  of  consent  in  monetary transactions  and  marriage  and  the  laws  of  cleaning  one’s  garments  and  body  are examples  of  ‘adi  laws  within  ‘adiyyat

The  reason  for  mentioning  this  distinction  is  that  bid‘ah  only  arises  in  ritualistic  or  ritualised  (ta‘abbudi)  matters,  as  these  are  what  constitutes  religious  innovations;  whereas,  innovations  in  non-ritualistic,  mundane  or  explicable  (‘adi)  matters,  although  they  may  be  sinful,  they  will  not  be  classed  as  bid‘ah  in  its  Shar‘i  usage  so  long  as  they are  not  ritualised  (meaning,  adopted  in  a  religious  way).

Imam  al-Shatibi  writes: 

“As  for  matters  that  are  ta‘abbudi  in  nature,  their  desired  objective  is  pure  submission,  without  any  addition  or  subtraction.”

He  also  supplies  some  evidence  for  this  from  the  Sunnah. Thus,  all  ta‘abbudi  laws  must  be  adhered  to  as  they  are  without  any  changes.  

In  al-I‘tisam,  after  listing  several  examples  of  laws  that  are  ta‘abbudi  in  acts  of  worship,  al-Shatibi  concludes:

“You  know  from  the  intention  of  the  Lawgiver  that  He  has  not  entrusted  any  ta‘abbudi  law  to  the  opinions  of  [His] slaves,  so  nothing  is  left besides  stopping  at  the  limit  He  has  set,  and  adding  to  it  is  bid‘ah  just  as  subtracting  from  it  is  bid‘ah.” [Al-I‘tisam 3:58]

Thus,  in  the  ta‘abbudi  aspects  of  ‘ibadiyyat  –  matters  intrinsic  to  religion  –  any  addition  or  subtraction  is  inescapably  a bid‘ah.  Innovations  in  these  matters  are  therefore  bid‘ah  in  themselves. 

In  ‘adiyyat  and  ‘adi  aspects  of  ‘ibadiyyat,  however,  since  these  are  not  originally  part  of religion  or  are  not  ritualistic  elements  of  religion,  innovations  in  them  will  only  be  classed  as  bid‘ah  when  regarded  as  religious  or  when  they  are  ritualised.  For  example,  ‘aqiqah  is  a  celebration  established  in  the  religion  for  expressing  joy  at the  birth  of  a  child.  Thus,  it is  performed  for  this  ‘adi  reason,  but  is  also  performed  ritualistically,  as  part  of  religion,  since  it  is  established  in  the  Sunnah.  If  someone  decided  to  express  joy  by  another  form  of  celebration,  this  would  be  an  innovation  in  ‘adiyyat.  Such  an  innovation  would  not,  however,  be  regarded  as  bid‘ah,  for  the  very  reason  that  this  would  not be  an  innovation  in  religion  but  in  worldly  affairs.  However,  if  it  is  accompanied  by  the  belief  that  it  is  part of  religion,  in  just  the  same  way  as  ‘aqiqah,  that  is,  it  is  ritualised,  it  will  also  be  deemed  bid‘ah.  Thus,  al-Shatibi  says: 

“‘Adiyyat  in  their  capacity  as  mundane  (or  non-ritualistic) affairs  contain  no  bid‘ah  in them;  but  bid‘ah  enters  into  them  when  they  are  ritualised  or  assigned  a  ritualistic function.” [Ibid. 2:461]

This  is  why,  al-Shatibi  suggests,  the  Sahabah  would  not  abolish  the  customs  and  cultures  of  the  non-Arab  converts  to  Islam,  unless  they  violated  the  laws  of  the  Shari‘ah.  However,  with  respect to  matters  of  worship  and  ritual,  they  were  extremely  careful  that  no  innovation  infiltrates  them.  In  sum,  if  something  does  not  have  a  comprehensible  purpose  (ghayr  ma‘qul  al-ma‘na),  it  cannot  be  added  to,  subtracted  from  or  changed  in  any  way.  If  something  has  a  comprehensible  purpose,  based  on  that  purpose,  there  can  be  developments  and  changes.  For  example,  the  purpose  of  sadaqah  or  charity  is  to alleviate  the  suffering  of  needy  people,  which  is  a  comprehensible  objective.  Thus,  this  can  be  accomplished  in  a number  of  different  ways  that  achieve  that  objective.  On  the other  hand,  the  purpose  of  praying  two  rak‘ahs  in  Fajr  is  incomprehensible  so  to  create changes  in  that,  by,  for  example,  changing  it  to  three  rak‘at,  is  an  example  of  bid‘ah.
By  “incomprehensible”  is  meant  that  a  detailed  understanding  of  its  purpose  is  unavailable  to  us,  such  that  it  is  not  possible  to  make  any  deductions  or  analogies  based  on  it.  It  is  not  meant  that  a  general  objective  or  purpose  cannot  be  discerned.

Means  or  Wasa’il
“Means”  or  wasa’il  only  arise  in  matters  which  are  not  ta‘abbudi,  as  the  cause  and  reason  behind  something  that  is  adopted  as  a  means  is,  by  definition,  understood.  Imam  al-Shatibi  explains  this  rule,  and  illustrates  it  with  the  following  example:

“If  there  was  someone  who  journeyed  towards  the  obligation  of  hajj  by  flying  in  the  air  or  walking  on  water,  he  will  not  be  regarded  as  a  person  of  bid‘ah  by  his  movement  in  this  way,  because  the  objective  is  only  to  arrive  at  Makkah  in  order  to  fulfil  the  obligation.” [Ibid. 1:331-2]

Thus,  the  aspect  of  “travel”  in  hajj  is  ‘adi  (non-ritualistic/explicable)  as  it  has  the objective  of  arrival  at  Makkah.  Therefore,  this  can  be  done  in  various  ways  that  are  used  to  achieve  this  underlying  goal,  and  will  not  be  regarded  as  bid‘ah.  Means  are,  thus,  in principle,  non-ritualistic.  Hence,  something  that  is  consciously  adopted  as  a  means  is  not classed  as  bid‘ah,  although  depending  on  its  nature  and  objective,  it  may  be  sinful  or blameworthy. 

An Example
As  a  simple  illustration  of  bid‘ah  in  ‘adiyyat,  al-Shatibi  discusses  the  following  example: 

If  someone  were  to  avoid  a  particular  lawful  food  item,  it  may  be  for  a  number  of reasons.  It  may  be  for  medical  purposes  or  due  to  personal  dislike  or  unavailability;  or  it may  be  that  there  is  some  doubt  over  its  lawfulness,  so  out  of  scrupulousness,  the person  chooses  to  avoid  it.  All  of  these  reasons  are  valid  because  they  are  either  worldly –  ‘adi  –  reasons  or  a  legitimate  Shar‘i  reason.

However,  if  the  person  were  to  avoid  it  ritualistically  or  religiously,  meaning,  for  no  other  reason  but  because  he  believed  that  by  avoiding  that  particular  food  item,  he  would  draw  closer  to  Allah  or  it  will  bring  him  reward  or  it  will  be  beneficial  for  his  afterlife  and  so  forth,  this  will  make  it  bid‘ah.  As al-Shatibi  says:  “If  the  omission  is  carried  out religiously,  that  is  innovation  in  religion.”  And  then  he  says reiterating  the  central  definition  of  bid‘ah  in  the  Shari‘ah:

“The  one  who  practises  something  besides  the  Sunnah religiously,  that  is  precisely  [the definition  of]  one  who  practises  bid‘ah .” [Al-I‘tisam, 1:54]

The  above  explanation  conveys  the  basic  understanding  of  bid‘ah.  What  remain  are  the proofs  for  this  conception  of  bid‘ah,  and  some  further  details.

Proofs  for  the  Definition  of  Bid‘ah
Imam  al-Shatibi  provides  extensive  textual  documentation  from  the  Qur’an,  Sunnah  and  sayings  of  the  early  Muslims  as  evidence  of  the  blameworthy  character  of  this  definition  of  bid‘ah  in  the  second  chapter  of  his  book,  but  I  will  suffice  with  a  small  selection  of  clear  texts  in  this  section  to  demonstrate  that  what  is  described  above  is  indeed  the  definition  of  bid‘ah.

Hadith  One
In  a  hadith  recorded  by  both  al-Bukhari  and  Muslim  in  their  Sahihs,  the  Prophet  (peace and  blessings  be  upon  him)  said: 

“Whoever  introduces  into  this  matter  of  ours  what  is  not  from it,  it  is  rejected.”  

Ibn  Rajab  al-Hanbali  wrote  in  his  commentary  of  al-Nawawi’s  collection  of  forty  hadiths, Jami‘  al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam,  under  the  explanation  of  this  hadith:

“And  in  some  of  its  wordings,  ‘Whoever  introduces  into  this  religion  of  ours  what  is  not from  it,  it  is  rejected.’” [Jami‘  al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam, p. 155] 

Thus,  the  meaning  of  “matter”  in  the  narration  is  “religion.”  Worldly  innovations,  therefore,  like  new  cities,  technologies  and  crafts  are  excluded,  as  these  are  mundane  activities  (‘adiyyat)  which  are  also  essentially  part  of  the  world.  It  is  this  that  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  referred  to  in  his  famous  statement  recorded  in  the Sahih  of  Imam  Muslim:  “You  are  more  learned  of  the  matters  of  your  world”,  which, based  on  the  context  in  which this  statement  was  said,  means:  in  those  things  that  are  permissible  (mubah)  in  the  religion,  which  are  based  on  experiment  and  experience,  like  medicine,  industry,  and  so  forth,  you  are  free  to  select  and  innovate  your  own  methods,  and  are  not  restricted  by  my  example. [al-Tariqat  al-Muhammadiyyah, p. 9]

Also  excluded  from  what  this  hadith  describes  are  new  acts  of  sin  which  are  in  clear violation  of  the  laws  prescribed  in  the  Shari‘ah,  like  theft  in  a new  way  (e.g.  credit  card  fraud);  as  these  fall  not  under  “innovations  in  religion”  but  direct  acts  of  violation,  unless they  are  consciously  adopted  as  religion.  Thus,  what  this  hadith  declares  as  “rejected”  is precisely  the  Shar‘i  definition  of  bid‘ah  described  earlier.

Hadith  Two
In  another  hadith,  narrated  with  an  authentic  chain  by  al-Tirmidhi,  Abu  Dawud  and others,  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  said:

“Hold  fast  to  my  Sunnah  and  the  Sunnah  of  the  rightly-guided  caliphs.  Bite  onto  them with  the  molar  teeth.  And  beware  of  newly  introduced  matters,  for  verily,  every  newly introduced  matter  is  bid‘ah  and  every  bid‘ah  is  misguidance.”  

“Matters”  in  this  narration  is  contrasted  with  the  Sunnah  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and blessings  be  upon  him)  and  his  successors,  Abu  Bakr,  ‘Umar,  ‘Uthman  and  ‘Ali  (may Allah  be  pleased  with  them  all).  “Sunnah”  in  its  Shar‘i  usage  means  “a path  adopted  in  the  religion”,  in  particular,  that  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon him)  and  his  righteous  successors,  Abu  Bakr,  ‘Umar,  ‘Uthman  and  ‘Ali  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  them all). [Mulla Jiwan al-Siddiqi, Nur al-Anwar, 1:474-5]

Hence,  in  this  hadith  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  defined  bid‘ah  as  all  matters  of  religion  not  found  in  the  Sunnah,  precisely  the  Shar‘i  definition  explained  above.  Moreover,  in  this  hadith  he  censured  all  bid‘ahs,  without making  any  exception.

Statement  of  Imam  Malik
Imam al-Shatibi narrates in his book: 

Ibn  Habib  al-Maliki  (d.  238)  narrated:  Ibn  al-Majishun  (d.  214)  said:  I  heard  [Imam] Malik  (d.  179)  say:  “Whoever  innovates  into  Islam  a  bid‘ah  (innovation),  deeming  it  good ,  then  verily  he  has  claimed  that  Muhammad  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him peace)  betrayed  the  role  of  Messenger,  because  Allah  says:  ‘Today  I  have  completed  for  you  your  religion.’  (5:3)  Thus,  whatever  was  not  religion  at  that  time,  is  not  religion  today .” [Al-I‘tisam 1:64]

Ibn  Habib  and  Ibn  al-Majishun  are  both  well-known  authorities  and  transmitters  of  the  Maliki  school.

In  another  version  of  this  statement,  Imam  Malik  begins  with:  “Whoever  innovates  into this  ummah  something  that  its  predecessors  were  not upon…” [Ibid. 2:306 ] 

As  clear  from  the  context  and   time  in  which  this  was  said,  “predecessors”  refers  to  the  Sahabah.  Thus,  all  religious  matters  innovated  after  the  Sahabah  are,  in  Malik’s  usage,  bid‘ah,  and  none  of  them  can  be  described  as  good.  Hence,  we  are  provided  with  a  very  clear  early  formulation  of  the  definition  of  bid‘ah.

Statement  of  Hudhayfah  ibn  al-Yaman
It  is  reported  from  the  Sahabi,  Hudhayfah  ibn  al-Yaman  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him):

“Every  ritual  the  companions  of  the  Messenger  of  Allah  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him peace)  did  not  render  in  worship  [to  Allah],  do  not  render  it  in  worship  [to  Allah]  –  or  do not  innovate  it  –  for,  verily,  the  early  ones  did  not leave  any  voice  for  the  latter ones…Adopt  the  path  of  those  who  came  before  you.”  [Ibid. 3:53]

Statement  of  ‘Abd  Allah  ibn  Mas‘ud
Ibn  Mas‘ud  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  said:

“Follow,  and  do  not  innovate,  for  verily,  you  have  been  sufficed.”  [Majma‘ al-Zawa’id, 1:434]

In  some  versions  there  is  the  addition,  “follow  our  footsteps” [Al-Bida‘ wa l-Nahy ‘anha, p. 17] 

Similar  pronouncements  can  be  found  in  Muhammad  ibn  Waddah’s  al-Bida‘  wa l-Nahy ‘anha  and  al-Shatibi’s  al-I‘tisam.

The  rationale  behind  the  latter  two  statements  is  the  following.  The  Sahabah  superseded  the  ummah  in  the  acquisition  of  virtue  and  reward.  Thus,  in  the  words  of  Ibn  Mas‘ud  their  example  is  sufficient  for  us.  Furthermore,  any  accretion  would  be  regarded  as  bid‘ah  as  it  would  be  to  claim  that  non-Sahabah  are  more  aware  of  religious  virtue  and  more  desirous  of  acting  upon  it  than  the  best  of  generations,  that  of  the  Sahabah.  This  is  why  Imam  Malik  is  reported  to  have  said  in  condemnation  of  bid‘ah:  “Do  you  think  the  people  today  are   more  desirous  of  virtue  than  those  who  have  passed?!”  [Al-I‘tisam, 2:276]

The  pious  ruler,  widely  regarded  as  the  reviver  of  the  first  Islamic  century,  ‘Umar ibn  ‘Abd  al-‘Aziz,  also  said  something  to  this  effect  in  a  statement  which  will  be  quoted  a  little  later.

Al-Shatibi’s  contemporary,  Hafiz  Ibn  Kathir  (d.  774),  expressed  this  principle  under  his explanation  of  verse  46:11  of  his  Qur’anic  commentary  as  follows: 

“As  for  the  Ahl  al-Sunnah  wal-Jama‘ah,  they  say  with  respect to  every  action  and  statement  [which  is  adopted  as  religion  or  is  ritualised],  not  established  from  the  Sahabah   (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  them),  ‘It  is  bid‘ah,’  because  had  it  been  virtuous,  they  would  have  beaten  us  to  it,  since  they  did  not  leave  a  trait  from  the  traits  of  virtue  except  they  hastened  towards  it.”  [Tafsir  al-Qur’an  al-‘Azim, p.  1703] 

There  are,  thus,  a  number  of  clear  statements  from  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him),  the  Sahabah  and  the  early  Muslims  that  any  innovation  into  the  religion  after  the  Sahabah  equates  to  bid‘ah,  which  is  precisely  the  definition  of  bid‘ah  outlined  above.

Proofs for the Detestability of  Bid‘ah
There  are  many  strong  and  unequivocal  condemnations  of  bid‘ah  found  in  the  hadiths  and  statements  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  the  early  Muslims.  

Hadith  One
In  a  hadith  recorded  by  al-Bukhari  and  Muslim  in  their  Sahihs,  the  Prophet  (peace  and blessings  be  upon  him)  said: 

“Whoever  introduces  therein  an  innovation  or  shelters  an  innovator,  upon  him  is  the curse  of  Allah,  the  Angels  and  all  of  mankind.  Allah  will  accept  neither  a  compulsory  nor  a  voluntary  deed  from  him  on  the  Day  of  Resurrection.”  

Hadith  Two
In  a  hadith  recorded  in  Sahih  Muslim,  Jabir  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  narrates  that the  Prophet  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him peace)  would  say in  his  sermons: 

“The  best  speech  is  the  Book  of  Allah  and  the  best  example  is  the  example  of  Muhammad.  The  worst  of  affairs  are  their  newly-invented  ones,  and  every  bid‘ah  is  misguidance.”  

In  imitation  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him),  Muslim  leaders  from  both early  and  later  times  repeat  this  formula  in  their  sermons.  

Statements  from the  Early  Muslims
Al-Lalaka’i,  Muhammad  ibn  Nasr  and  al-Bayhaqi  transmit  with  an  authentic  chain  from  ‘Abd  Allah  ibn  ‘Umar  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him):

“Every  bid‘ah  is  misguidance,  even  if  people  deem it  good.”  [Jalal  al-Din  al-Suyuti,  al-Amr  bi  l-Ittiba‘ wa l-Nahy ‘an al-Ibtida‘, p. 64]

This  shows  that  in  the  usage  of  Ibn  ‘Umar  there  is  no  situation  in  which  bid‘ah  can  be  good.  Hence,  whenever  it  is  conclusively  proven  that  a  certain  matter  described  as “bid‘ah”  is  good,  this  is  according  to  a  different  usage  of  the  term.

Al-Darimi  narrates  with  an  authentic  chain  from  the  eminent  Tabi‘i,  Hassan  ibn  ‘Atiyyah (d. 130):

“No  people  innovate  a  bid‘ah  into  their  religion,  except  Allah  removes  from  their  sunnahs  the  like  of  it,  and  then  He  will  not  return  it  to  them  till  the  Day  of  Resurrection.”

Note  the  explicit  usage  of  the  phrase  “in  their  religion,”  and  the  absence  of  any  exception,  supporting  the  conclusion  that  bid‘ah  in  the  Shari‘ah  refers  exclusively  to  religious  innovations  and  that  they  are  all  blameworthy  with  no  exception.

It  is  reported  from  the  famous  ascetic,  Fudayl  ibn  ‘Iyad  (107  –  187): 

“Whoever  sits  with  a  champion  of  bid‘ah,  he  will  not  be  given  wisdom.” [Al-I‘tisam 1:149]

It  is  clear  from  these  statements  that  bid‘ah  was  invariably  used  negatively  by  the  early  Muslims,  as  were  its  derivatives,  “ahl  al-bid‘ah,”  (people  of  bid‘ah)  “sahib  al-bid‘ah” (champion  of  bid‘ah)  and  “mubtadi‘”  (innovator).  Even  those  Muslims  today  who mistakenly  defend  the  view  that  bid‘ah  in  its  conventional  and  Shar‘i  usage  can  be  both praiseworthy  and  blameworthy  do  not  use  these  terms  positively.  This  is  a  clear  proof that  in  the  Muslim  conscience,  bid‘ah  has  always  been  thought  of  as  a  negative  principle  and  never  a  positive  one,  when  used  in  its  normal  context.  Whenever  bid‘ah  was  mentioned  by  the  early  Muslims  without  any  qualification,  it  was  the  Shar‘i  meaning  that  was intended.

Imam  al-Shatibi  collected  all  the  negative  consequences  of  bid‘ah  documented  in  the hadiths  and  statements  of  the  early  Muslims  with  their  original  references.  Some  of  these consequences  are  as  follows:  No  worship  will  be  of  benefit  for  the  practitioner  of  bid‘ah;  protection  is  removed  from  his  gatherings;  respect  for  him  helps  in  destroying  Islam;  he  is  cursed  by  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him);  he  grows  distant  from  Allah;  it  prevents  prophetic  intercession;  it  lifts  and  removes  the  blessed  sunnahs;  the  innovator  incurs  the  sin  of  those  who  imitate  him;  it  is  feared  that  he  will  be  deprived  of  repentance;  he  will  be  disgraced  and  incur  the  wrath  of  Allah;  he  will  be  removed  from  the  fountain  on  the  Day  of  Resurrection;  it  is  feared  he  will  be  counted  amongst  the  disbelievers  and  die  a  disbeliever;  his  face  will  be  blackened  on  the  Day  of  Resurrection and  he  will  be  punished  in  the  Fire;  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  disassociated  himself  from  him;  it  is  feared  he  will  be  punished  even  in  this  world,  let  alone  the  afterlife. [Ibid. 1:183]

All  this  –  and  more  –  is  clear  proof  that  bid‘ah,  in  its  popular,  generic,  Shar‘i  usage,  is  always  blameworthy,  and  as  the  statements  of  Ibn  ‘Umar  and  Imam  Malik  clearly  show, there  can  be  no  good  in  it.  Al-Shatibi  lists  several  principles  why  the  condemnations  of bid‘ah  must  be  understood  as  general  and  inclusive  without  any  exceptions.  Some  of  these  principles  are  as  follows:

1.  The  hadiths  condemning  bid‘ah  in  its  totality  are  frequent,  explicit  and  make  no exception.  When  explicit  and  general  texts  are  recurrent  in  this  manner,  a  principle  of  jurisprudence  states  that  it  must  be  accepted  at  face  value  and  may  not  be  restricted  or  qualified.

2.  The  early  Muslims  invariably  used  the  term  negatively,  as  they  did  “ahl  al-bid‘ah,”  “sahib  al-bid‘ah”  and  “mubtadi‘,”  which shows  that  these  terms  were  never  conceived  in  the  Muslim  conscience  as  having  any  goodness  in  them.  In  fact,  the prominent  Maliki  scholar,  al-Qarafi,  related  consensus  on  the  condemnation  of  bid‘ahs,  quoting  from  Ibn  Abi  Zayd  al-Qayranawi  and  others. [Al-I’tisam 1:313] 

Thus,  bid‘ah,  in  its  conventional usage,  must  be  blameworthy  in  totality  with  no  exception.

3.  In  its  conception,  bid‘ah  is  to  deem  something  good  in  religion  which  was  non-existent  in  the  early  period,  while  goodness  and  virtue  in  religion  is  only determined  by  revelation  to  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him),  and was  practised  and  observed  most  fervently  by  his  companions,  so  even  on  this rational  basis  alone,  no  bid‘ah  –  that  is,  religious  innovation  –  can  possibly  be  good.  

‘Umar  ibn  ‘Abd  al-‘Aziz  expressed  this  principle  as  follows,  as  transmitted  by  Ibn  Waddah:

“You  must  adhere  to  the  Sunnah,  because  it  is  a protection  for  you  by  the  permission  of  Allah.  And  know that  the  people  did  not innovate  a  bid‘ah  except  there  has  passed  before  it  that  which  is  a  proof  against  it  and  an  admonition  therein,  for  verily,  the  Sunnah  was  only  instituted  by  one  who  knew what  is  in  variation  from  it  of  error,  slip,  stupidity  and extremism.  So  be  content  for  yourself  with  what  the  people  [i.e.  the  Sahabah]  were  content  with  for  themselves,  for  they  are  the  foremost (Qur’an  9:110)…For,  if  guidance  was what  you  are  upon  then  you  have  beaten  them to  it …Whereas,  verily,  they  are  the foremost .  Indeed  they  have  spoken  on  it  with  what  suffices.” [I‘tisam 1:63-4]

Proofs for the Distinction between the Lexical and Shar‘i  Meanings of Bid‘ah
One  of  the  reasons  for  confusion  over  the  concept  of  bid‘ah  is  that  sometimes  bid‘ah  was  used  in  its  linguistic  meaning  by  the  early  Muslims.  I  will  present  two  well-known examples  of  this,  and  then  demonstrate  that  these  statements  must  be  understood unconventionally  and  linguistically.

Statement  of  ‘Umar
Al-Bukhari  narrates  in  his  Sahih  from  ‘Abd  al-Rahman  ibn  ‘Abd  al-Qari  that  he  said:  “I  went  out  with  ‘Umar  ibn  al-Khattab  (Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  on  a  night  of  Ramadan  to  the  mosque,  when  behold,  the  people  were  in  isolated  groups,  one  man  praying  on  his  own  and  another  leading  a  group  in  prayer.  So  ‘Umar  said:  ‘I  think  it  would  be  better  if  these  [separate  groups]  were  gathered  under  one  reciter.’  Then  he  made  a  resolve,  so  he gathered  them  under  Ubayy  ibn  Ka‘b.  Then  I came  out  with  him on  another  night,  while  their  reciter  led  the  people  in  prayer.  ‘Umar  said:  ‘A  blessed  bid‘ah  this  is!’.” [Fath  al-Bari 4:317-8]

To  understand  ‘Umar’s  usage  of  bid‘ah  in  this  sentence,  it  is  necessary  to  know  a  little  about  the  history  of  this  prayer.  Imam  al-Shatibi  quotes  from  Abu  Dawud’s  Sunan  from Abu  Dharr  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  that  he  said:  “We  fasted  with  the  Messenger of  Allah  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him  peace)  during  Ramadan,  but  he  did  not  stand with  us  [in  prayer]  in  any  part  of  the  month  until  seven  [nights]  remained.  Then  he  stood  with  us  until  a third  of  the  night  had  passed.  When  the  sixth  [remaining  night]  came,  he  did  not  stand  with  us.  When  the  fifth  [remaining  night]  came,  he  stood  with  us  until  a  half  of  the  night  passed.  So  we  said,  ‘We  wish you  had  led  us  in  supererogatory  prayers  during  the  whole  of  tonight.’  He  said,  ‘When  a  man  prays  with  an  imam  until  he  leaves, he  is  reckoned  as  having  spent  a  whole  night  in  prayer.’  When  the  fourth  [remaining  night]  came  he  did  not  stand  with  us.  When  the  third  [remaining  night]  came,  he  gathered  his  family,  his  wives,  and  the  people  and  prayed  with  us  until  we  were  afraid  we  would  miss  success  (falah)  [meaning,  the  pre-dawn  meal  or  suhur].” [Al-I‘tisam, 1:324]  

Al-Shatibi  then  states:  “However,  when  he  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him  peace)  feared  it  would  become  obligatory  on  the  ummah  he  withheld  from  it.  Thus,  in  the  Sahih  [it  is  narrated]  from  ‘A’ishah  (Allah  be  pleased  with  her)  that  one  night  Allah’s  Messenger  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him  peace)  prayed  in  the  mosque  and  the  people  followed  him  in  prayer.  The  next  night  he  also  prayed  and  the  people  increased.  On  the  third  or  fourth  night  they  gathered,  but  Allah’s  Messenger  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him  peace)  did  not  come  out  to  them.  When  morning  came  he  said,  ‘I  saw  what  you  were  doing  and  nothing  but  the  fear  that  it  might  be  enjoined  on  you,  stopped  me  from  coming.’  And  that  was  in  the  month  of  Ramadan.” [Ibid. 1:324-5]

Al-Shatibi  goes  on  to  explain  that,  therefore,  the  reason  the  Prophet  (peace  and blessings  be  upon  him)  abstained  from  the  continued  practice  of  this  special  night  prayer  in  Ramadan  was  for  fear  that  revelation  will  make  it  incumbent  on  the  Muslims  if  they  were  to  observe  it  continuously.  With  the  demise  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be upon  him),  this  barrier  no  longer  remained  as  revelation  had  come  to  an  end.  Hence,  the  original  ruling  of  the  desirability  of  Tarawih  throughout  the  month  returned,  which  was  only  hampered  in  the  time  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  for  a  temporary  fear  that  ended  with  his  death.  Abu  Bakr  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  probably  did  not  attend  to  reviving  this  prayer  due  to  his  other  commitments  and  the  short  period  of  his  caliphate.  ‘Umar  referred  to  it  as  bid’ah  “by  consideration  of  the apparent  situation”,  from  the  perspective  that  Allah’s  Messenger  (Allah  bless  him  and   grant  him  peace)  eventually  left  it  out  and  it  so  happened  that  it  was  not  revived  as  a  continuous  practice  in  the  time  of  Abu  Bakr  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him),  not  that  it  is  bid’ah  in  the  real  sense. [Ibid. 1:326-7] 

This  is  therefore  an  example  of  bid‘ah  being  used  in  its  linguistic  meaning,  not  in  its  Shar‘i  meaning  of  an  actual  innovation  in  religion. Furthermore,  the  practices  of  the  righteous  caliphs  form  part  of  the  Sunnah  as  explicitly mentioned  in  hadith,  so  by  definition,  it  cannot  be  bid‘ah  in  its  Shar‘i  meaning.

Statement  of  al-Shafi‘i
Ibn  Rajab  al-Hanbali  writes  in  his  Jami‘  al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam:

“Hafiz  Abu  Nu‘aym  narrated  with  his  chain  from  Ibrahim  ibn  Junayd:  Harmalah  ibn  Yahya narrated  to  us,  he  said:  I  heard  al-Shafi‘i  (Allah  have  mercy  on  him)  say:  ‘Bid‘ah  is  two  bid‘ahs:  praiseworthy  bid‘ah  and  blameworthy  bid‘ah.  Thus,  whatever  agrees  with  the Sunnah,  it  is  praiseworthy  and  whatever  conflicts  with  the  Sunnah,  it  is  blameworthy.’  And  he  adduced  as  evidence  the  statement  of  ‘Umar:  ‘What  an  excellent  bid‘ah  this  is!’” [Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam, p. 600]

It  should,  firstly,  be  noted  that  this  statement  of  Imam al-Shafi‘i  is  irreconcilable  with Imam  Malik’s  earlier  statement  that  there  can  be  no  good  in  bid‘ah  if  we  suppose  they meant  the  same  thing  by  the  word  “bid‘ah.”  (Imam  Malik  was senior  to  al-Shafi‘i,  and amongst  his  teachers.)  It  must,  therefore,  be  the  case  that  they  used  bid‘ah  in  different ways.  Al-Shafi‘i  used  it  linguistically  as  proven  by  his  citation  of  the  statement  of  ‘Umar  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him).  His  usage  of  bid‘ah  here  was  linguistic,  and  inclusive  of  religious  and  worldly  innovations;  whereas,  Malik  used  it  in  its  Shar‘i  usage.  It  is  due  to  this  irreconcilability  if  a  uniform  meaning  of  the  word  “bid‘ah”  is  assumed  that  the  distinction  between  a  lexical  and  Shar‘i  definition  of  bid‘ah  is  necessary.  Without  this distinction,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  reconcile  such  apparently  conflicting  statements.

Moreover,  it  is  clear  from  al-Shafi‘i’s  methodology  that  he  disallows  innovation  in  religion. Thus,  bid‘ah  in  its  Shar‘i  meaning,  i.e.  innovations  introduced  into  religion  (even  if  there  is  no  direct  opposition  to  the  Sunnah)  is  unanimously  rejected.  Ibn  Hajar  al-‘Asqalani wrote: 

“Al-Shafi‘i  replied  to  the  statement  of  the  one  who  says  nothing  of  the  House  is abandoned  [so  we  ought  to  salute  all  four  corners  of  the  Ka‘bah]  that  we  do  not  omit salutation  of  the  two  corners  in  abandonment  of  the  house  –  and  how  is  it  being  abandoned  when  the  Tawaf  includes  them?  –  but  we  follow the  Sunnah,  both  in  performance  and  in  omission …” [Fath al-Bari, 3:599]

It  is  clear  from  this  statement  that  al-Shafi‘i  did  not  allow accretions  of  a  religious  nature to  what  is  established  in  the  Sunnah. 

Statements of Major Scholars Major  pre-modern  scholars  besides  al-Shatibi  explained  the  distinction  between  the  lexical  and  Shar‘i  meanings  of  bid‘ah.  Three  of  them  are  quoted  below.

Ibn  Kathir  (d.  774  H)  wrote  in  his  commentary  of  verse  2:117  of  the  Qur’an: 

“Bid‘ah  is  of  two  types:  sometimes  it  is  Shar‘i  bid‘ah,  like  his  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him  peace)  statement:  ‘For  indeed  every  innovation  is  bid‘ah  and  every  bid‘ah  is misguidance,’  and  sometimes  it  is  linguistic  bid‘ah  like  the  statement  of  the  Commander of  the  Believers,  ‘Umar  ibn  al-Khattab  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him),  about  his  unification  of  them  on  the  Tarawih  prayer  and  their  continuous  [practice  of  it]:  ‘An  excellent  bid‘ah  this  is!’” [Tafsir al-Qur’an al-‘Azim, p. 191]

Ibn  Hajar  al-‘Asqalani  (d.  852  H)  said: 

“As  for  ‘bida‘,’  it  is  the  plural  of  ‘bid‘ah,’  which  is  everything  that  has  no  precedent  that came  before  [it].  Thus,  linguistically,  it  includes  that  which  is  praised  and  dispraised.  And in  the  convention  of  the  Shari‘ah  it  is  specified  to  what  is  dispraised;  and  if  it  is  used  in  a  praiseworthy  matter,  that  is  according  to  its  linguistic  meaning.” [Fath al-Bari, 13:340]

Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali (d. 795 H) said: 

“Thus,  all  who  innovate  something  and  attribute  it  to  the  religion,  and  it  has  no  basis  in the  religion  to  which it  is  referred,  it  is  misguidance,  and  the  religion  is  free  from  it.  The  matters  of  belief,  actions  and  outward  and  inward  speech  are  equal  in  this.  As  for  what  has  occurred  in  the  speech  of  [some  of  the]  Salaf  in  deeming  some  ‘bid‘ahs’  good,  that  is  only  linguistic  bid‘ahs  not  Shar‘i  bid‘ah” [Jami‘ al-‘Ulum wa l-Hikam, p. 597]

Similar  statements  distinguishing  the  lexical  and  Shar‘i  meanings  of  bid‘ah  can  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Muhammad  al-Birgivi  (d.  981  H),  Ibn  Hajar  al-Haythami  (d.  974 H)  and  many  scholars  of  the  later  period.  Al-Shatibi’s  extensive  scholarly  treatment  of  the  texts  of  the  Shari‘ah  and  the  usage  of  the  term  by  the  early  Muslims  conclusively demonstrates  the  true  nature  of  bid‘ah  in  the  Shari‘ah,  so  if  used  otherwise  it  is  either  as  a metaphor  or  due  to  ignorance  of  the  reality  of  bid‘ah. [Al-I‘tisam, 1:45]

Answering Objections
Some  people  contend  that  the  condemnation  of  religious  innovations  is  restricted  to those  innovations  that  directly  clash  with  the  Shari‘ah.  Otherwise,  they  are  not blameworthy,  and  in  fact  may be  permissible  or  even  recommended.  Al-Shatibi  answers  their  doubts  in  the  third  chapter  of  his  book.  Three  of  their  most  commonly  used  evidences  will  be  presented  below  followed  by  their  replies: 

Hadith  of  Jarir  ibn  ‘Abd  Allah  al-Bajali
The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said as recorded in Sahih Muslim: 

“Whoever  institutes  a  good  sunnah,  he  will  have  its  reward  and  the  reward  of  those  who practise  it,  and  that  will  not  decrease  from  their  rewards  in  the  least.  And  whoever institutes  a  bad  sunnah,  he  will  have  its  sin  and  the  sins  of  those  who  practise  it,  and  that  will  not  decrease  from  their  sins  in  the  least.”  

The  proponents  of  the  view that  innovations  in  religion  need  not  be  blameworthy  or discouraged  argue  that  this  hadith  proves  that  not  only  can  a  new  practice  that  is introduced  into  religion  be  good  but  may  also  be  the  cause  of  an  immense  amount  of  reward.

The  reply  to  this  argument  is  that  this  conclusion  is  contradicted  by  the  context  in  which  this  statement  was  said. [Ibid. 1:304] 

The  full  context  as  narrated  by  Jarir  ibn  ‘Abd  Allah  al-Bajali  is that  a  group  of  people  came  to  the  Prophet  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him  peace)  dressed  in  wool,  and  they  were  desperately  in  need.  He,  therefore,  invited  the  people  to spend  in  charity,  upon  which  a man  emptied  a  purse  of  silver  and  others  followed  suit.  It  was  then  that  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  made  this  statement.

Sadaqah  (charity)  is  established  in  the  Shari‘ah  and  from  the  Sunnah,  but  one  particular aspect  of  it  was  not  being  practised.  Furthermore,  voluntary  charity  is  not  restricted  to  any  ritualistic  (ta‘abbudi)  law,  as  its  purpose  –  which  is  to  alleviate  suffering  –  is  understood  and  is  comprehensible.  Hence,  the  hadith  does  not  refer  to  inventing  something  new  into  the  religion,  but  about  applying  an  ‘adi  law  to  a  situation  that demanded  it.  Mufti  Taqi  Usmani  writes  in  his  commentary  of  this  hadith:  

“This  is  with  respect  to  what  is  established  as  being  good  from  the  Qur’an  and  Sunnah, but  the  people  have  left  it  or  they  have  not  attended  to  one  of  its  aspects,  as  has  occurred  here,  since  the  virtue  of  charity  is  established  from  the  Qur’an  and  Sunnah,  but  the  one  who  attended  to  this  particular  cause  and  produced  charity  first,  inviting  others  to  it,  attained  this  virtue.  As  for  what  is  not  established  as  a righteous  deed  from  the  Qur’an  or  the  Sunnah,  inventing  such  a  deed  is  innovation  that  has  no  connection  to  this  hadith.” [Takmilah Fath al-Mulhim, 5:407]

Furthermore,  it  should  be  noted  that  “sunnah”  in  this  hadith  is  used  in  its  linguistic meaning  of  “path,”  “way”  and  “method,”  which  can  be  both  good  and  bad  as  described  in the  hadith.  However,  according  to  its  Shar‘i  meaning  –  which  is  its  dominant  usage  amongst Muslims  –  it  refers  to  the  religious  example  set  for  us  by  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  his  closest  companions,  and  thus  can  only  be  positive.

The Innovations of the Early Muslims
The  proponents  of  the  view that  religious  innovations  may  be  good  contend,  secondly,  that  the  Sahabah  and  early  Muslims  introduced  many  innovations  in  religion,  including  the  compilation  of  the  Qur’an  and  writing  down  knowledge.  Thus,  they  argue,  if  inventing  new  practices  in  religion  is  for  a  good  purpose,  it  is  praiseworthy.

The  answer  to  this  is  that  these  are  not  bid‘ah,  as  they  are  innovations  in  ‘adi  matters. These  particular  examples  fall  under  what  al-Shatibi  refers  to  as  al-masalih  al-mursalah (unspecified  benefits).  There  are  two  major  differences  between  these  acts  introduced  by the  Sahabah  and  the  early  Muslims  and  what  is  regarded  as  bid‘ah  in  the  Shari‘ah:

1.  The  basis  of  these  innovations  is  understood  and  comprehensible.  In  other  words  they  are  ma‘qul al-ma‘na  or  ‘adi, and  are  not  ta‘abbudi.

2.  They  are  adopted  as  means  and  not  as  ends,  based  on  the  principle  that  “whatever  an  obligation  is  not  complete  without,  that  itself  is  obligatory.”  

A  group  of  the  Sahabah  compiled  the  Qur’an  into  one  volume  in  the  time  of  Abu  Bakr (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  for  fear  that  the  Qur’an  will  be  lost  if  left  to  oral  transmission  alone  as  many  of  the  memorisers  of  the  Qur’an  died  in  battle.  Thus,  for  the  purpose  of  hifz al-shar‘  (preserving  the  Shari‘ah),  the  Sahabah  undertook  this  action.  Hifz al-shar‘  is  something  the  purpose  of  which  can  be  comprehended,  and  it  can  be  practised  in  a  variety  of  different  ways,  depending  on  the  situation  and  on  the  resources  that  are  available.  Furthermore,  its  basis  can  also  be  traced  to  tabligh  al-shar‘ (conveying  the  Shari‘ah),  which  is  from  the  established  teachings  of  the  Qur’an  and  Sunnah.  This  is  also  a  non-ritualistic  (‘adi)  instruction,  as  its  purpose  –  that  is,  to  facilitate  the  message  reaching  others  –  is  understood.  The  same  reasoning  also  applies  to  compiling  knowledge. [al-I‘tisam 3:12-7]

In  sum,  these  “innovations”  were  not  in  ta‘abbudi  matters,  and  therefore  do  not  fall  under  the  meaning  of  bid‘ah  as  intended  in  the  Shari‘ah.  A  clear  indication  of  this  is  that  they  were  adopted  as  means  (wasa’il)  and  not  as  ends  in  themselves  which  is  the  nature of  bid‘ah.

The Scholars’ Division of Bid‘ah into Good and Bad
A  third  proof  presented  by  the  proponents  of  the  view  that  religious  innovation  may  be good  is  that  certain  major  scholars  divided  bid‘ah  into  the  five  juridical  categories,  namely,  fard,  mustahabb/mandub,  mubah,  makruh and  haram.  Al-Shatibi  discusses  the  statements  of  two  prominent  scholars:  al-Qarafi  (d.  684)  and  his  teacher  ‘Izz  al-Din  ibn ‘Abd  al-Salam  (d.  660),  as  both  were  major  scholars  of  usul  al-fiqh.  He  demonstrates  that  there  is  clear  inconsistency  in  their  exposition  of  bid‘ah  which  comes  down  to  a  conflation  of  the  literal  and  Shar‘i  meanings  of  the  word.  I  will  summarise  some  of  his  conclusions  below.

It  should  be  noted  that  al-Qarafi  imitated  ‘Izz  al-Din  ibn  ‘Abd  al-Salam  in  this categorisation,  and  it  is  clear  al-Qarafi  did  not  make  any  distinction  between  a  literal definition  of  bid‘ah  and  a  Shar‘i  definition.  It  appears  that  to  him  they  are  both  the  same. 

Both  al-Qarafi  and  al-‘Izz  state  that  the  method  of  identifying  the  ruling  of  an  innovation (bid‘ah)  is  to  subject  it  to  the  laws  and  principles  of  the  Shari‘ah.  [Al-I‘tisam 1:319] 

Thus,  if  the  laws  prove  that  an  innovation  is  wajib  it  is  wajib,  or  if  they  prove  that  it  is  haraam  it  is  haraam  and  so  forth.  Al-Shatibi’s  first  point  in  response  is  that  if  something  is  proven  to  be  makruh  or  haraam,  they  are  classed  as  direct  violations  and  not  bid‘ah  in  religion.

More  importantly  however,  al-Qarafi,  one  of  the  major  scholars  who  promoted  this  view,  falls  into  a  contradiction  when  he  says:  “The  scholars  (al-ashab)  as  far  as  I  have  seen  are agreed  on  condemning  bid‘ah.” [Al-I‘tisam 1:313] 

Quoting  Ibn  Abi  Zayd  (d.  386), the  prominent  Maliki  jurist,  and  others,  but  then  says:  “The  truth  is  that  it  is  divided  into  five  types,” [ibid]  which  if  taken  literally  would  imply  al-Qarafi  is  openly  violating  the  consensus he  himself  transmitted!  Al-Shatibi  takes  al-Qarafi  to  task  for  this  and  states  he  clearly  “violated  consensus.” [Ibid. 1:322]

A  second  inconsistency  in  al-Qarafi’s  discussion  on  bid‘ah  is  where  he  states:  “If  it  [i.e. bid‘ah]  is  considered  in  a  general  sense,  in  terms  of  it  being  an  innovation  (bid‘ah),  and  ignoring  anything  that  requires  it,  it  is  detested;  for  verily,  all  good  is  in  imitation  and  all  evil  in  innovation ” [Ibid.  1:319] 

Al-Shatibi  points  out  that  this  is  incongruent  with  his  earlier  exposition  as  it  would  imply  a combination  of  two  conflicting  rulings  in  some  matters,  that  of  detestability  and of  obligation.  However,  this  difficulty  is  avoided  if  we  simply  make  the  distinction between  the  lexical  and  Shar‘i  meanings  of  bid‘ah  as  outlined  earlier.

In  examining  ‘Izz  al-Din  ibn  ‘Abd  al-Salam’s  statement,  al-Shatibi  observes  that  the examples  of  “obligatory”  innovations  he  produced  fall  under  the  category  of  al-masalih al-mursalah  explained  above,  which,  he  states,  al-‘Izz  mistook  as  bid‘ah  because  of  their  absence  in  those  specific  forms  in  the  earlier  period.  Al-Shatibi  also  inspects  some  of  the  other  examples  he  uses.  I  will  look  at  a  few  representative  examples  below.

In  the  examples  of  mandub,  al-‘Izz  includes  the  Tarawih  prayer  which  was  examined  earlier  in  the  discussion  of  ‘Umar’s  statement,  “An  excellent  bid‘ah  this  is!”

Al-‘Izz  also  refers  to  Islamic  schools  (madrasahs)  as  an  example  of  mandub  bid‘ahs.  The  reply  to  this  is  that  building  madrasahs  is  not  based  on  a  ta‘abbudi  (ritualistic)  rule,  and is  therefore  not  bid‘ah.  Madrasahs  are  built  with  the  objective  of  conveying  knowledge,  an  important  injunction  of  the  Shari‘ah.  Conveying  knowledge  has  a  comprehensible  purpose  which  is  to  pass  on  the  inherited  sciences  of  the  religion  to  those  who  are  ignorant  of  them,  hence  this  is  an ‘adi  ruling.  It  is  known  that  in  order  to  convey  knowledge  it  is  more  effective  to  have  the  equipments,  books,  instruction  manuals,  instructors  and  students  in  one  place.  And  since  a  madrasah  facilitates  the  interaction  of  all  of  these  things,  it  follows  that  it  is  sensible  to  build  one.  Al-Shatibi  does  however  make  a  caveat,  that  madrasahs  would  be  bid‘ah  in  one  of  two  situations:  

It  would  be  bid‘ah  if  transferring  knowledge  in  the  time  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and blessings  be  upon  him)  and  his  illustrious  companions  was restricted  ritualistically  to  one place.  But  this  is  not  so,  as  we  find  examples  in  their  lifetimes,  of  knowledge  being  taught  in  houses,  markets,  mosques,  during  a  journey  etc.  

Secondly,  if  it  is  believed  madrasahs  are  the  only  place  where  knowledge  can  be  acquired  as  a  religious  conviction,  and  they  are  ritualistically  adopted  in  this  way,  that  would  then  make  them  bid‘ah.  However,  it  is  generally  the  case  that  people  are  not  susceptible  to  the  misunderstanding  that  madrasahs  are  literally  something  that  originates  in  the  example  of  the  early  generations,  because  the  reason  for  constructing  them  (i.e.  the  facilitation  of  instruction)  is  understood  and  comprehensible  to  the  general  mind.  Therefore  it  is  a completely  ‘adi  –  non-ritualistic  –  matter,  and  there  is  little  danger  of  it  becoming  ta‘abbudi  in  the  minds  of  some.  (The  issue  of  a  fear  of  something  being  interpreted  by  the  common  people  as  a  ta‘abbudi  restriction  will  be  discussed  later.)

Al-‘Izz  also  mentioned  “every  act  of  kindness  without  precedent  in  the  first  era.”  as  an  example  of  a  bid‘ah  that  is  mandub.  Al-Shatibi  replies  that  this example  requires  making  the  following  distinctions:

1.  If  the  “act  of  kindness”  is  limited  by  a  ta‘abbudi  restriction,  as  for  example  in Zakah  and  Sadaqat al-Fitr,  a  change  will  certainly  constitute  bid‘ah.

2.  If  there  is  no  ta‘abbudi  restriction  in  “the  act  of  kindness,”  it  would  fall  under  the  general  order  in  the  Qur’an  and  Sunnah  to  be  good  and  kind  to  others.  And  since “kindness”  and  “being  charitable”  is  a  principle  that  is  comprehensible  and explicable,  this  command  can  be  enacted  in  unprecedented  ways.  However,  al-Shatibi  says,  there  are  two  conditions  to  this:  First,  the  normal  rules  of  the  Shari‘ah  apply,  that  the  wealth  is  lawful,  the  charity  is  not  followed  up  by  injury (adha)  and  so  on;  second,  that  there  is  no  insistence  on  a  specific  form  that  gives  the  impression  that  particular  form  is  established  from  the  Sunnah,  for  example,  always  giving  charity  publicly  on  a  particular  day  with  no  ‘adi  reason.  Since  this  gives  the  impression  of  an  innovated  ta‘abbudi  restriction,  it  would  be  cautioned  against  due  to  imitation  of  bid‘ah.  This  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  below  under  the section  of  relative  bid‘ah.  Of  course,  if  there  is  an  actual  belief  of  a  ta‘abbudi restriction,  that  would  fall  under  the  literal  definition  of  bid‘ah. [Al-I‘tisam 1:347-8]

As  an  example  of  bid‘ah  that  is  mubah,  al-Izz  cites  handshaking  after  Fajr  and  ‘Asr,  which  was  a  common  practice  in  his  time.  Al-Shatibi  replies  that  if  handshaking  after  these  two  prayers  is  not  done  with  the  intention  that  there  is  a  religious  connection  between  handshaking  and  those  prayers  it  will  certainly  not  be  a  “true  bid‘ah”  in  the  way  described  above.  However,  with  persistence  on  it  will  become  a  type  of  bid‘ah  referred  to  as  “relative  bid‘ah,”  that  is,  a  practice  in  which  there  is  a  fear  that  by  persistence  on  it,  it  will  eventually  be  added  to  the  prayers,  the  reason  being  that there  is  no  overtly ‘adi  reason  for  this  specific  practice.  This  principle  will  be  discussed  below  under  the  section  of  relative  bid‘ah.

Moreover,  this  is  an  example  of  where  ‘Izz  al-Din  ibn  ‘Abd  al-Salam  contradicts  himself.  When  he  was  asked  specifically  about  this  practice,  of  shaking  hands  after  Fajr  and  ‘Asr,  he  said  in  his  Fatawa:  “Shaking  hands  after  Fajr  and  ‘Asr  is  from  the  bid‘ahs,  except  for  one  who  arrives  [from  a  journey  at  that  time]…”.  He  goes  on  to  explain  that  this  is  not  from  the  example  of  the  Prophet  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him  peace)  and  “all  good  is  in  imitation  of  the  Messenger.” [Kitab al-Fatawa, p. 46-7]

The  Nature  of  the  Evidences  Furnished  by  the  People  of  Bid‘ah
People  who  engage  in  bid‘ah  do  not  recognise  what  they  do  as  bid‘ah.  On  the  contrary,  by  definition,  the  practitioner  of  bidah  believes  what  he  is  engaged  in  to  be  praiseworthy and  established  in  the  religion.  Thus,  they  will  invariably  furnish  “proofs”  for  their  bid‘ahs  from  the  sources  of  the  Shari‘ah.  Al-Shatibi  devotes  an  entire  chapter  to  explaining  the  kinds  of  proof  presented  by  the  people  of  bid‘ah.  He  shows  that  there  is  always  a progression  from  personal  whim and  opinion  to  seeking  out  the  evidence,  as  opposed  to allowing  the  evidences  to  explain  themselves  based  on  the  understanding  of  the  earlier generations.  The  primary  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  evidences  they  supply  is that  they  are  always  unclear  (mutashabih).  An  example  he  gives  is  the  bid‘ah  of  the Mu‘tazilah  of  their  belief  that  the  Qur’an  is  created,  as  opposed  to  the  belief  of  the  Ahl  al-Sunnah  that  it  is  uncreated.  They  quote  the  verse,  “Allah  is  the  Creator  of  all  things,” (39:62)  as  proof  of  this  claim,  which  is  an  unclear  form  of  evidence.  [Al-I‘tsam 2:44]

Al-Shatibi  explains  that  on  such  shaky  grounds,  anyone  can  support  any  conclusion  they  like  from  the  scriptural  texts.  For  example,  a  Christian  can  take  support  from  the  verse, “And  His  word  that  He  cast upon  Maryam,”  (4:100)  as  proof  that  ‘Isa  (peace  be  upon him)  is  a  partner  with  Allah  (Great  and  Glorious  is  He). [Al-I‘tsam 2:124] 

He  further  says:  “Likewise,  it  is possible  for  every  person  who  follows  the  ambiguous  evidences  or  distorts  the applications  [of  the  evidences]  or  interprets  verses  in  a  way they  were  not  understood  by the  pious  Salaf  or  holds  fast  to  weak  hadiths  or  takes  evidences  on  face  value  to  draw  support  for  every  action,  statement  or  belief  that  agrees  with  his  objective  from  a  verse or  hadith  that  did  not  intend  that  at all.  The  proof  for  this  is  that  every  sect  that  has become  famous  for  its  heresy  (bid‘ah)  draws  support  from verses  or  hadiths.” [Ibid. 2:125]  

I  will  take  a  look  at  some  of  these  invalid  arguments  which are  used  by  the  people  of bid‘ah  in  the  section  on  “examples”  below.

True Bid‘ah and Relative Bid‘ah
In  the  fifth  chapter  of  al-I‘tisam,  al-Shatibi  discusses  an  important  categorisation  of bid‘ah  which  was  alluded  to  earlier.  Bid‘ah  –  in  its  Shar‘i  usage  –  divides  into  two  types: bid‘ah  haqiqiyyah  and bid‘ah  idafiyyahBid‘ah  haqiqiyyah  (true  bid‘ah)  is  bid‘ah  as explained  above.

Bid‘ah  idafiyyah  (relative  bid‘ah)  is  a  kind  of  innovation  that  was  also  regarded  as  “bid‘ah”  by  the  early  Muslims.  In  its  basic  conception,  it  is  a  matter  that  consists  of  two  elements:  one  that  is  established  in  the  Shari‘ah  and  a  second  element  that  is  innovation.  That  is,  its  specific  procedure,  conditions,  details  and  times  are  not proven  in  the  Shari‘ah,  though  they  are  required  as  these  specifications  are  performed  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  the  impression  that  they  are  part  of  religion.  This  is  best  demonstrated  by  means  of  examples:

Voluntary  (nafl)  practices  like  dhikr,  optional  prayer  and  optional  fasts  are  recommended and  praiseworthy,  and  these  voluntary  acts  of  worship  have  the  inherent  property  of “flexibility”  (tawsi‘ah).  If  one  performs  voluntary  worship  (i.e.  recitation  of  Qur’an,  dhikr, supplication,  fasting  and  prayers)  with  a  sequence  or  number  that  is  not  exactly established  from  the  Sunnah,  even  with  continuity  (dawam),  that  individual  is  acting  within  the  remits  of  the  flexibility  allowed  for  by  the  voluntary  nature  of  these  acts  of  worship.  This  is  as  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  said  in  a  hadith  recorded  by  al-Bukhari  and  Muslim  in  their  Sahihs: “You  should  do  [voluntary]  deeds  as  much  as   you  are  able”  which  he  said  specifically  in  the  context  of voluntary  prayer  performed  by  an  individual  with  continuity.  This  is  of  course  with  the condition  that  this  prayer  does  not  adversely  affect  one’s  self  or  his  responsibilities  to  others,  as  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  hadiths.

Voluntary  worship  was  originally  intended  to  be  performed  in  isolation,  not  in  public.  Thus,  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  said:  “The  best  of  your  prayer  is  in your  homes  except  the  prescribed  prayers.”  Thus,  in  the  early  period,  voluntary  worship  was  not  done  publicly  except  rarely,  unlike  wajib  and  sunnah prayers  (e.g.  ‘Id  and  Tarawih  prayers).  If,  however,  a particular  form  of  optional  worship  is  done  with  insistence  (iltizam)  and  continuity  (mudawamah)  publicly,  it  will  become  what  is  known  as  “bid‘ah  idafiyyah”  (relative  bid‘ah),  even  if  the  person  doing  it  does  not  have  the  intention  of  specifying  that  act  to  that  form  and  time.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  those  acts  that  are  performed  in  this  way  –  i.e.  specific  forms  of  worship  done  in  public  –  are  precisely  how  the  early  Muslims would  practise  sunnah  and  wajib  acts.  Thus,  an  impression  may  easily  be  created  that  the  voluntary  act  is  sunnah  or  wajib,  which  if  in  fact  believed  would  make  it  a  “true  bid‘ah”  (bid‘ah  haqiqiyyah);  but  if  only  the  impression  is  created  and  the  public  are  made  susceptible  to  that  belief,  it  would  be  counted  as bid‘ah  idafiyyah. [ibid. 2:232-5 ]

This  is  why  the  Sahabah  left out  acts  that  are  originally  permissible  for  fear  of  it  being treated  as  sunnah.  For  example,  ‘Umar  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  forbade  the  people  from  following  the  traces  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and searching  for  places  where  he  prayed,  as  recorded  in  the  Musannaf  of  ‘Abd  al-Razzaq. [Ibid. 2:236]

However,  if  one  were  to  do  this  merely  as  an  expression  of  love  or  longing  for  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him),  and  not  as  a  sunnah  act,  it  would  certainly  be  permissible  and  not  bid‘ah.  But  ‘Umar  forbade  it  for  fear  of  it  being  treated  as  a  sunnah.  After  listing  a  number  of  other  examples,  al-Shatibi  states: “And  all  of  this  is  a  path  to  not treating  what  is  not  sunnah  as  sunnah.”  [Ibid. 2:237]

An  example  from  the  teachings  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  is  the hadith  recorded  in  the  Sahihs  of  al-Bukhari  and  Muslim:   

“None  of  you  should  fast  one  or  two  days  before  Ramadan.”

One  of  the  reasons  given  for  this  by  the  commentators  is  that  there  is  a  fear  of  such voluntary  fasts  being  joined  to  the  obligatory  fast,  so  people  may  begin  to  believe  that  these  voluntary  fasts  are  also  obligatory. 

After  explaining  a  number  of  examples,  al-Shatibi  puts  down  a  basic  statement  defining  this  principle: 

“Every  action  the  basis  of  which  is  established  in  the  Shari‘ah  but  in  publicising  its practice  or  maintaining  continuity  therein  is  feared  that  it  will  be  believed  that  it  is sunnah,  it  is  required  that  it  be  totally  abandoned  as  a  path  to  blocking  the  means.” [Ibid. 2:333]

From the  definition,  it  is  clear  that  the  principle  is  subjective,  as  it  is  contingent  on  a  “fear.”  If  what  is  feared  is  actualised  in  some  of  the  common  people,  there  is  no  doubt the  bid‘ah  would  be  true  bid‘ah  (bid‘ah  haqiqiyyah)  for  those  individuals,  and  bid‘ah  idafiyyah  for  those  who  persist  on  it  without  that  belief.  Additional  specifications  in  the performance  of  a  voluntary  act,  like  doing  so  in  congregation,  out  in  public,  with  continuity,  and  under  people  who  are  followed  as  religious  authorities,  combine  to  make  a  voluntary  action  bid‘ah  idafiyyah,  unless  there  is  a  very  clear  ‘adi  reason  for  doing  so  (As  discussed  earlier  in  the  example  of  madrasah).

The  reason  is  that  it  is  easy  to  see  how  laypeople  will  begin  to  believe  what  is  not  sunnah  or  wajib  as  being  sunnah  or  wajib. In  sum,  “bid‘ah  idafiyyah”  can  be  understood  as  behaving  in  the  way  a  person  advocating  “true  bid‘ah”  would  behave,  as  an  individual  normally  will  only  insist  and  persist  publicly  on  a  non-sunnah  act  in  a  very  specific  way  if  he  believes  it  to  be  sunnah.

Below  I  will  look  at  a  few examples  where  bid‘ah  idafiyyah  was  censured  by  the  early  Muslims  and  in  the  statements  of  later  jurists. 

Ibn  Waddah  narrates  from  al-Sha‘bi  that  ‘Umar  ibn  al-Khattab  would  beat  those  who  openly  fasted  the  entire  month  of  Rajab.  Ibn  Waddah  explained:  “Its  purpose  is  for  fear that  they  would  adopt  it  as  a  sunnah  just  like  Ramadan.” [Ibn Waddah, p. 51]

If  a  person  fasts  the  entire  month  of  Rajab  as  his  private  practice,  that  would  fall  under the  general  recommendation  of  optional  fasts  (unless  it  adversely  affects  his  other obligations).  However,  if  a group  did  this  publicly,  there  is  an  imminent  fear  of  it  being treated  as  sunnah.  Since  this  group  fasted  the  entire  month  of  Rajab  openly  (and  the narration  mentions  that  they  were  known  by  the  collective  title  “Rajabiyyun”),  ‘Umar  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  forbade  them  from  doing  so  as  it  may  lead  to  true  bid‘ah.

Ibn  Waddah  narrates  from Khalid  al-Ashajj:

“We  were  in  the  mosque  of  Madinah  and  a  storyteller  told  us  tales,  and  he  began  to select  the  verses  of  prostration  from  the  Qur’an  and  prostrate  and  we  prostrated  with  him. Then  an  old  man  emerged  and  he  opposed  us,  saying:  ‘If  you  are  on  something,  verily  you  are  superior  to  the  companions  of  the  Messenger  of  Allah  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him peace).’  We  inquired  about  him, and  we  said,  ‘Who  is  this  old  man?’  They  said,  ‘It  is  ‘Abd  Allah  ibn  ‘Umar.’” [Ibid. p. 29]

Reading  the  verses  of  prostration  and  prostrating  upon  doing  so  is  established  in  the  Sunnah.  However,  specifying  them  for  recitation  and  then  doing  that  in  congregation  creates  the  impression  that  this  procedure  is  sunnah,  even  if  it  is  not  believed  so.  Hence, the  act  is  not  “true  bid‘ah”  but  “relative  bid‘ah”  and  was  condemned  by  Ibn  ‘Umar  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him).

Al-Darimi  narrates  in  his  Sunan  with  a  good  chain  that  a  group  of  Muslims  would  perform  dhikr  in  a  particular  way,  with  the  head  of  the  circle  instructing  the  people  to  recite  certain  numbers  of  different  forms  of  dhikr.  Ibn  Mas‘ud  condemned  them, saying:

“These  are  the  companions  of  your  Prophet  widely-available…By  the  One  in  Whose  hand  is  my  soul,  indeed  you  are  on  a  religion  which  is  more  guided  than  the  religion  of  Muhammad  or  you  have  opened  the  door  to  misguidance  [by  practising  innovation].”  [Sunan  al-Darimi, 1:287]

Reciting  any  number  of  dhikr  is  to  be  commended,  but  when  it  is  done  openly  and  in congregation  under  the  guidance  of  one  who  is  regarded  as  a  religious  authority,  that  particular  number  and  form  may  be  conceived  by  the  ignorant  as  being  sunnah.  Hence,  Ibn  Mas‘ud  condemned  it  as  bid‘ah.
In  all  of  these  examples,  although  it  cannot  be  ascertained  with  certainty  that  the  people  practising  these  acts  did  so  with  the  belief  that  they  are  specifically  part  of  the  Sunnah,  but  because  they  imitated  or  resembled  the  way  a  person  who  does  believe  this  would  behave,  the  Sahabah  forbade  them  from practising  them.

The  prominent  early  Hanafi  jurist  and  muhaddith,  Abu  Bakr  al-Jassas  al-Razi  (305  –  370 H),  comments  on  a  ruling  transmitted  from  the  founders  of  the  Hanafi  madhhab,  that  it  is  prohibited  to  fix  a  particular  chapter  of  the  Qur’an  to  a  particular  rak‘ah  of  prayer.  Since  his  explanation  is  both  lucid  and  instructive,  I  will  quote  its  translation: 

“Abu  Ja‘far  [al-Tahawi]  said:  It  is  makruh  (prohibitively  disliked)  to  adopt  a  part  of  the  Qur’an  for  a  specific  part  of  the  prayers.

“And  that  is  because  if  that  was  to  be  permitted,  it  would  not  be  assured  that  with  the passage  of  time  people  will  believe  it  is  sunnah  or  wajib ;  as  has  occurred  today  in  the understanding  of  many  of  the  ignorant  people  in  the  like  of  it,  so  when  the  recitation  of Surat  al-Jumu‘ah  is  left  out  on  the  night  of  Friday,  and  Alif  Lam  Mim  Tanzil  al-Sajdah  [is left  out]  on  the  day  of  Friday,  they  find  it  strange.  Thus,  the  people  of  knowledge  intended  to  preserve  the  religion  and  protect  it  from  adding  to  it  what  is  not  from  it .

“[This  is]  just  as  was  narrated  from  some  of  the  Salaf  [their]  hatred  of  fasting  six  days  of Shawwal  [consecutively,  immediately  after  Ramadan]  despite  what  is  narrated  in  hadith [of  its  desirability],  for  fear  that  persistence  on  it  will  be  a  cause  for  it  being  appended  to  the  obligatory  [fast  of  Ramadan].

“[And  it  is]  just  as  was  narrated  from  the  Prophet  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him peace)  that  it  is  prohibited  to  fast  on  Friday,  unless  [one  keeps  a  fast]  the  day  before  it,  and  unless  it  coincides  with  a day  one  of  us  used  to  fast  [anyway].” [Sharh Mukhtasar  al-Tahawi, 8:525-6]

Imam  al-Nawawi  was  asked  about  the  persistent  practice  of  some  people  of  reading Surat  al-An‘am  in  the  last  rak‘ah  of  Tarawih  on  the  seventh  night  of  Ramadan.  He replied:

“This  is  not  a  sunnah  but  a  detestable  bid‘ah  and  for  its  detestability  are  reasons:  from them  is  the  impression  of  it  being  sunnah …Thus,  every  worshipper  should  refrain  from this  practice  and  should  relay  its  condemnation,  for  indeed  it  is  established  in  authentic hadiths  that  newly-invented  matters  are  prohibited  and  that  every  bid‘ah  is  misguidance,  and  this  practice  has  not  been  transmitted  from  any  of  the  Salaf .” [Fatawa l-Imam al-Nawawi, 1:25-6]

In  this  section,  I  will  take  a  brief  look  –  in  light  of  the  principles  of  bid‘ah  outlined  above –  at  some  common  practices  about  which  people  are  unsure  whether  they  constitute  bid‘ah  or  not.  I hope  that  in  the  course  of  analysing  these  examples,  further  light  is  shed  on  some  important  principles  relating  to  bid‘ah,  specifically,  and  the  method  of  drawing  proof  from  the  Shari‘ah,  generally.  The  first  two  practices  are  examples  that  al-Shatibi  himself  addressed  in  quite  some  detail.  Although,  he  briefly  makes  mention  of  the  third  example,  he  does  not  elaborate  on  it  as  he  does  the  first  two.

Example One: Loud Group Dhikr in Unison
Al-Shatibi  discusses  the  practice  of  “loud  group  dhikr  in  unison”  which  is  basically  a congregational  recital  of  dhikr  in  one  voice.  Some  people  do  this  as  a  specific  ritual  practice,  i.e.  in  a  ta‘abbudi  way,  to  attain  reward  and  closeness  to  Allah.  My  purpose  here  is  not  to  give  an  unequivocal  ruling  on  this  practice  but  to  use  it  as  an  example  to  illustrate  faulty,  ambiguous  (mutashabih),  evidences  used  by  people  of  bid‘ah.

Some  argue  that  this  is  included  in  the  general  evidences  recommending  dhikr.  For example,  the  Qur’an  says:

“O  you  who  believe,  make  mention  of  Allah,  with  excessive  dhikr”  (33:41)   

“And  make  mention  of  Allah  much  so  that  you  are  successful.”  (8:45)

However,  al-Shatibi  explains  that  this  is  based  on  the  mistaken  assumption  that  the generality  of  a  word  implies  the  permissibility  of  everything  that  can  be  imagined  to  occur  from  its  meaning.  However,  this  is  not  the  case  in  matters  of  ritual.  In  brief,  this  form  of  evidence  attempts  to  put  in  practice  absolute  statements  (mutlaqat)  before  examining  their  restricted  application  as established  from  the  early  Muslims  (muqayyidat). [Al-I‘tisam 2:62]  

To  understand  the  invalidity  of  such  an  argument,  consider  the  following  example.  A  verse  of  the  Qur’an  states:

“O  you  who  believe!  Bow  down  in  ruku‘  and  in  prostration  and  worship  your  Lord.” (22:77)

Based  on  the  command  in  this  verse  to  bow  down,  can  one  deduce  the  recommendation  or  obligation  of  performing  stand-alone  ruku‘s  outside  of  Salah,  as  the  verse  gives  a  general  command  to  bow?  The  answer  is  that  this  is  precisely  the  mistaken  type  of  reasoning  explained  above,  as  in  such  ritualistic  matters  one  must  take  into  consideration  the  restricted  application  first before  applying  the  generalities.  Furthermore,  if  a  stand-alone  ruku‘  was  a  valid  interpretation  and  application  of  the  general  command  in  the  verse,  would  not  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  the  Sahabah  be  the  first  to  have  comprehended  this  meaning  and  acted  upon  it?  If  we  were  to  take  this  invalid  form  of  argumentation  to  its  extreme,  one  may  just  as  well  deduce  from the words  “worship  your  Lord”  any  form  of  ritual  worship,  like  yoga,  believing  that  this  a  fulfilment  of  this  command!  But,  of  course,  all  Muslims  recognise  that  this  is  incorrect.  The  reason  is  that  it  is  based  on  this  faulty  reasoning.

Thus,  in  ritual  acts,  it  is  wrong  to  approach  general  evidences  to  prove  specific  practices.  It  is  necessary  to  find  specific  evidence.  Hence,  in  this  case,  group  dhikr  in  unison  would not  be  bid‘ah  if  the  Prophet  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him peace)  and  Sahabah  performed  dhikr  in  this  way.  

The  above  was  an  analysis  of  what  would  not  count  as  proof  for  the  validity  of  this  practice.  If  it  was  established  that  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  Sahabah  did  engage  in  this  practice  of  performing  loud  group  dhikr  in  unison,  that  would  be  a  valid  support  for  believing  that  it  is  sunnah  and  not  bid‘ah.  There  are  some  authentic  hadiths  which  do  suggest  that  groups  of  Sahabah  did  dhikr.  A  hadith  in  Sahih  Muslim  for  example  states  that  angels  convey  the  news  of  “gatherings  of  dhikr”  in  which  the  people  are  saying  Allahu  akbar  and  subhan  Allah.  
However,  al-Shatibi  argues  that  this  hadith  and  those  like  it  are  ambiguous  as  they  do  not  clarify  whether  this  was  done  audibly  or  quietly,  in  unison  or  individually.  Thus,  it  may  easily  apply  to  what  was  known  to  be  a  common  practice  amongst the  Sahabah,  of  gathering  in  one  place  while  each  of  them  performed  individual  worship,  whether  recitation  of  Qur’an,  recitation  of  dhikr,  or  optional  prayer. [Al-I‘tisam 2:94-5]

Some  scholars  have,  however,  understood  the  meaning  of  loud  group  dhikr  in  unison  from this  hadith,  for  example  ‘Abd  al-Haqq  Muhaddith  Dihlawi. [See:  ‘Abd  al-Hayy  al-Laknawi,  Sibahat  al-Fikr  fi  l-Jahr  bi  l-Dhikr,  ed.  ‘Abd  al-Fattah  Abu Ghuddah, Dar al-Salam, pp. 63-66]

However,  for  lay  Muslims  it  is  advisable  to  follow  the  most  cautious  path,  based  on  the prophetic  advice:

“Leave  that  which  causes  you  to  doubt  for  that  which  does  not  cause  you  to  doubt.”

There  are  many  forms  of  dhikr  established  in  the  Sunnah,  like  reciting  tahlil,  takbir, tasbih,  tahmid,  hawqalah  and  other  litanies  which  may  be  practised  privately  and  inaudibly,  and  there  is  no  doubt  in  the  sunnah-status  of  this  practice. This  accepted  sunnah  can  easily  replace  the  forms  of  dhikr  in  which  there  is  doubt. [For  a  comprehensive  collection  of  dhikrs  established  from  the  Sunnah,  see  al-Adhkar  min  Kalam Sayyid al-Abrar  by  Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi]

Because  the  flipside  of  the  benefit  attained  from  performing  this  doubtful  form  of  dhikr  is  that  one  would  be  engaging  in  bid‘ah  haqiqiyyah  in  the  situation  that  this  was in  reality  not  a  practice  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  the  Sahabah,  the  danger  in  practising  it  far  outweighs  the  benefits  of  performing  it. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  above  discussion  applies  only  to  the  situation  in  which  loud  group  dhikr  in  unison  is  done  ritually  (ta‘abbudan),  as  a  formal  form  of  dhikr.  However,  some  Muslim  scholars  and  teachers  use  it  as  a  means  of  instruction,  as  loudly  reciting  some  forms  of  dhikr  together  is  a  useful  way  to  make  people  learn  certain  formulae.  If  done  in  this  way  there  is  no  harm  as  this  has  a  comprehensible  purpose  (ma‘qul  al-ma‘na)  and  is  adopted  as  a means.  Furthermore,  many  Sufi  disciplinarians  justify  their  use  of  this  practice  by  stating  that  it  is  a  means  to  improve  concentration  in  the  heart  of the  spiritual  novice,  so  as  to  achieve  a  state  of  remembrance  that  came  naturally  to  the  Sahabah  merely  by  accompanying  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him).  In  order  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  the  effect  of  that  companionship,  the  Sufi  teachers  prescribe  these  practices,  only  as  a  means. [Tasawwuf kiya hey pp. 17-26]

In  this  case,  too,  since  it  is  not  performed  ritualistically  but  as  a  means,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  bid‘ah.  

Example  Two:  Audible  Group  Du‘a  after  Salah
Another  practice  al-Shatibi  discusses  is  the  continuous  practice  of  group  du‘a  after  the obligatory  prayers.  In  the  case  of  group  du‘a  itself,  where  one  person  leads  the  congregation  in  du‘a  by  reciting  the  supplications  audibly  and  the  others  say  “amin,”  we  don’t  have  the  immediate  problem that  we  did  with  audible  group  dhikr  in  unison.  With  the  latter  there  is  a  question  over  its  very  existence  in  the  early  period.  However,  audible  group  du‘a  is  established  from  the  Salaf.  The  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  said:

“A  group  does  not  congregate,  one  of  them  supplicating  and  the  rest  of  them saying amin,  except  Allah  answers  them.” [Majma‘ al-Zawa’id, 10:267]

Shaykh  Muhammad  Yusuf  al-Kandhlewi  has  a  section  in  his  celebrated  Hayat  al-Sahabah devoted  to  the  instances  where  the  Sahabah  performed  group  du‘a. [see: Hayat  al-Sahabah,  Shaykh  Muhammad  Yusuf  Kandhlewi,  ed.  Bashshar  ‘Awwad  Ma‘ruf, Mu’assasat al-Risalah, 4:443-6]

Al-Shatibi  also  accepts  that  group  du‘a  in  general  is  approved.  [Al-I‘tisam 2:313]

The  issue  here,  however,  is  doing  it  perpetually  after  the  congregational  Salahs,  such  that  an  impression  is  created  that  it  is  sunnah  at  that  time  and  that  it  is  attached  to  these  prayers.  The  evidence  from  the  example  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be upon  him)  and  his  companions  shows  that  there  is  flexibility  (tawsi‘ah)  in  the  practice  of  group  du‘a.  Thus,  if  done  on  some  occasions  in  a  manner  that  does  not  give  the impression  of  it  being  restricted  to  a  specific  time  or  place,  this  would  faithfully  represent  an  adherence  to  the  evidence  of  this  flexibility.  However,  when  it  is  insisted  on  at  one  particular  time  without  proof,  the  general  evidence  does  not  support  the  practice.  Rather,  the  opposite  is  true  because  “insisting  on  matters  that  are  not  insisted  on  in  the  Shari‘ah,  its  nature  is  that  legislation  will  be  understood,  especially  with  those  taken  as  authorities  [i.e.  imams]  and  in  the  places  where  people  gather  like  masjids”  [Ibid. 2:59-60] 

Thus,  drawing  on  the  general  proofs  encouraging  group  du‘a  for  practising  it  specifically  after  Salah  is  a  type  of  faulty evidence  which  al-Shatibi  says  is  an  example  “distorting  the  proofs  from  their  places.”  [Ibid] 

The  general  encouragement  towards  group  du‘a  has  a particular  application  of  flexibility.  But  if  acted  upon  at  a  specific  time  and  place,  in  conjunction  with  a  particular  worship,  sticking  fervently  to  it  so  it  appears  as  if  a  desired  goal  in  the  Shari‘ah  (maqsud  bi  al-shar‘),  then  the  general  evidence  does  not  support  it.  This  is  what  al-Shatibi  says  is known  as  “two  different  applications”  (ikhtilaf  al-manatayn),  where  the  application  of  the  evidence  is  flexibility,  and  what  the  claimant  is  attempting  to  prove  –  i.e.  adopting  du‘a  after  Salah  audibly  for  the  attendees  always  just  as  sunnahs  are  performed  is  restricted  and  specified.  Thus,  the  evidence  is invalid.  This  practice  would  therefore  be  an  example  of  “relative  bid‘ah.” [Ibid.  2:262]

One  person  in  al-Shatibi’s  time  who  was  in  favour  of  perpetual  group  du‘a  after  the  obligatory  prayers  argued  that  there  is  no  prohibition  of  group  du‘a,  and  there  is  general  encouragement  towards  it,  and  the  omission  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  Sahabah  of  this  practice  specifically  after  the  prayers  is  not  a  proof  of  its  detestability.  Al-Shatibi  replies  that  the  person  is  right  that  there  is  no  prohibition  of  group  du‘a  and  there  is  general  encouragement  towards  it,  which is  why  he  says  if  done  occasionally  after  the  obligatory  prayers  there  is  no  problem  as  this  would  fall  under  the  general  recommendation.  But  if  done  perpetually  it  will  give  the  impression  to  laypeople  that  it  is  a  sunnah  at that  particular  time  which  is  a  ritualistic  (ta‘abbudi)  restriction.  Thus,  it  falls  under  bid‘ah  idafiyyah.

Furthermore,  with  respect  to  the  omission  of  the  early  generations,  al-Shatibi  explains that  there  is  detail  to  this  with  respect  to  ritualistic  matters  that  were  omitted  by  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  Sahabah.  In  such  scenarios,  there  are  two  possibilities:

1.  There  was  no  stimulant  (ma‘na muqtadi  lahu)  in  the  time  of  the  Prophet  (peace  be upon  him)  for  determining  that  ritualistic  ruling.  For  example,  as  was  mentioned  earlier  the  shares  of  inheritance  fixed  for  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  are  ritualistic  (ta‘abbudi)  in  Islam.  However,  there  is  a  particular  scenario  in  which  only  the grandfather  of  the  deceased  and  his  brothers  remain,  which  was  not  addressed  by  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  because  there  was  no  need  to  address  this  scenario  at  the  time.  Thus,  the  Sahabah  and  the  later  scholars  issued  a  ruling  on  this  scenario  based  on  the  general  patterns  they  saw  in  the  rules  of  inheritance.  Such  an  innovation  in  ritualistic  matters  is  allowed  as  it  is  based  on  a  new  circumstance  which  the  Shari‘ah  needs  to  address.

2.  The  stimulant  was  present,  yet  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  and  the  Sahabah  did  not  endorse  it  or  practise  it.  This  is  equivalent  to  the  Shari‘ah  purposely  choosing  to  restrict  that  action  within  those  limits.  Thus  any  change  would  be  bid‘ah. [Al-I‘tisam, 2:263-5]

It  is  in  this  vein  that  al-Shafi‘i  said,  as  mentioned  earlier,  “we  follow  the  sunnah,  both  in performance  and  in  omission.”  Similarly,  Mulla  ‘Ali  al-Qari  said:   

“Adherence  –  just  as  it  is  in  performance,  it  is  in  omission  too  –  so  whoever  persists [ritualistically]  on  a  practice  the  lawgiver  did  not do,  he  is  an  innovator.”  [Mirqat al-Mafatih Sharh Mishkat al-Masabih, 1:94-5]

For  example,  some  people  in  the  time  of  al-Shatibi  argued  that  group  du‘a  is  more  likely to  be  accepted  as  mentioned  in  hadith,  and  this  can  be  combined  with  the  general recommendation  of  du‘a  after  Salah,  and  thus  it  is  argued  group  du‘a  should  be  practised after  Salah.  It  is  precisely  this  thinking  in  ritualistic  matters  that  makes  it  bid‘ah  as  this reason  was  present  in  the  early  period  and  the  Sahabah  would  be  more  deserving  of comprehending  it  and  being  the  first to  act  upon  it. [Al-I‘tisam 2, p. 267 & 274]

Example Three: The Annual  Mawlid Celebration on Rabi‘  al-Awwal
Al-Shatibi  discusses  many  examples  of  bid‘ah  idafiyyah  that  he  says  are  close  to  bid‘ah  haqiqiyya,  like  inventing  an  Adhan  and  Iqamah  for  the  ‘Id  prayers.  He  also  answers  the  question  of  ‘Uthman’s  (may  Allah  be  pleased  with  him)  introduction  of  a  second  Adhan  for  Jumu‘ah.  The  basic  reply  is  that  before  ‘Uthman’s  time,  the  Adhan  was  called  immediately  before  the  sermon.  Although  this  was  sufficient  when  the  Muslims  were  small  in  number,  as  the  population  grew  in  ‘Uthman’s  time,  an  earlier  call  to  prayer  was  required.  Thus  he  patterned  Jumu‘ah  after  the  normal  prayers  where  Adhan  was  called  at  its  start  time,  and  maintained  the  later  Adhan  established  from  the  Sunnah.  Thus,  this  was  an  addition  due  to  changing  circumstances  that  called  for  a  reasoned  response. Furthermore,  the  practices  of  the  early  caliphs  form  part  of  the  Sunnah  as  explicitly mentioned  in  hadith,  so  by  definition,  it  cannot  be  bid‘ah  in  its  Shar‘i  meaning.  [Al-I‘tisam 2:305]

Another  type  of  bid‘ah  idafiyyah  al-Shatibi  discusses  is  what  is  called  taqyid  al-mutlaq (restricting  the  absolute).  For  example,  a  person  selects  a  day  of  the  week,  say  Wednesday,  or  a  date  of  the  month,  like  the  23rd,  which  has  not  been  specified  in  the  Shari‘ah,  and  then  begins  to  always  fast  on  those  days,  not  because  the  person  has  more  energy  (nashat)  or  free-time  (faragh)  or  due  to  convenience  (wifaq),  but  only  due  to  resolve,  planning  and  determination  (tasmim).  This  is  different  from a  person  who  has  a  daily  habit  of  awrad  or  optional  worship,  as  this  is  based  on  convenience,  and  not  ultimately  on  determination  and  planning.  Taqyid  al-mutlaq  is  a form  of  relative  bid‘ah. [Ibid. 2:293-4]

Although  al-Shatibi  does  not  present  it  as  an  example  of  this  particular  principle,  the annual  mawlid  celebration  performed  in  the  month  of  Rabi‘  al-Awwal  is  an  example  of taqyid  al-mutlaq.  Remembering  the  birth  of  the  Prophet  (peace  and  blessings  be  upon  him)  just  as  remembering  any  aspect  of  his  life  is  praiseworthy  and  beneficial,  but  when  it  is  done  permanently  on  a  particular  day of  the  year  without  any  non-ritualistic  or  comprehensible  (‘adi)  basis,  it  very  easily  creates  the  impression  that  that  particular  day  is  superior  for  this  practice,  but  there  is  no  proof  for  this  from  the  sources  of  the  Shari‘ah  or  the  example  of  the  early  generations.  Thus,  if  it  is  performed  in  this  way  without  any  particular  belief  attached  to  it,  it  would  be  a  relative  bid‘ah  (bid‘ah  idafiyyah).  However,  in  the  case  of  the  annual  mawlid  celebration,  the  fear  of  it  being  ritualised  has  actually  been  realised,  and  many  Muslims  in  fact  believe  that  a  particular  day  or  month  of  the  year  is  religiously  superior  to  any  other  time  for  that  remembrance.  Many  Muslims  adopt  it  literally  as  a  formal  religious  festival  or  “‘Id,”  which  is  why  al-Shatibi  included  “adopting the  day  of  the  prophetic  birth  as  an  ‘Id”  amongst  a  number  of  actions  he  listed  as  examples  of  bid‘ah  in  al-I‘tisam. [see: al-I‘tisam 1:46] 

He  also  said  in  his  collection  of  fatwas: 

“Establishing  the  mawlid  in  the  way  that  is  customary  amongst the  people  is  an  innovated  bid‘ah  and  every  bid‘ah  is  misguidance.” [Al-Mi‘yar  al-Mu‘rib, 7:102-3]

The  reason  he  adds  “in  the  way  that  is  customary  amongst the  people”  is  that  if  the restrictions  customarily  bound  to  the  mawlid  celebration,  like  the  date,  were  removed,  and  it  consisted  only  of  a remembrance  of  the  prophetic  biography  or  the  prophetic  birth,  this  would  certainly  not  be  an  innovation  in  religion.  Many  Muslims  actually  believe  that  since  he  was  born  on  a  particular  day  of  Rabi‘  al-Awwal,  it  is  better  and  preferable  to  do  this  remembrance  on  this  day of  Rabi‘.  This  would  make  the  act  for  those  Muslims  bid‘ah haqiqiyyah  as  the  stimulant  for  this  practice  (ma‘na muqtadi  lahu)  was  present  in  the time  of  the  Sahabah.  Thus  the  implication  of  this  reasoning  is  that  the  Sahabah  failed  to recognise  the  virtue  of  that  day,  and  the  reward  of  recollecting  the  birth  on  that  date,  and  the  later  people  were  able  to  comprehend  that  virtue.  And  this  is  absurd.  

I  will  end  with  a  quote  on  this  issue  from a  Maliki  contemporary  of  al-Shatibi,  Abu  ‘Abd Allah  al-Haffar  (d.  811  H).  As  the  passage  is  long,  I will  avoid  quoting  the  Arabic  text.  At  one  point  in  his  statement,  al-Haffar  errs  in  his  reasoning,  which  I  hope  readers  will  now be  able  to  appreciate.  (I  will  highlight  the  error  in  an  end-note.)  Al-Haffar  writes:

“The  pious  predecessors,  and  they  are  the  companions  of  the  Messenger  of  Allah  (Allah bless  him  and  grant  him  peace)  and  their  successors,  would  not  congregate  on  the  night  of  mawlid  for  worship,  and  they  would  not  practise  more  therein  than  the  rest of  the nights  of  the  year  because  the  Prophet  (Allah  bless  him  and  grant  him  peace)  is  not  to  be venerated  except  in  a  way  his  veneration  has  been  legislated. [This  is  where  al-Haffar  slips,  as  “veneration”  or  “respect”  is  a  comprehensible  (‘adi)  matter,  and  is  not  ritualistic  (ta‘abbudi).  People  may  demonstrate  their  respect,  adoration  and  love  for  the  Prophet  (peace  be  upon  him)  in  different  ways.  Yes,  if  this  matter  is  performed  in  such  a  way  that  a  ritualistic  restriction  is  clearly  understood  or  a  ritualistic  restriction  is  actually  believed,  as  is  the  case  with  the  annual  mawlid  celebration,  that  is  when  it  is  no  longer  ‘adi  and  becomes  an  addition  into  religion.  This  is  similar  to  the  example  of  sadaqah  discussed  earlier.  The  valid  points  to  take   from  al-Haffar’s  statement  are  what  he  continues  to  say,  “The  proof  that  the  Salaf…”] 

His  veneration  is  from  the  greatest  of  nearing  acts  to  Allah,  but  nearness  is  sought  to  Allah  (Great  is  His  Majesty)  only  by  what  is  legislated.  The  proof  that  the  Salaf  would  not add  therein  anything  extra  to  the  rest of  the  nights  is  that  they  differed  over  it  [i.e.  the  date  of  his  birth].  It  was  said  that  he  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him peace)  was  born  in  Ramadan  and  it  was  said  in  Rabi‘,  and  the  day  [of  Rabi‘]  in  which  he  was  born  has  been  disputed  according  to  four  opinions.  Hence,  if  worship  was  established  in  the  night  of  the  day  in  which  he  was  born  due  to  the  birth  of  the  best  of  creation  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him peace),  that  would  indeed  be  known  and  famous,  and  no  disagreement  would  arise  therein.  However,  an  excess  in  veneration  has  not  been  legislated.  Do  you  not  see  that  Friday  is  the  best day  on  which  the  sun  rose,  and  the  best  that  is  done  on  a  virtuous  day  is  fasting,  yet  the  Prophet  (Allah  bless  him and  grant  him  peace)  forbade  fasting  on  Friday  despite  its  great  excellence?  This  proves  that  no  worship  is  to  be  established  in  a  time  or  place  unless  it  is  legislated  and  what  is  not  legislated  is  not  to  be  done,  since  the  latter  part  of  this  ummah  will  not  bring  greater  guidance  than  what  the  first part  of  it  brought.  And  if  this  door  was  to  be  opened,  a  group  will  indeed  come  and  say  the  day  of  his  migration  to  Madinah  was  a  day  in  which  Allah  honoured  Islam  so  congregate  in  it  and  worship,  and  others  will  say  the  night  in  which  he  was  taken  on  a  night  journey  he  acquired  glory  the  extent  of  which  cannot  be  imagined  so  worship  is  to  be  established  therein.  This  will  not  stop  at  a limit.  All  good  is  in  following  the  pious  Salaf,  for  which  Allah  chose  them.  Thus,  what  they  did,  we  do,  and  what  they  left,  we  leave.  Once  this  is  established,  it  is  apparent  that  to  congregate  on  this  night  is  not  required  in  the  Shari‘ah. Rather,  one  is  ordered  to  leave  it.”  [Al-Mi‘yar  al-Mu‘rib,  7:99-100]

Also Read: The Concept of Bid’ah – Between the Two Extremes